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
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IMPERIAL DEFENCE,

BY

LIEUT.-COL.

SIR GEORGE S. CLARKE,

K.C.M.G., F.R.S.

BRITISH AFRICA INDIA CANADA AUSTRALASIA WEST INDIES

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TO
THE QUEEN EMPRESS,
BY
HER MAJESTY'S
MOST GRACIOUS PERMISSION,
THIS BOOK IS
HUMBLY DEDICATED.

PREFACE.

THE historian of the future will point to the Victorian era as marking a true epoch in the onward progress of the Empire. Territorial expansion on a vast scale, a stupendous development of commerce, a growth of population combined with material prosperity unapproached in any other period of sixty years—these are among the achievements of the wonderful reign of Her Majesty.

Internally, the United Kingdom has attained to a measure of political consolidation previously unknown. Divisions on domestic questions remain, but great rifts no longer exist. In all Europe to-day there is no people more united. We have half forgotten that this union is a plant of comparatively recent growth, and that political discord weakened England during the most critical periods of her history. Only a century ago, Carnot, organiser of victory, based his plans of invasion upon the probability of a rising of Englishmen

Empire, to which every member can contribute moral and material strength—an Empire unaggressive but able to guard its rights—has everywhere gained ground. Events have clearly shown the dangers of disunion, and both at home and in the Colonies, writers and speakers have striven to point the moral. The 60th year of Her Majesty's beneficent reign finds the nation united in loyalty to the Crown and in determination to uphold its honour. When the historian comes to trace the causes of this drawing together of the British people, he cannot fail to recognise the all-important part played by the Queen's personality. No Sovereign has been so well and so deservedly beloved, and it is impossible to estimate the extent of the influence thus transmitted throughout the length and breadth of the Empire. The Crown—during many years of our history a cause of disunion—is now the fitting symbol of true union. Thus the great occasion, which we are preparing to celebrate, possesses a deep national significance, and the gathering of representatives from every part of the Dominions of the Queen may be made the means of strengthening

the bonds of sympathy and of mutual support which link the scattered members of our race.

In the following pages I have striven to show what the Empire is, and how it has been built up, to point out alike its immense potential strength and its points of weakness, to lay down definite principles of defence, based on the experience of great wars and to plead for an organisation in harmony with such principles. We are responsible for the security of a splendid structure, the inheritance derived from centuries of storm and stress. If anything in the world is worth maintaining, it is the Empire, as we now understand the word. Of Great Britain, an eminent American has justly stated: "Wherever her sovereignty has gone, two blades of grass have grown where one grew before. Her flag, wherever it has been advanced, has benefitted the country over which it floats, and has carried with it civilisation, the Christian religion, order, justice, and prosperity. England has always treated a conquered race with justice, and what under her rule is the law for the white man is the law for his black, red, or yellow

brothers." Such, in the view of a disinterested observer has been the part played by the British Empire, in the evolution of the world, and the stigma which, handed down from the past, has attached to the word "Imperial" disappears before so striking a record of service rendered to progress and humanity. It may be said with truth that the disruption of the British Empire would be a universal calamity, that there would be nothing to fill the void, and that the duty of maintaining the national integrity rests on higher grounds than our own interests.

Patriotism, strong race sentiment, and loyalty to a common cause are factors of the utmost importance in war, but they can never compensate for want of preparation. The great mass of the French population in 1870-71, showed a devotion which has rarely been equalled; the cheerful endurance of the people of Paris during the ever-increasing privations of the blockade was above praise; new armies sprang into existence in quick response to the call of Gambetta. All was unavailing. There were men, arms, and fighting spirit enough to have saved France, if the organisa-

tion necessary to enable her resources to be brought to bear upon the national emergency had not been wanting. In the bitter cry: "Nous sommes trahis," there was an element of truth. Even a compact people like the French cannot organise itself for war; much less can scattered communities, preoccupied with domestic affairs, undertake the solution of a great national problem. The impulse and the guiding must be supplied by the political leaders.

I have sought, therefore, to indicate the conditions of our national problem, and to point out the road towards a solution. It would be useless to present a complete and detailed scheme; nor is any rigid form of organisation either possible or desirable. All that can now be done is to constitute machinery for the local consideration of questions of defence, for ensuring that preparations are made to meet all reasonably probable contingencies, for drawing the Colonies together in groups, and binding the groups to the Mother Country, with a view to mutual support, and for recording and diffusing much needed information. The Empire can be effectively defended only as a whole, and its

measures of preparation should embrace every member. Each can take some part in the work, however small its resources, and co-operation in a great national cause must tend to deepen the sense of interdependence which is a powerful factor in creating a true union. I venture to think that the means I have suggested would gradually but surely lead to the creation of a general scheme of defence based upon great principles, harmonious and consistent.

Although throughout this book I have necessarily dwelt upon the naval and military aspects of Imperial defence, I am deeply conscious that other and wider considerations are involved. The strength of a Navy or an Army is derived from the vigour, the constancy, and the self-sacrifice of the nation at its back. Upon great moral qualities the security of a State must ultimately depend. For more than eighty years Great Britain has not known the real stress of war, and the next struggle will be fought out under conditions which can have no exact parallel in the past. That the Mother Country, as well as the young communities which have sprung up across the seas will, at a

time of need, show the same fortitude, tenacity of purpose, and endurance that were strikingly manifested at the beginning of the century, is my firm belief. The potential strength of the Empire is absolutely and relatively far greater now than at the outbreak of the War of the French Revolution; but the effective realisation of that strength in the event of a great emergency must depend mainly upon national unity and organisation. United and prepared, we should be able to face the unknown future without misgiving. In the earnest hope of strengthening the ties which bind the scattered dominions of the Queen, and of stimulating ordered and combined effort for the defence of our splendid inheritance, this book has been written.

London : April, 1897.

NOTE.—My best thanks are due to the Hon. T. A. BRASSEY, for permitting the reproduction of three diagrams from the *Naval Annual*; and to Mr. FRANCIS GEORGE HEATH for voluntarily undertaking the task of compiling a full Index.

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ILLUSTRATIONS.

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ERRATA.

Page x. (Preface), line 17 from top—for “disunion” read “division.”

Page 12, line 17 from top—for “1840” read “1740.”

Page 23, lines 8 and 9 — for “21st October” read “1st August.”

Page 119, line 18—for “Eight” read “Eighteen.”


Page 128, Table M., last line—for “50” (Russian Torpedo Boats) read “74.”

OF THE EMPIRE CAN THIS BE EXACTLY SAID; BUT EXPANSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRINCIPLES DELIBERATELY FIXED

IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

PART I.

THE EMPIRE.

N Empire built up by deliberate design, in pursuance of a defined and continuous policy, would escape the difficulties by which we are now confronted. Each fresh annexation would be made for an object previously considered; each new off-shoot would start its political life under conditions laid down with an eye to the defensive strength of the whole. The general principles by which the fabric could be held together under the strain of war having been formulated and consistently upheld, the requirements of Imperial defence would be met as they arose, and power to resist aggression would steadily grow in proportion to the national development.

Of no Empire can this be exactly said; but expansion in accordance with principles deliberately fixed

has received remarkable illustrations. The Romans unquestionably grasped the idea of Imperial defence, as it presented itself in their day, and long made it the basis of their policy. On the other hand, the Greeks failed in certainty of purpose, and their Colonies tended to become rival states frequently at war with each other or with the Mother Country. Germany and Russia, in our own day, have expanded in obedience to deliberate design cherished and actively promoted by their respective dynasties. To both, territorial aggrandisement has consequently brought accession of strength. The founders of the United States devised a constitution under which a vast territory has been gradually settled, successive additions bringing direct increase of wealth and power. But for the disturbing element introduced by the slave system, it is probable that smooth and unchecked development would have resulted.*

In the creation of the British Empire, design has been conspicuously absent. The process has followed

* Whether the present constitution of the United States will stand the strain which before long will be thrown upon it, appears doubtful.

the general laws of evolution. Here and there a great statesman may have marked and sought to guide the swift onward progress, or may have pondered as to how the inevitable requirements of the future were to be met. Great wars have forcibly directed attention to the strategic importance of particular points, and have left their impress upon the national policy; but the lessons were not all applied, and the re-adjustments, which followed upon long contests in which Great Britain played a leading part, do not always show either clear purpose or adequate foresight. The incentive to expansion appears to have been supplied and sustained mainly by commercial rivalry, impelling forward a race which cherishes a strong aversion to militarism. It is natural that questions of Imperial defence should have been neglected. Wherever profitable trade was capable of being established, wherever a new territory appeared suited to the colonizing proclivities of the Anglo-Saxon, there must the flag be planted. How it was to be maintained, how the new acquisition would act and re-act upon the national strength, were matters easily overlooked.

To this strong impulse of commercial rivalry, the late Sir J. Seeley, ably traced the real origin of a long series of great wars, which shattered the older systems of Portugal, Spain, Holland, and France, and left Great Britain pre-eminent as a Colonial power. Since 1815, the process of extension has steadily advanced, no longer, however, at the expense of rival commercial Powers. The one European war in which we have been involved was inspired by fears for the security of our communications with the East, and of the numerous minor struggles, extending down to the recent conflict in Rhodesia, expansion for commercial purposes has been either the direct motive or the indirect occasion.

Thus has grown up an Empire spread over the whole world, capricious in its distribution, largely heterogeneous in its elements, diverse in its political and economic conditions. An island Continent ruled by five mutually independent administrations; a vast Asiatic territory, won and held by military force, and now marching with Russia, China, and perhaps France; a great portion of North America, with three thousand

miles of frontier shared by a nation of seventy millions of English-speaking people; a group of progressive Colonies in South Africa, with huge spheres and protectorates scarcely explored; isolated stations in all lands, from Gibraltar carved out of Spain, to Kowloon marked off from China; islands in every sea, from the great fortress of Malta to Fanning in the centre of the Pacific—such are the territorial elements of Greater Britain. Of forms of government there is an ascending chain from remote Tristan d'Acunha, which appears to take care of itself, through Crown systems varying in type, to Canada with virtual independence. A population of more than 360 millions dwells under the flag, which also covers an annual sea-borne trade of about 970 millions sterling.*

Such an Empire finds no parallel in history. "The Romans," writes Sir A. Lyall,† "once united under an extensive dominion a number of subject provinces, client kingdoms, protected allies, races and tribes, by

* The total value of the maritime interests of the Empire is, however, far greater. [See page 50.]

† *The Rise of the British Dominion in India.*

a system of conquest. . . . But the Roman dominions were compact and well knit together by solid communications." The modern Empire of Germany is compact in territory as in race and climatic conditions. Russia is swiftly building up a vast Asiatic dominion, but is proceeding with deliberate purpose and a clear view to defensive requirements. "With the Roman, Russian, and all other historical Empires, the mass of their territory has been acquired by advancing step by step from the central starting-point, making one foothold sure before another was taken, firmly placing one arch of the viaduct before another was thrown out, allowing no interruption of territorial coherence from the centre to the circumference." With us, the process has differed absolutely, and security for the future has not been the main or even a principal object sought after. Our expansion has followed more nearly the methods of Athens, Portugal, Holland, and Spain,* which led to disruption and disaster. The Colonial systems of the first and last of these Powers

* All were Continental States ; but Athens in regard to the Persian invasion of 450-479 B.C. may, perhaps be, regarded as an island.

fell by reason of the overthrow of their sea-power; those of the second and third on account of failure to maintain their home territory against overland invasion. No island Power except England has ever yet won a maritime Empire; the future of Japan, a State which offers striking analogies of conditions and of history to our own, remains to be determined. Herein lie historical lessons of vital import.

The expansion of England, unlike that of Rome, of Russia, and the United States, has taken place *by the sea alone*. Although, as Captain Mahan has clearly shown, the Romans, in their great contest with Carthage, owed everything to the command of the Mediterranean, their territorial extension was not, as ours has been, limited solely to regions approached by sea, nor were the communications between the Mother Country and the outlying members maritime alone. Shorn of her transmarine possessions, Rome might still have remained a great Power, as is Germany to-day, as would be France without Algeria, Tunis, Cochin China, or Madagascar. The consolidation of purely military strength throughout a large area, even if

compact, was, however, far more difficult in the times of the Romans than in our own.

It is her Colonial Empire alone which confers upon Great Britain pre-eminence among modern States. To France, Germany and Spain, Colonies are appendages bringing no access of wealth or of political strength, and in many cases entailing large expenditure. They are not real outlets for surplus population, of which France at least has no need. The number of French and of German Colonists who dwell under their respective flags is trivial. Spain is now engaged in an exhausting struggle with revolted Colonies. Holland has expended millions in a protracted and hitherto unsuccessful attempt to subdue Sumatra. To Great Britain, on the other hand, her Colonies are vital. Of a total British population of about 50,000,000, fully one-fifth finds a home abroad. Of the total public revenue and debt of the Empire, about one-half in each case belongs to the Colonies and India.*

* The figures for 1893 according to the *Colonial Office List* for 1895, are:—Total Revenue of Empire £197,402,635; Total Revenue of United Kingdom £91,133,410; Total Debt of Empire £1,156,191,846; Total Debt of United Kingdom £664,163,141.

Of about 11,000,000 square miles ruled by the Queen, Great Britain and Ireland do not greatly exceed the one hundredth portion. The British nation is thus distributed over scattered territories linked by the sea alone, and the United Kingdom to-day is not the sole centre of wealth and of energy.

The difference between our Empire and all others is complete and absolute. There is no longer any question of degree — of Colonial systems admitting of numerical comparisons — but of new conditions unparalleled either in the ancient or the modern history of the world.

The national instincts and aptitudes which have contributed to this marvellous development lie deep in the curiously composite origin of the British race. They may be traced back to the days of the Saxon Kings; they played an important part in the early rivalry of France and England. The first great impetus to Colonial expansion was, however, given in the reign of Elizabeth. The overthrow of the Armada is frequently regarded as the mere defeat of a projected invasion. In reality it was the commencement

of a new era, revealing to the mind of the nation a long vista of splendid possibilities, and pointing out the way to their realization. Acute internal dissensions, civil wars, and revolutions served to retard the accomplishment of the visions of the seamen of Elizabeth; but the patent for the colonization of Virginia granted to Raleigh in 1584 marks a turning point in the national history.

The Spanish and French wars of Charles I. were abortive; but Cromwell's Spanish war led to the important capture of Jamaica in 1655, and the purely naval war with Holland (1652—54), proved disastrous to the Dutch. On the other hand the first Dutch war of Charles II. (1664—67), opened with the capture of Goree and New York, but ended in national disgrace, and the second (1672—74), brought no real advantage. During this reign, however, Antigua, Montserrat, and St. Kitts, were obtained by treaty with France, who received Nova Scotia, while the settlements of Tangier (abandoned in 1683) and Bombay became British possessions as part of the dowry of Queen Catharine.

The French war, imported into England by William III., did not advance Colonial expansion and was generally unsuccessful. Invasion although planned by a deposed English King in secret concert with the greatest of English generals and a traitorous faction, was averted by an inadequate fleet.

In the war of the Spanish Succession (1702—13) effort was principally directed to military operations on the Continent and Marlborough led composite armies to victory on the Upper Danube and in Flanders. Meanwhile, Rooke raided Vigo, captured Gibraltar, and won the important battle of Malaga, securing the command of the Mediterranean. The expedition against Quebec ended in disastrous failure.

Gibraltar, Minorca, Hudson's Bay, Nova Scotia, and the Island of St. Christopher were confirmed to England by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, together with Newfoundland, saddled with conditions, which were perpetuated in subsequent settlements, and stand to this day as a blot on the Imperial escutcheon.

The Triple Alliance of 1717 formed with the innocent object of maintaining the Treaty of Utrecht, became

the Quadruple Alliance of 1718, which by the embroilment of Austria and Spain, involved England in a war with the latter Power. Byng won a great naval victory off Cape Passaro; Gibraltar was hopelessly besieged by the Spaniards; Vigo was again effectually raided; and a futile Spanish expedition was despatched to Scotland in aid of the Pretender. By a turn of the European kaleidoscope, Austria and Spain became closely allied through the Treaty of Vienna, to which Catharine I. was favourably disposed, and an English fleet entered the Baltic as a menace to Russia. The only foreign war of George I. added nothing to our Colonial possessions, and the union of Hanover with the British Crown brought no national advantage. The expansion of England could not take the form of Continental dominion.

In the war of the Austrian Succession (1740—48) which was superimposed upon the Spanish war commencing in 1739, the military operations on the Continent, generally unsuccessful after Dettingen, were hampered by the rebellion of the Young Pretender. Anson off Finisterre and Hawke off Belleisle won

great naval victories, and Louisburg was captured; but, under the Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle in 1748, the acquisitions of France and England were mutually restored.

Throughout this series of wars, expansion by conquest made slow progress. It was a period of political and religious dissensions, unfavourable to distant enterprises. A united people had not yet emerged from the storm of Civil War, and until after the battle of Culloden in 1746 the dynastic division bequeathed by the Revolution was not laid to rest. It was not a united England which confronted the might of Spain in 1588 and triumphed over the Dutch in 1653; it was an even less united England which opposed Louis XIV.

The idea of naval supremacy, which fired the imagination of the seamen of Elizabeth and stands deeply graven in the writings of Raleigh and of Bacon, cannot be distinctly traced in the national policy. The national resources were frequently strained by military operations on the Continent, which brought small advantage, and except under the brilliant leadership of

Marlborough, were frequently unsuccessful. Neglect of the Navy enabled a Dutch fleet to sail up the Thames and Medway in 1667. In 1690, the French were allowed to be superior in the Channel; but Torrington's squadron, wisely and skilfully withheld from a decisive action, sufficed to avert a projected invasion. In 1692 the situation was restored by the great victory of La Hogue, and in 1694, 1695, and 1696, the weight of the British Navy was heavily felt upon the coasts of France. Dissension at home was, perhaps, reflected in the fleet; since, both in 1702* and in 1744† the certainty of inflicting heavy defeats upon the French was lost by the disloyalty of British officers. Throughout this period, however, there were no real naval disasters. The starving of the Navy entailed disgrace, loss, or grave risk; but so soon as the national resources were again brought to bear upon the sea, naval success followed.

* Benbow's action with Du Casse. 20th to 22nd August, in West Indian waters.

† Matthews and Lestock opposed to a Franco-Spanish squadron, 8th and 11th February, off Toulon.

The Seven Years' War which broke out in 1756 was directly due to the growing rivalry of France and England for Colonial dominion. Naval unpreparedness again entailed its inevitable results, and the contest opened with the loss of Minorca which it was hoped to relieve with an ill-equipped fleet. The military operations on the Continent in 1757 proved most unsuccessful; but Clive at Plassey laid the foundation of British rule in India. In the same year the conduct of the wars fell into the hands of Pitt, and the Navy having been strengthened, a vigorous impulse was imparted to the national policy. In 1758, Senegal and Goree were captured; Rochefort was raided and the docks of Cherbourg destroyed; in both East and West Indian waters, the Navy well held its own. In 1759, a French project of invasion resembling that of 1805 was shattered by Hawke in Quiberon Bay, the victory being as decisive and as momentous as Trafalgar. With the fall of Quebec the French cause in Canada was lost, and the capitulation of Montreal in 1760 secured North America to the Anglo-Saxon race, while Eyre Coote's victory

of Wandewash effectually checked French designs in the Carnatic. In 1761, Belleisle, Dominica and Pondicherry were captured. In January, 1762, Spain declared war, too late to be of any service to her French allies. Martinique was taken, and Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent surrendered. Havana and Manilla fell to expeditionary forces, and England, in full command of the sea, could have stripped her enemies of all their foreign possessions. By the Treaty of Paris in 1763, Canada, Nova Scotia, Cape Breton, Tobago, Dominica, St. Vincent, Grenada, and Senegal were ceded to England, and Florida, together with the rights of log cutting in Honduras, was accepted in unequal exchange for Havana and the Philipine Islands.

The sea power of England had been frequently asserted before the Seven Years' War; but never had the results been so far-reaching. It is Pitt's lasting distinction to have realized the "tremendous weapon" which lay ready to his hand and, to have struck heavy blows across the world. The conquest of Canada, the ruin of the French cause in America,

and its partial destruction in India, mark a real turning point in the history of the Empire.

In the twelve years of peace which followed the Seven Years' War, trade flourished, and the American Colonies, freed by the great efforts of the Mother Country from all French rivalry, prospered exceedingly. The triumph of the British Navy had given a new impulse to discovery, and the voyages of Cook, Byron, Wallis and Carteret, opened out fresh fields of geographical knowledge. Nelson, as a boy of 14, took part in a Polar expedition and prided himself on the command of a four-oared cutter.

In 1775, the revolt of the American Colonies, brought about by gross impolicy, involved England in a war which assumed unprecedented dimensions. France, in 1778, Spain in 1779, Holland in 1780, were added to the roll of our enemies; while Russia Sweden and Denmark, subsequently reinforced by Prussia and other Powers, formed a menacing alliance of "armed neutrality." In India, war with the Marathas and with the formidable power of Hyder Ali of Mysore, contributed to the full tide of the national difficulties.

War found this country, as usual, almost unprepared, the 70,000 seamen and marines voted by Parliament in 1761 had dwindled to 20,000 in 1774, the 65,000 troops to 18,000. Military effort was mainly concentrated upon America with general insuccess and ultimate failure. The Navy, numerically far inferior to those of the allies, and hampered by grave responsibilities for the periodical relief of Gibraltar, was heavily overweighted. In 1779, 46 ships of the line confronted d'Orvillier's fleet of 66 in the Channel, and invasion was regarded as imminent. Naval defeat alone was needed to bring about national disaster; but happily for the future of the Empire, this condition was wanting. D'Estaing, discovered by Howe in Narraganset Bay, avoided a general engagement and narrowly escaped capture, to be roughly handled by Byron off Grenada in the following year. In 1780, Rodney dealt a crushing blow to de Langara off Cape St. Vincent, and subsequently fought an indecisive action with de Guichen. In 1781, Parker, with an inferior force defeated the Dutch off the Dogger Bank, and both off Martinique and the Chesapeake, the

British Navy foiled the projects of de Grasse. On the 12th April, 1782, Rodney won a splendid victory over his great opponent by which Jamaica was saved and the naval supremacy of Great Britain was at length asserted. Meanwhile in the East, Suffren, one of the most brilliant of French admirals, captured Trincomalee, but was unable, in five remarkable actions, to obtain any advantage over the inferior squadron of Sir E. Hughes. Minorca, Dominica and Grenada were lost; but Gibraltar, St. Lucia and Jamaica had been saved, and numerical inferiority alone prevented the British Navy from earlier asserting its rightful supremacy. The tremendous strain of the war in North America, reacting heavily upon the sea power of Great Britain, preserved the allies from certain defeat. On the sea, by the fleets of France, Spain and Holland, the independence of the American Colonies was won.

By the Treaty of Versailles, in 1783, Tobago and St. Lucia, Senegal and Goree, Chandernagore, Pondicherry, and other settlements were restored to France; Minorca and Florida to Spain. Dominica, Grenada

and other islands returned to British rule, and Negapatam was ceded by Holland. By the loss of the North American Colonies, the expansion of the Empire received a temporary check; but the result has been distinctly advantageous alike to the separated Colonies and the Mother Country. It is the manner in which the separation was effected that alone cast a dark shadow, not yet removed, across the onward path of the Anglo-Saxon race. If, however, the War of Independence had been marked by naval collapse, the history of the British Empire would have been changed. Overtasked from 1778 onwards, and unprepared for the enormous strain thrown upon its resources, the Navy was yet able, on the whole, to guard the seas. Not only, therefore, was national disaster averted; but the British cause in India, which fell to its lowest ebb in 1780, emerged shaken, yet triumphant. "God be praised for the peace" was the ejaculation of Suffren, who, still in possession of a superior squadron, recognized that the situation was becoming desperate.

Wholesale reduction of the British Navy followed

upon the Treaty of Versailles. For 1783, 110,000 seamen and marines were voted; in the following year the number was 26,000, and 25,000* in 1792 when the country was on the brink of a new period of great wars.

During the ten years of peace which preceded the outbreak of the war of the French Revolution, British expeditions scoured many seas and trade flourished. Vancouver Island, now a thriving portion of the Dominion of Canada, received the name of its discoverer, and was claimed by Spain. The National Convention having declared war successively upon Holland, England and Spain, Hood and de Langara occupied Toulon on behalf of the royalist party, and seized the French shipping in the harbour. Unless supported by a powerful military force, the measure was foredoomed. In December, 1793, the harbour was evacuated, and a large population which could not be moved, was perforce abandoned to massacre. The French Mediterranean fleet having almost ceased to exist, San Fiorenzo,

* Increased by 20,000 in February, 1793, after the execution of Louis XVI.

Bastia and Calvi were subjected by Nelson to blockade and land attack, and in August, 1794, Corsica was fully occupied. Meanwhile, on the 29th May to 1st June, Howe defeated the French Brest fleet under de Villaret Joyeuse in the Atlantic, capturing six ships. In January 1795, the Dutch, forced into a French alliance, declared war, and in October of the following year, Spain followed suit. The naval actions of 1795 and 1796, if not remarkable for brilliancy, were at least reverses to the enemy. Bridport off Lorient and Hotham off Genoa and again off the Hyères Islands won incomplete victories, and a projected invasion of Ireland proved a hopeless failure. Great French preparations at Toulon were, however, in progress, and the accession of 26 Spanish ships of the line and 10 frigates led to a temporary abandonment of the Mediterranean. On the 14th February, 1797, Jervis with 15 ships of the line, defeated the Spanish fleet of 27 off Cape St. Vincent; but for a time, the action of the Navy was paralyzed by the great mutiny which, beginning at Spithead in April, spread to the Nore and reached the squadrons off the Texel, off Cadiz, and on the Cape

and West Indian stations. Nelson's attempt upon Santa Cruz in July, impracticable without the presence of a large landing force, involved heavy loss. On the 11th October, Duncan with a superior squadron succeeded in bringing de Winter to action off Camperdown, and won a decisive victory gallantly contested. In May, 1798, Nelson re-entered the Mediterranean, and the battle of the Nile followed on the 21st October. No naval victory has been more complete or more important. The command of the inland sea was gained, and the fate of the French army in Egypt, of Malta, of Minorca, and of the Ionian Islands was decided. Everywhere the resistance to French aggression gained strength, and a Russian squadron, with British assistance, entered the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, two French expeditions to Ireland had failed. Humbert with four frigates from Rochefort succeeded in landing a force in Killala Bay, which quickly surrendered to General Lake. Of the larger expedition which sailed from Brest only two frigates returned to France. So hopeless are over-sea operations attempted by a Power which has not obtained the command of

the sea. In August, 1799, the remains of the Dutch fleet in the Texel were surrendered to a combined British force with which Russia co-operated; but, after obtaining this success, the Helder expedition ended disastrously. The seizure of the Danish frigate *Freyja* in July, 1800, led to the establishment of the Armed Neutrality of the Northern Powers, under the auspices of the Emperor Paul. In effect nearly 60 ships of the line were thus added to the naval resources of the Allies, and it was necessary to strike an immediate blow in the Baltic. On the 2nd April, 1801, Nelson destroyed the Danish fleet at Copenhagen, and the Russian and Swedish squadrons sought the shelter of their ports. The war ended with the Treaty of Amiens in March, 1802, and of the conquests of Great Britain only Ceylon and Trinidad were retained. Egypt was restored to the Porte, the Cape to Holland, and Malta to the decadent Knights of St. John.*

In May, 1803, Great Britain and France were again at war, which involved Holland, still a French

* This item of the Treaty was never carried out, although as Captain Mahan points out its execution was "honestly" intended by the British Government.

dependency. There had not been time either for the customary enfeeblement of the British navy, or for the re-habilitation of that of France. By declaring war the British Government forced the hands of Napoleon, and regaining its belligerent rights, the Navy resumed the offensive. Before the Texel, Brest, Rochefort and Toulon, British squadrons at once took station, "covering British interests from the Baltic to Egypt, the British Colonies in the four quarters of the globe, and the British merchantmen which whitened every sea."* Cornwallis in the Channel and Nelson in the Mediterranean stood waiting only for the opportunity to strike. Under the conditions thus existing, over-sea operations on a large scale were possible to the French only after winning decisive victories at sea—victories of which there was no reasonable prospect. Ignoring this universal law and forgetting the disastrous result of the Egyptian expedition of 1798, Napoleon concentrated his energies upon the complex scheme of invasion which had begun to take shape in 1801. Whether any great result was ever expected, or

* Captain Mahan.

whether the project was developed with the view of imposing upon the imagination of the English people and of veiling ulterior designs, cannot be known; but the energies and the resources expended upon the preparations unquestionably tended to weaken the navy of France at a time when its supremacy was essential to success in the final struggle with Great Britain. Meanwhile, St. Lucia and Tobago, Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice were captured, and in 1804, Spain having agreed to provide a subsidy in aid of Napoleon, suffered the loss of her treasure ships and declared war.

The naval history of 1805 is that of the Trafalgar campaign and the long records of war afford no study so fascinating, or for the British nation so supremely important. Unfortunately, the impression of imminent danger created by the elaborate preparations across the Channel, and the general difficulty of realizing the unseen guardianship of a navy, have given rise to a wide-spread misconception of the issues. No campaign has been less understood, and till recent years historians have failed to point its true moral. Napoleon's

problem—to obtain the sustained command of the sea with a naval force inferior in sea-training and in *moral*—was insoluble. His far-reaching and over-elaborate plans demanded for their accomplishment the exact fulfilment of many conditions, and even if the strategic concentration in the Channel had been effected, it still remained to win a great naval victory over forces numerically not far inferior and in other respects manifestly superior. The details of the Trafalgar campaign should be mastered by every one who wishes to understand the principles of Imperial defence. The lessons are as old as naval history, but they have never received an illustration so strikingly complete.

The partial and indecisive action off Finisterre on the 22nd July, for which Calder was tried and reprimanded, sufficed to convince Napoleon of the hopelessness of his great project, and two months before Trafalgar the Grand Army was on the march to the Rhine. After spending nearly a month in England, Nelson, on the 28th September, joined the fleet watching Cadiz. The situation with which the war began

was thus reproduced, except that Villeneuve with the French Mediterranean squadron, was locked in an Atlantic port, and that the Spanish navy, numerically formidable but moderately effective, added to the responsibilities of the British commanders. Ordered by Napoleon to return to the Mediterranean, and aware that Admiral Rosilly was *en route* to relieve him, the luckless Villeneuve quitted his shelter on the 19th October. Under favourable conditions, this second evasion might have succeeded; but there were no grounds for expecting a success which would at best have transferred the blockade to Toulon. Caught off Cape Trafalgar on the 21st October, the Franco-Spanish fleet of 33 sail was almost annihilated by Nelson with 27, and Great Britain was left with the absolute command of the sea. While, therefore, the great victory of Trafalgar played no part in determining the safety of England, and was in this sense a "useless holocaust," as Captain Mahan has stated, the consequences were of vast importance. Secure at sea, Great Britain was now free to strike in any part of the world. In January, 1806, the Cape was

again taken, and in July the French were heavily defeated at Maida in Calabria. Expeditions to South America ended in a miserable failure at Buenos Ayres.

Meanwhile, Napoleon having reduced Austria and Prussia to vassalage in two brilliant campaigns, concluded the Treaty of Tilsit with Russia after the battle of Friedland. It was again sought to utilize the navies of the Baltic Powers in the interests of France, and the British Government despatching a strong expedition to Copenhagen, enforced the surrender of the Danish fleet. Having failed utterly to cripple the sea power of England, Napoleon endeavoured to ruin British commerce by indirect measures. The literal execution of the Berlin and Milan decrees demanded either that every port of Europe should be under French control, or that all the Powers should, in the interests of France, enforce regulations greatly to their own disadvantage. Such measures ignoring the elementary rights of neutrals, were rendered possible only by the military ascendancy of France on the Continent and must necessarily fail if that ascendancy

could not be maintained. While, therefore, the naval war had practically ended, and Great Britain could have deliberately captured every foreign possession of France, Spain and Holland, loyalty to the cause of European freedom and the pressure upon her commerce, created by conditions entirely exceptional, involved her in military operations. Spain, the naval enemy in so many contests, sought British aid which was readily given. The Peninsular War, begun in 1808 with wholly inadequate means entailing initial disaster, ended at Paris in 1814, after a series of victories unparalleled in the long history of our military adventures on the Continent. On the other hand, the great Walcheren expedition of 1809, completely mismanaged, only resulted in dividing the national effort, and thus enfeebling the operations of Wellington in the Peninsula.

While these military measures were in progress, activity in distant seas was not suspended. In 1810, Guadaloupe, Amboyna, Bourbon (now Réunion) and Mauritius were taken, the last-named having served as a base for French cruisers acting against British

trade in the Indian Ocean. In 1811, Batavia capitulated, and the island of Java was soon afterwards surrendered. The Russian campaign of 1812, mainly arising out of the disinclination of Alexander I. to enforce the French "Continental system," was the beginning of the downfall of Napoleon.

The senseless war of 1812—14 with the United States had no real influence on Colonial expansion. Canada was defended without difficulty, and although the American navy won some frigate actions and captured a British flotilla on Lake Erie, the general result of the war was disastrous to American commerce and entailed wide-spread distress. Washington was occupied and its public buildings were unfortunately burned, while the expedition to New Orleans ended in disaster.

Under the first and second Treaty of Paris (1814, 1815) Malta, Tobago, St. Lucia, Mauritius, the Cape and Dutch Guiana became permanent British possessions. Java was restored to Holland.

The series of great wars which began in 1775 was, in the main, a prolonged contest for commercial and

Colonial supremacy which turned wholly upon the sea power of Great Britain. The ultimate triumph against odds, which, during the War of American Independence, appear overwhelming, was solely due to national effort unprecedented in the history of the world. With a population of only ten millions, often discontented, with Ireland in chronic rebellion, the "mighty onset of the French Revolution," directed by the greatest master of war, was met and shattered. It is not possible to define the precise part played by England in securing the liberties of Europe; but it is at least certain that she alone remained steadfast to the cause for which she had taken up arms, and to her Navy the overthrow of Napoleon must be primarily attributed. From the long and exhausting contest she reaped some direct advantages. The Cape, Malta, Mauritius, Ceylon, and many West Indian islands remained as the spoils of war. British India in 1805 comprised only Bengal, a fringe of the Eastern coastline and scattered settlements on the West. Many wars remained to be fought before the present dominion was assured; but at least the rivalry of European

nations in the Hindustan Peninsula was ended, and in 1810 assistance was forthcoming from our great Dependency for the capture of Mauritius and Java. If, however, the territorial gains were considerable and some of the points of vantage of the world passed into British hands, the retrocessions were also extremely important, and having regard to the opportunities, rapacity was not a marked characteristic of British policy. Goree thrice, Minorca and Martinique twice captured, together with Réunion, all strategic positions of value, were restored when France had been beaten to her knees. The restitution of the splendid island of Java is not significant of overwhelming ambition. The exchange of Havana and the Philippine islands for Florida and log-cutting rights in Honduras shows a curious disregard of relative values; while the neglect in 1815 to put an end to the anachronism of the French fishing rights on the shores of Newfoundland, suggests blindness to Imperial interests.

The indirect results of the period of great wars were immensely more important than the direct territorial

gains. From Trafalgar, the British Empire, as we now know it, may be said to date. To the crowning triumph of the Navy and the immense efforts put forth by the Mother Country during these wars, the present Colonial development is entirely due. Trade, which by reason of the supremacy asserted by the British Navy had actually thriven during the great struggle, received a powerful impetus as soon as peace was established. For purely naval reasons the one great war since 1815 endangered no Colonial interest and left Imperial commerce unaffected.

Burmah, part of Beluchistan, Singapore, and the Malay States, Hong Kong, a large portion of Borneo and of New Guinea, Lagos, Aden, Fiji, and many islands in the South Pacific and Indian Oceans, have since passed under the flag. A little settlement in New South Wales in 1788 has proved the precursor of six great self-governing Colonies, with a population of about $3\frac{3}{4}$ millions. New Zealand, annexed only in 1840, after suffering for nearly 13 years of native wars, has already more than 700,000 people. The small Dutch colony at the Cape has grown into a vast

territory extending to the southern shores of Lake Tanganyika, while Berbera, Zanzibar, and the great tract known as British East Africa, have been added to the Empire. Since 1884, as Lord Rosebery has pointed out,* 2,600,000 square miles have been either annexed, or rendered subject to British influence, increasing the total area of the Queen's dominions by about one-third.

This enormous territorial extension has been accomplished by small wars, by treaties with native rulers, by settlement, or by agreements with the European Powers; but the power to expand was a legacy bequeathed by naval victories. The prestige of the British Navy and the memory of the immense national efforts made between 1756 and 1815 remained even when the strength of the fleet had been suffered to sink perilously low. To the Imperial ascendancy won in wars half forgotten, the present prosperity of the Colonies is wholly due, and throughout the many international difficulties arising in regard to Colonial interests, the power—often inadequate but still dreaded

* Edinburgh, 9th October, 1896.

—which lay behind British Ministers, has sufficed to uphold the rights of Greater Britain.

It has been thought necessary to sketch briefly the long series of wars which ended in 1815, because there is a strong tendency, especially in the Colonies, to ignore the foundation on which the Empire has been built and the conditions to which its prosperity is due. "Australasia and New Zealand cost England nothing"; the Colonial Empire "has been too cheaply won to be properly appreciated." These are the fearless statements of a recent South African writer,* whose absolute disregard of history is by no means exceptional. The Mother Country still bears heavy burdens arising out of the gigantic efforts by which her Colonial and commercial success has been established and maintained. To be able to realize the nature of those efforts is a primary qualification for the discussion of the great question of Imperial defence.

* "Colonial" New Review, October, 1896.

PART II

TRADE.

All over the world is spread the gigantic and intensely complex network of British trade, creating interests in all lands and heavy stakes in every sea, holding the scattered members of the Empire in the bonds of commercial interdependence, and inevitably exciting the jealous rivalry of other nations. This vast system has been mainly built up in the years of peace since 1815; but the long contest for commercial supremacy was decided by successful war, and the failure of the Navy in the period of the French Revolution and Empire would have crippled the progress of the nation.

Taking the returns of 1893 as a basis, the commerce of the Empire, geographically grouped, is represented by the Table on the following page:—

TABLE 'A.

	GROUP.	EXPORTS AND IMPORTS.		
		IMPERIAL*	FOREIGN.	TOTAL.
		£	£	£
1	United Kingdom	170,352,766†	511,473,682†	681,826,448
2	Europe	1,812,284	414,969	2,227,253
3	Asia, (exclusive of { India and Burmah) }	32,232,927	24,792,447	57,025,374
4	Africa	32,356,062	5,413,689	37,769,751
5	America (including { Falkland Islands) }	27,978,253	29,356,507	57,334,760
6	West Indies	6,608,532	7,292,565	13,901,097
7	Australasia (includ- { ing Fiji & N. Guinea) }	107,965,898	11,433,129	119,399,027
8	India & Burmah	66,669,531	39,573,620	106,243,151
	Totals.	445,976,253	629,750,608	1,075,726,861

* By "Imperial" is meant trade within the Empire.

† The corresponding figures for 1895 are £160,507,293, and £529,637,650 exclusive of £216,122 for parcel post.

These figures do not include the values of shipping employed or that of specie, bullion, and marketable documents carried.

They do not, therefore, convey any real idea of the total maritime interests of the Empire; but they serve to show fairly the relative commercial activities of the various territorial groups and the distribution of their trade between Imperial and Foreign ports. This distribution may conveniently be represented by percentages as follows:—

TABLE B.

	GROUP.	PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL EXPORTS & IMPORTS.	
		IMPERIAL.	FOREIGN.
1	United Kingdom	24.9	75.1
2	Europe	81.5	18.5
3	Asia	56.5	43.5
4	Africa	85.7	14.3
5	America	48.8	51.2
6	West Indies	47.5	52.5
7	Australasia	90.5	9.5
8	India & Burmah	62.7	37.3

The influence of geographical position is thus clearly shown, the percentages varying widely in the different groups. Thus, in the European, African, and

Australasian Colonies an immense preponderance of trade is Imperial, and mainly with the Mother Country. In the Asian groups and in India, the preponderance is less marked. British America and the West Indies show a small balance in favour of foreign countries.

If this analysis is extended to individual Colonies, the group percentage of Imperial and Foreign trade is not even approximately maintained. Thus, of the total trade of Cyprus in the European group, more than 72 per cent. is carried on with foreign ports, and in the case of Lagos in the African group, the corresponding percentage is more than 43. In the American group, a great preponderance of the trade of British Guiana and of the Falkland Islands is Imperial, as also is that of Grenada and St. Vincent in the West Indies. Again, the foreign trade of New South Wales is proportionally greater than that of Victoria, while almost the entire commerce of Tasmania and Fiji is Imperial.

The above figures show how completely the Empire rests on a commercial basis. The Colonies, in varying degrees, are trading centres, depending, like the Mother

Country, on security of sea transport. From Turks Island, with its total exports and imports of £48,254, to the great Australasian group with £119,398,027, each member derives its means of existence from sea-borne trade. No unit can suffer heavy loss without entailing loss on others. In his memorable words at the Conference of 1887, Mr. Deakin employed no mere figure of speech:—

We cannot imagine any description of circumstances by which the Colonies should be humiliated or their powers lessened, under which the Empire would not itself be humiliated, weakened and lessened. And we are unable to conceive any conditions under which the wealth and status of the Colonies could be increased, which would not increase in the same measure the wealth and status of the Empire.

These words fitly embody a great truth which has not yet received full recognition. The old idea of Colonies as mere outlying portions of the national estate, conquered or settled in the first instance on account of their intrinsic value, and bringing direct profit to the Mother Country, has happily passed away. This was, and still is, the view of Spain, Holland, and Portugal, and no race except our own has succeeded in creating great self-governing Colonies such as those of North America, South Africa, and Australasia.

The old Colonial policy entailed an elaborate system of "prohibitions, guards, penalties, and forfeitures,"* securing to the Mother Country the monopoly of the trade of her Colonies. Such restrictions, hampering the progress and prosperity of our off-shoots, have disappeared, and the reign of Queen Victoria has witnessed the growth and the final triumph of new conceptions of Colonial Empire. To Burke was given a clear vision of the future, and in memorable words he indicated the principles of a true Colonial policy.

I was ever of opinion that every considerable part of the British dominions should be governed as a free country; otherwise I know that if it grew to strength, and was favoured with opportunity, it would soon shake off the yoke, intolerable in itself to all liberal minds, and less to be borne from England than from any country in the world.

The conception of Colonies which found favour in the age of Elizabeth, and was borrowed from the policy of the older colonizing nations—the conception which entailed the loss by successful revolt of the thirteen Colonies of North America—has given way to

* Burke.

the principles enunciated by Burke, and eleven vigorous self-governing communities scattered over the world, attest his statesmanlike prevision. The modern British Colony remains a possession of the Mother Country in the sense that national honour demands that it should be defended at all cost against aggression. It is not a direct source of profit, but the centre of a trade conferring mutual advantages. On account of its geographical position, its ports and local resources may have great strategic value. Its commerce is unfettered by artificial restrictions, and is governed only by the conditions of a free evolution. Its prosperity depends on commerce, and its financial stability rests upon the guarantee provided by the Navy.* Small Colonies under the flag can borrow almost on the same terms as powerful independent States. Finally, mutual interdependence no longer characterizes the relations of the Mother Country and the Colonies alone; but, for defensive reasons as well as on purely commercial

* The ruling prices of Colonial stocks supply the best proof of the value of this guarantee. The yield of Canadian loans to the investor is only £2 12s. 6d., and that of the inscribed stock of Western Australia and Barbados is £2 17s. 6d.

grounds, now exists between Colonies themselves. The Empire, scattered as are its many members, forms one great whole, and as such it must be defended.

National unity, where territories are divided by thousands of miles of sea, offers more difficulties to the imagination than that of a European State, but is, perhaps, more essential. The loss, through unsuccessful war, of the Rhine provinces of France did not sensibly weaken her strength or permanently injure her prestige. The loss of Australasia, in similar circumstances, would shake the foundations of the Empire, because it would imply the insecurity of every member; while the conquest of South Africa by a rival Power would render insoluble the difficult problem of Imperial defence.

These considerations are, perhaps, gaining ground; but indications, at home and in the Colonies, of false conceptions of the primary conditions of our national existence, are not wanting. Trade, it has been said, is cosmopolitan. It cares for no flag, knows no patriotism, and is independent of national sentiment. Were our Colonies to break adrift, or pass into other hands, we could still trade with them without loss of

mutual profit. From the Colonial side, it has been publicly asserted that the Imperial connection involves undue risks and "an irritating subjection to extraneous influences;"* that declarations of independence would follow an outbreak of hostilities between the Mother Country and a foreign Power; and that trade would either be permitted to pass free under some newly-invented flag, or could easily transfer itself to the flag of some unspecified neutral.

Such doctrines are radically and dangerously false.

It is true, as shown in Table B, that of the total trade of the Mother Country, a little more than three quarters is carried on with foreign countries, and in this portion, it may be contended, that Greater Britain has no direct interest. The same Table, however, illustrates the enormous value of Imperial commerce to the Colonies, whose foreign trade is only about one quarter of their total. To Greater Britain, Imperial trade is vital, and a declaration of independence at the outset of hostilities, would at best place a Colony in the position of an exceedingly weak neutral whose

* Mr. Norwood Young in *The U. S. Magazine*, of January, 1891.

products intended for belligerent ports could and would be for the most part regarded as contraband of war. The elasticity of movement of modern trade is great; but new markets cannot be quickly created on a large scale, and the loss or weakening of the all-important United Kingdom markets would to most Colonies be disastrous. Their foreign trade would not suffice for their necessities. Their entire prosperity must for many years remain bound up with the fortunes of the Empire as a whole. No hastily adopted flag could possibly protect their maritime interests in war, even if the great legal difficulties of a wholesale transfer of shipping, officers and crews, to another nationality, could be overcome.

Conversely the loss of a trade with her Colonies amounting to £170,352,766 in 1893 (India and Burmah excluded) would inflict untold suffering upon the Mother Country. As Sir John Robinson well said:—“If Greater Britain should fall to pieces, then God help Great Britain.”* It is of course possible that the present conditions might change, and that the

* Conference of 1887.

home markets might cease in certain cases to be of value to a particular Colony—Turks Island and the Virgin Islands, for example, at present export little or nothing to the Mother Country—but with the larger Colonies any great diversion of trade is most improbable. And even of the small trade of Turks Island nearly one fourth goes to markets within the Empire, and might be destroyed if those markets fell into other hands.

Reared on a commercial basis, knit together by innumerable and ever-increasing commercial and domestic ties, the splendid fabric of the Empire must be defended as a whole. Heterogeneous as are, in a sense, its members, they are united in one supreme common interest—the protection of the sea communication between each other and the Mother Country.

While it is easy to arrive at a fairly accurate estimate of the relative value of the sea-borne trade of the various Imperial units, there is great difficulty in appraising the total maritime interests of the Empire and their magnitude in relation to the corresponding interests of other Powers. The Admiralty Returns

for 1895 assign the following figures to the principal commercial Powers :—

TABLE C.

COUNTRY.	Value of Sea-borne trade, including Bullion and Specie.	Aggregate Tonnage Mercantile Marine (vessels of 100 tons and upwards)	Aggregate annual Naval Expenditure.
	£	Tons.	£
United Kingdom	748,521,041	12,117,957	16,328,117 (a.)
India	66,701,526 (b.)	50,745 (net)	972,985
Self-governing Colonies } Other Colonies (a)	83,949,104 (b.) 55,313,920(b)(c)	937,476 (net) 120,007 (net)	220,216 —
Total British Empire }	954,485,591	13,226,185	17,521,318
United States	393,393,736	(d)994,675 (net)	5,073,365
France	294,753,414	1,094,752	10,825,040
Germany	150,693,600(f)	1,886,812	4,318,125
Russia	69,665,220 (e)	487,681	5,114,569

(a) Includes expenditure under Naval Defence Act.

(b) Excludes trade with United Kingdom. but necessarily counts intercolonial trade twice over.

(c) Excludes trade of Hong Kong, Gibraltar, and Malta.

(d) Excludes vessels engaged in Lake, River, and Home trade.

(e) Imports for Home consumption and Exports of domestic produce only.

(f) Approximate only. Returns do not distinguish between Sea-borne and Overland trade.

The trade of Hong Kong, Malta, and Gibraltar, is omitted from the above Table, and the total commerce of the Empire must be increased by about £40,000,000 making a grand total of £994,485,591. In this figure, however, all intercolonial trade, which, according to the returns for 1893, amounted to £82,714,970 is counted twice over. . Deducting this amount, the net total would be £911,770,621.

The maritime interests of the Empire, however are thus immensely underestimated. Mr. Thursfield* has pointed out that the British transshipment trade, estimated by a great authority at £10,000,000 each way, has been omitted from the Admiralty Returns. He further shows that, according to the Returns, the proportion of goods carried to tonnage available is much higher in the case of foreign Powers than in our own, which is evidently absurd. The discrepancy is due to the large amount of foreign commerce carried in British ships, while comparatively little British trade is carried in foreign vessels. Mr. Thursfield estimates the total commerce of foreign

* *The Navy and the Nation.*

Powers carried in British bottoms at £350,000,000, and adds: "Probably at least half of this 350,000,000 is owned by British merchants in transit," and in any case, this carrying trade must be defended if it is to be retained. The above estimate is, perhaps, too large; but the value of British carrying trade cannot be much less than £300,000,000. The value of the mercantile shipping annually employed must be at least £120,000,000; that of marketable documents carried in British bottoms and owned in transit by British subjects, is estimated by the authority to whom Mr. Thursfield refers, at fully £250,000,000. Adding the four new items to the net total previously deduced, the enormous figure of £1,601,770,621 (approximately £1,600,000,000 sterling) is obtained. The annual value of the maritime interests of the Empire cannot be less and may be more than this vast sum.

The return quoted in Table C is thus not only quite misleading as regards the total trade of the Empire, but it accords to the sea-borne commerce of foreign Powers an undue relative value. The column giving the aggregate tonnage of the mercantile marine

of the several States, is, perhaps, a safer guide than the illusory estimate of value. In any case, it is clear that the interests of the British nation in the sea are, beyond all comparison, superior to those of any other Power, and are probably double those of the United States, France, Germany, and Russia combined. This stupendous development has arisen since 1815, and mainly during the wonderful reign of the Queen.

It is evidently impossible that a growth so enormous can indefinitely maintain its rate of progress. Successful war—the result of immense sacrifices on the part of the Mother Country—procured for the Empire a long start, which the genius of the race, aided by natural and geographical advantages, was well qualified to turn to account. By great efforts, other nations have at length succeeded in making up a little—a very little — of their lee-way. Those, however, who realize the significance of the figures above given, will certainly decline to see in the tardy success of the enterprise of our rivals, any sign of the commercial decadence of the Empire. Competition in certain branches of trade must be expected, and can be met

only by the adoption of new methods and by greater attention to details. It is also inevitable, for various reasons, that the manufacture of certain articles will tend to fall into other hands. This can and will be counterbalanced by an increase of production of other British goods whose superiority can be assured. No nation has any right to expect to retain a universal pre-eminence in economic production, and manufacture must necessarily conform to the laws of natural evolution. In view of existing facts, however, it is childish to speak of competition in the broad sense. The commerce of the Empire, as a whole, is unapproached by any rival.

The "Comparative Trade Statistics," recently presented to Parliament, give the following as the tonnage of shipping entered and cleared in the foreign trade of the countries stated:—

TABLE D.—Average tonnage for quinquennial period 1890-4.

COUNTRY.	ENTERED AND CLEARED.		
	NATIONAL SHIPPING.	FOREIGN SHIPPING.	TOTAL.
Great Britain	55.00 Millions.	20.00 Millions.	75 00 Millions.
United States	8.83 * ,	30.07 * ,,	38 90 ,,
France	8.945 ,,	20.10 ,,	29.045 ,,
Germany	9.766 ,	22.832 ,	32.598 ,,

* Includes shipping engaged in Lake Trade with Canada.

The following Table gives the increase in each case over the preceding quinquennial average:—

TABLE E.

COUNTRY.	Increase Millions.	Years in which average of 1890-4 was exceeded.
Great Britain	9,48 *	1894
United States	7,658	1892 ; 1893 ; 1894
France	1,371	1891
Germany	4,727	{ 1891 ; 1892 ; 1893 ; 1894

In the important shipbuilding industry, the figures for 1895 stand as follow:—

TABLE F.

NATURE.	SHIPS BUILT IN UNITED KINGDOM.		TOTALS.
	FOR BRITISH OWNERS.	FOR FOREIGN OWNERS.	
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.
Sail	54,155	10,562	64,717
Steam	464,467 †	117,450 ‡	581,917
Totals	518,622	128,012	646,634

* The figures for 1895 show a further increase of 6 millions.

† Largest figures except 1882, 1883, 1889, 1890, but larger than any quinquennial average.

‡ Largest figures except 1883, 1889, 1890, but much larger than any quinquennial average.

Turning to the latest trade returns for the ten months ending 31st October, 1896, the total exports and imports of the United Kingdom stand as follows :—

TABLE G.

Nature of Trade.	Totals.	Increase over corresponding Period of 1895.
Exports*	£ 201,091,150	£ 13,641,847
Imports*	355,926,761	15,926,761
Totals	557,017,911	29,568,608

If this rate of increase is preserved for the remaining two months of the year, the total increase would be £35,482,329.

Of the increase of imports recorded in Table G, no less than £4,137,940 arises in animals imported for food, other articles of food and drink, and tobacco. This considerable increase is only partly due to the recent rise in the price of wheat, and it seems clear that the purchasing power of the population has materially improved in comparison with that of last year.

* Bullion, Specie, and marketable documents are not included.

The imports of the United Kingdom contain two heavy items—food stuffs, including drinkables and raw materials—both of which figure in a less degree among exports. On the other hand, the great bulk of our exports consists of manufactured or partially manufactured articles.

Taking the latest returns for the ten months ending 31st October, 1896, the principal imports stand as follows:—

TABLE H.

CATEGORY.	IMPORTS.	EXPORTS.
Food Stuffs, Wines, Spirits, etc.*	149,310,526	10,037,423
Raw Materials	111,447,994	14,782,979

The food of the people is thus mainly sea-borne, and is paid for by industries largely dependent on imported materials. In a careful Paper † read before the

* Chemicals, some of which are used in manufacture, are not included. In the ten months ending 31st October, 1896, the imports of "chemicals, dye-stuffs, and tanning substances," was £5,967,832, and the exports of "chemicals and chemical and medicinal preparations," was £6,921,354. The proportional import and export for the year would be £6,962,470 and £8,074,913 respectively. There is in addition an annual import of "oils" amounting to more than £7,800,000, some of which, directly or indirectly, is employed in manufacture.

† "On the increasing dependence of this country on foreign supplies of food."

Manchester Statistical Society in 1877, Mr. S. Bourne showed "that out of thirty-three million inhabitants of the United Kingdom, eighteen millions may be sustained on food grown at home, and fifteen millions on that received from abroad." He further estimated that "on an average, each member of the community now consumes to the value of two-and-a-half times as much foreign food as he did twenty years back." Writing in 1879,* Captain (now Sir J.) Colomb pointed out that in 1877, the import of wheat was "fifty-four-and-a-quarter million odd hundredweights," of which only nine-and-a-half million hundredweights came from British possessions. The present annual import of wheat, wheat-meal, or flour required by a population of about 39·1 millions,† is about 100 million hundred-weights of which 16½ millions are grown in British Colonies.‡ In 1895 the value of wheat, wheat-meal, and flour imported was £30,210,188, of which only £4,946,943 came from British possessions. The import of wheat

* "The defence of Great and Greater Britain."

† Figures for 1895.

‡ The consumption per head in Great Britain is almost exactly one-half that of France, and is less than that of Hungary, Spain, the United States, Switzerland, and Belgium.

has thus increased in a greater ratio than the population, and the United Kingdom is increasingly dependent upon the sea-borne supply. The available amount of wheat and flour in this country varies at different periods of the year, but does not appear ever to fall below the requirements of a five months' consumption, and must at some periods rise considerably above this amount. Of meat, if stocks were consumed, the supply would suffice for more than two years.*

In view of these facts, the establishment of public granaries has frequently been urged, and the proposal seems to possess attractions. It is, however, based upon an inadequate realization of the magnitude of the operations involved, and it is fraught with great practical difficulties. Towns have frequently been thus provisioned to resist blockade, and the Knights of St. John, subsequent to the great Turkish siege of Valetta in 1575, excavated numerous rock chambers for the purposes of grain storage. To deal with the civil inhabitants of a town during a siege has always

* Of other food stuffs, such as Rice, Indian Corn, Sugar, Cheese, Bacon, Hams, etc., it is difficult to ascertain the normal supply available.

proved a difficult problem. With a population of forty millions, the difficulty appears insuperable. Moreover, the question goes far beyond that of food supply. The naval conditions which would render the import of grain impossible, would, at the same time, prevent the transit of raw material and of manufactured articles, and would, consequently, paralyse the industries by which the mass of our people live. The wage fund of the greater part of the population would cease to exist.* Of what use would be the accumulated stores of grain, if the purchasing power of the masses was extinct? To be logical, the advocates of national granaries should also demand public stores of raw materials, and should further demonstrate that manufacture would still proceed, although exports had ceased.

There is no need for the measures proposed, and no possible justification of the immense expense involved. That the effective land blockade of a town defended by a large army is possible, all history proves. In

* It is a discouraging fact that the leaders of the great labour organizations of this country, absorbed in local controversies, do not find time to point out to the working man the basis upon which his means of existence wholly depend.

our own day, we have seen Paris and Metz so blockaded with the inevitable result. The long defence of Sebastopol was due to the fact that no land blockade was established. On the other hand, the naval blockade of these islands is an absolute impossibility. In sailing days, at a period when the British Navy was overmatched, the attempt of the Allies to blockade the single port of Gibraltar failed, and the fortress was thrice relieved. In days of steam, the whole naval force of the Northern States long failed to maintain an effective commercial blockade of the Southern ports, notwithstanding that there was no opposing navy to protect the blockade runners. Spain, in equally favourable conditions, and without the smallest naval opposition, is unable to maintain a complete blockade of Cuba. Excessively difficult in sailing days, naval blockades of an immense open coast-line, such as our own, are now absolutely impossible, even if, as is usual with certain writers, the enormously potent factor of the British Navy is left out of consideration. And if such a blockade of the United Kingdom were practicable, it would imply not

only the fall of what Sir J. Colomb has termed the "citadel," but the final disruption of the Empire.

The Colonies are, for the most part, self-supporting as regards food-supply, and in this sense are able to defy blockade; but their wage fund and the resources of their populations depend, none the less, upon trade. In the Australasian group, a total commerce of £119,399,027 is maintained by the industries of about five millions of people, and the public debt amounts to £206,067,919.* The average annual stake in sea-borne trade is thus about £24 per head, and as a Queensland writer † most truly states:—

Probably no other community of four millions in the world has so large a commerce exposed to so great an ocean risk. This trade reached its present dimensions, and is growing rapidly now under the shelter of the British flag. It is the strength represented by that flag which has procured peace on the ocean for us.

Temporary depression of trade in time of peace implies wide-spread suffering; cessation of trade during war would mean ruin. India, even if able to feed its immense population, is dependent for purchasing power upon a sea-borne trade of more than £106,000,000. Moreover, conditions which would render the food-supply

* Figures for 1893.

† *Brisbane Courier*.

of the United Kingdom impossible, would imply the severance of the Imperial communications, the cessation of Colonial trade, and the liability of every Colony to easy conquest by any great military Power.*

The greater includes the less, and if the sea communications of the Empire are guarded, as they have been in the past, as they can be more effectually today, the problem of the home food supply is resolved. The guarding of these communications is the supreme interest of the whole nation, upon the securing of which all efforts should be concentrated, and doubtful expedients serving only to promote illusions and thus to engender oblivion of vital needs, must be unhesitatingly rejected.

The present sources of the food-supply of Great Britain could not be abruptly changed, and have, therefore, an important bearing upon the problem of Imperial defence.

The following Table, deduced from the Returns of 1895, gives some of the principal items of imported food, and the sources from which they are drawn:—

* Canada alone would be secure as regards all European Powers.

TABLE I.

Nature of Food Stuff.	Principal Sources in order of importance.	Annual Value.	
1.—Wheat	United States	£ 7,760,967	
	Russia	6,048,929	
	Argentina	3,142,378	
	Roumania	537,756	
	Turkey	331,675	
	Small quantities, also from Germany, Persia, Chili, Uruguay, and British possessions.		
Total Foreign.		18,617,377	
,, Imperial.		3,913,799	
2.—Wheat, Meal or Flour.	United States	5,384,658	
	Canada	1,033,145	
	Austria	706,818	
	France	414,203	
	Small quantities also from Russia, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Roumania, Argentina, and British possessions.		
	Total Foreign		6,645,868
,, Imperial		1,033,145	

TABLE I.—*Continued.*

Nature of Food Stuff.	Principal Sources in order of Importance.	Annual Value.
3.—Cattle Live	United States	£ 4,915,834
	Canada	1,589,934
	Argentina	613,881
	Total Foreign	5,531,960
	„ Imperial	1,618,852
4.—Sheep and Lambs Live.	United States	769,864
	Argentina	505,537
	Canada	387,183
	Small number also from Norway and Denmark.	
	Total Foreign	1,389,151
„ Imperial	393,393	
5.—Beef fresh	United States	3,450,184
	Queensland	534,663
	N. S. Wales	183,668
	Total Foreign	3,496,738
	„ Imperial	778,810

TABLE I.—*Continued.*

Nature of Food Stuff.	Principal Sources in order of importance.	Annual Value.
6.—Mutton fresh	New Zealand	2,216,991 [£]
	Argentina	1,000,050
	N. S. Wales	597,784
	Holland	370,746
	Victoria	219,870
	Total Foreign	1,476,640
	„ Imperial	3,119,038
7.—Mutton preserved.	N. S. Wales	240,427
	New Zealand	40,043
	Queensland	29,720
	Total Foreign	14,079
	„ Imperial	320,528
8.—Meat unenumerated salted or fresh.	Holland	320 082
	United States	65,611
	Total Foreign	469,923
	„ Imperial	20,727

TABLE I.—Continued.

Nature of Food Stuff.	Principal Sources in order of importance.	Annual Value.
9.—Meat otherwise preserved.	United States	£ 544,385
	Queensland	197,328
	N. S. Wales	191,134
	Belgium	167,057
	Total Foreign	753,083
	,, Imperial	411,408
10.—Bacon.	United States	4,586,089
	Denmark	2,504,697
	Sweden	255,392
	Total Foreign	7,422,356
		,, Imperial
11.—Ham.	United States (rest small)	2,697,486
	Total Foreign	2,711,187
		,, Imperial

TABLE I.—*Continued.*

Nature of Food Stuff.	Principal Sources in order of importance.	Annual Value.
12.—Salt Fish.	United States	£ 659,201
	Canada	566,053
	Norway	325,839
	Newfoundland	160,839
	Total Foreign	1,127,694
	„ Imperial	734,453
13.—Butter.	Denmark	5,948,463
	France	2,443,734
	Sweden	1,644,111
	Victoria	982,682
	Holland	939,326
	New Zealand	232,009
	N. S. Wales	203,938
	Total Foreign	12,660,793
„ Imperial	1,584,437	
14—Sugar.	Germany	6,511,780
	Many other sources.	
	Total Foreign	13,499,526
„ Imperial	1,528,112	

The preceding Table serves to bring out the importance of the Russian wheat supply, and the preponderating part played by the United States in the victualling of Great Britain.

Among the fourteen items detailed, Greater Britain secures the larger share in two only. Broadly speaking, it is in the meat trade alone that the Colonial supply is relatively important. In corn, grain, meal and flour, the surplus production of the Colonies available for consumption in the United Kingdom appears curiously deficient. From foreign countries, we receive the value of more than forty-four millions sterling, compared with little over £5,700,000 grown within the Empire.

The vast commerce of the Empire and the prosperity thence arising, is due wholly to successful war. In 1815, which year may, perhaps, be regarded as the dawn of the present Colonial system, the total exports and imports of the United Kingdom were about £96,000,000, considerably less, therefore, than the present trade of the Australasian group alone. The most valuable Colonial trade was then that of the West Indies,

which was, however, much less than one quarter of the present total. Commercial Statistics in the eighteenth and the early portion of the nineteenth century were not compiled with accuracy; but the results of successful war can be clearly traced in the following Table :—

TABLE J.

Period Covered.	Year.	Total Imports and Exports.
1.—Spanish War, and War of Anstrian succession.	1739	£ 16,672,997
	1748	19,277,609
2.—Seven years War.	1754	20,303,519
	1761	26,331,408
	1762	24,122,496
	1763	28,000,000
3.—American War of Independence.	1774	32,136,362
	1782	23,357,218
4.—Wars of the French Revolution and Empire.	1792	44,000,000
	1815	96,000,000

The general result upon British commerce of the four periods of great wars may thus be expressed as in the following Table:—

TABLE K.

Period Covered.	Increase.	Decrease.
	Per Cent.	Per Cent.
1.—Spanish War, and War of Austrian succession.	15.6	
2.—Seven years War.	32.9	
3.—American War of Independence.		27.3
4.—Wars of the French Revolution and Empire.	118.2	

These figures show that, except in one case, British commerce increased largely during the four periods of great wars under consideration. The exception—the War of American Independence—was due to the enormous strain thrown upon the national resources. It has been the customary task of Great Britain to successfully oppose combinations of naval Powers; but the active hostility of the three greatest navies of the age and the menace of all the other fleets of Europe, added to land wars with her indomitable kinsmen, and

with the formidable military power of the Marathas,* of Mysore, and of Hyderabad proved—not unnaturally—beyond the strength of the Island Kingdom. In such circumstances, complete success was impossible, and trade inevitably suffered. How terribly severe is the penalty which commerce may have to pay for naval insuccess, is proved by the mistaken Anglo-American War of 1812—14. A total United States trade of fifty millions sterling sank to less than £4,400,000, entailing wide-spread distress.

On the other hand, the astounding increase of British trade during the Wars of the French Revolution and Empire, in which again the Navy of England found itself opposed by fleets of all Europe, supplies the measure of the national triumph. Between 1792 and 1800 alone, the British trade increased sixty-five per cent., and “the loss by capture was less than two-and-a-half per cent. of the annual volume.”†

* The Marathas, states Sir A. Lyall, were, “nearly up to the end of the century, at least a match for the English.”—*Rise of the British Dominion in India*.

† *The Influence of Sea Power on the Wars of the French Revolution and Empire*. Captain Mahan estimates the increase of British trade from 1757 to 1761 at twenty-nine per cent.

Dealing with the question from a somewhat different point of view, Mr. Lecky states:--

It is a remarkable proof of the healthy financial condition* of England that in nearly every war her exports, though they, for a time, declined in value, soon ascended again till they reached and passed in the time of war, the level of the preceding peace. In the war which began in 1702, this was effected in ten years. In the war which began in 1739, it was effected in nine years. In the war which began in 1755, in 1758 the exports passed the figures of the preceding peace.

Thus wonderfully has British trade been guarded by the Navy in the past, even when the odds appeared overwhelming. Even more effectively can that trade be guarded now, if the sufficiency of the Navy is treated as the primary requirement of Imperial defence.

The recent re-production of a facsimile of *The Times* of the 9th November, 1796, supplies a significant reminder of the great change which has occurred in the means of conducting commercial operations. Under "Ship News," it was recorded on this date that the *Earl of Wycomb* arrived at the Cape on the 28th May, and that the *Cirencester* from China left St. Helena

* This "healthy financial condition" was evidently sustained by the Navy, to whose guardianship the increase of commerce was wholly due.

homeward bound on the 23rd March, while information from Falmouth is no less than four days old. Trade is now, for the most part, directed by cable, and a great system of Imperial communications, unknown in the last great wars, claims protection. An extensive and sustained interruption of certain cable lines* would inflict great injury upon commercial interests, apart from the great drawbacks arising from delay in communication for naval purposes. In guarding merchant vessels during war, cables can play an important part. Some special preparations for maintaining cable and telegraph lines may be needed, as will be explained later; but the necessary protection must mainly depend upon the command of the sea.

One other danger to commerce remains to be noticed. It has been stated that the rise of insurance premiums at the outbreak of war would press heavily, perhaps disastrously, upon British shipping. Underwriters could not at first measure risks of which they have no practical experience. Competition and the great ability

* It is certain that arrangements for cutting cables were contemplated by a foreign government at a recent period when war appeared probable.

with which business is carried on at Lloyds, would eventually lead to the establishment of rates bearing a just proportion to the measure of the risks. At the outset of a naval war, however, when calm judgment would be all-important, it is possible that panic might be promoted by the action of underwriters seeking large profits, or unable for lack of *data*, to assess the risks. Thus the *Trent* affair of 1861 enabled premiums of five per cent. to be obtained in some cases for war risks, although this rate would have been excessive even if hostilities had actually occurred. The deprecations of the *Alabama* and her consorts caused premiums to be fixed at the following figures:—

North of Europe	5 per cent.
Mediterranean	6 „
India	4½ „
Gulf	4 „
West Indies	5 „
Coast	1½ „

These rates were probably in excess of the actual risks, and were certainly much greater than need have been demanded if the considerable naval force at the disposal

of the United States had been properly handled. Immense profits were in fact realised by insurance offices. In 1870, German ships in the Baltic trade were insured at five per cent., and in individual cases at ten per cent., while one-and-a-half per cent. only was demanded on French vessels. The German losses by capture were not large, and the insurance offices must have made large profits. During the wars of the French Revolution, insurance rates rose to twelve per cent. with convoy, and twenty per cent. without. After Trafalgar, the rates fell, and throughout the period of war, many owners did not insure. Between 1793 and 1815, 10,871 British merchant ships were captured; but Captain Mahan shows that the total loss was probably less than two-and-a-half per cent., and great fortunes were made out of premiums.

In view of these facts, the late Admiral Sir G. Tryon advocated* a national system of war insurance. As he pointed out, "our greatest pinch will probably be immediately after the first two months of war." The uncertainty which is popularly assumed to attach to

* *United Service Magazine*, September, 1890.

modern naval operations, the sudden plunge into conditions of which there will be no experience in living memory, and the consequent dislocation of commercial arrangements, must tend to produce feelings closely allied to panic. At such a time, the strength and readiness of the Navy will be the guage of national security. But the Navy may need weeks or months to demonstrate its potentiality. Great naval actions have rarely followed close on the outbreak of war. On the 1st February, 1793, the French Convention declared war; but Howe's victory over de Villaret Joyeuse was not won till the 1st June, 1794. Trafalgar followed nearly a year-and-a-half after the renewal of hostilities on the 16th May, 1803. It is not certain that a great naval action will be risked by an enemy, with whom the option must lie. Meanwhile, the doubts which such an action might resolve may suffice to injure commerce even when the risks are moderate. Rumours will be rife; the sailing of "commerce destroyers" will be widely advertised, even when they are lying in port under close surveillance; insurance rates will advance by leaps and bounds.

In such circumstances, the measure urged by Sir George Tryon should serve to allay panic and to keep alive that confidence in the flag which will be worth many millions sterling. If the percentage of loss by capture at sea can be kept as low in the next naval war as it was in the last, and a smaller percentage ought to be easily attainable, then a system of State insurance, at fixed rates, of war risks would prove a trifling burden in proportion to the national advantage. Navigation, in accordance with regulations laid down by the Admiralty, would be a necessary condition of insurance, and every Colony which contributed to the naval defence of the Empire, should be entitled to the benefit.

In any discussion of the question of Imperial defence, considerations of trade are of cardinal importance. To all other Powers, such considerations are subordinate. For us alone, policy in war and measures of preparation in peace, are dictated by the vital need of guarding sea communications.

PART III.

THE NAVY.

The foundations of Imperial defence rest entirely upon maritime strength. If the Navy proves unable to maintain the sea communications of the Empire in war, all other preparations will be of no avail. If this condition is unfulfilled, other Imperial forces cannot be brought into effective action. Immense resources will be rendered unavailing, and co-operation in the defence of the national cause becomes impossible. The Empire will be split up into weak fragments, and great Colonies will sink into the position of feeble States lying at the mercy of any military Power which has obtained command of the sea. The means of existence of the 40

millions of people of the Mother Country will disappear. On the sufficiency and efficiency of the Navy the national safety thus absolutely depends. In recent years, this has been so often said as to be now almost a platitude; but full recognition of all that is implied has not yet been attained, and in Greater Britain especially the paramount necessity of retaining the command of the sea has not been adequately grasped.

In a remarkable article, written twenty-six years ago, Mr. Gladstone forcibly drew attention to our defective sense of imagination in the following words:—

“It is hard to say whether or when our countrymen will be fully alive to the vast advantages they derive from consummate means of naval defence. . . . Our lot would perhaps be too much favoured, if we possessed, together with such advantages, a full sense of what they are. Where the Almighty grants exceptional and peculiar benefits, He sometimes permits, by counterpoise, an insensibility to their value.”

As has been already pointed out, the explanation of this mental obscuration is to be sought in the processes by which the Empire was created. Trade, having supplied the initial impulse, became an absorbing interest. Each new settlement, engaged

from the first in vigorously combating difficulties of all kinds, could not give a thought to Imperial defence. The early struggles being ended, the thriving community grew into a great self-governing Colony, intensely pre-occupied with the solution of its own domestic problems. It might, and frequently did, regard questions of local defence, but could not be expected to occupy an Imperial standpoint.

Meanwhile, the Mother Country, half-bewildered by the rapidity of an expansion which she had not designed and could not restrain, more and more engrossed in island politics, and weighted with the grave responsibilities of India, gave little heed to the higher policy of defence. Even now the working classes appear to be under the delusion that mere local legislation can meet all their needs. There is no one to teach them that their prosperity depends entirely upon security of commerce, of which the Navy is the only possible guarantee.

The geographical conditions of the Empire have contributed to the clouding of the national imagination. Communications visible and palpable, such as

roads, railways, and rivers, appeal directly to the mind. The necessity for their maintenance is being continually enforced; their risks are understood and provided against. The pathless seas, however, create no such impression. Ships come and go, and the growing ease, speed, and certainty of maritime transit lures those who have not known naval war into forgetfulness of the doom which awaits naval inferiority. Wide-reaching, all-embracing are the operations of modern commerce; as wide-reaching is the disaster to which it is liable.

In the Address of the House of Lords to Queen Anne in 1708, the first principle of Imperial defence was thus admirably stated:—

“It is a most undoubted maxim that the honour, security and wealth of this kingdom depend on the protection and encouragement of Trade, and the improving and right managing our naval strength. Other nations who were formerly great and powerful at sea have, by negligence and mismanagement, lost their trade and seen their maritime strength entirely ruined. Therefore, we do in the most earnest manner beseech

your Majesty that the sea affair may be always your first and most peculiar care."

These words were written during the War of the Spanish Succession, in the year of Oudenarde and of Wynendale. The population of England and Wales was about five and a quarter millions, of Scotland one million, of Ireland two millions, and of France eighteen millions. Scotland was believed to be ready to rise in favour of the Pretender, who, with an escort of 5,000 French troops, had been sent thither by Louis XIV., but was prevented from landing by a squadron under Byng. The British Army was mainly employed under Marlborough in Flanders. The national trade was relatively trivial, and for some years the operations of the Navy had scarcely extended beyond European waters.

A century of great conflicts lay before the nation, and the view so strongly maintained by the House of Lords was curiously prophetic. At such a time, it would not have been surprising if the land and not the "sea affair" had been commended to "the most peculiar care" of the Queen. The clear lessons of

history must, however, have been present to the minds of the framers of the Address of 1708. For fully 900 years the Navy had been the gauge of the strength of England, and the only effective guarantee of her territorial security. As early as 287 A.D., Carausius, by gaining over the Roman fleet, had been able to proclaim himself Emperor of Britain, and to make his power felt in distant waters. "His fleets rode triumphant in the Channel, commanded the mouths of the Seine and the Rhine, ravaged the coasts of the ocean, and diffused beyond the Pillars of Hercules the terror of his name. . . . Under his command, Britain, destined in a future age to obtain the Empire of the Sea, already assumed its natural and respectable station of a maritime Power."* By the agency of naval force, laboriously created, Constantius was at length able to overcome the successor of Carausius, and, finding everywhere "obedient subjects," to restore the island "to the body of the Roman Empire."†

Towards the end of the eighth century, Offa, King

* Gibbon.

† Ibid.

of Mercia, began "to turn his thoughts on the proper means of securing his dominions from foreign attempts, which he soon saw could in no other way be done than by keeping up a naval force."* By this means, the projected invasion of Charlemagne was averted, and Offa, dying "after a glorious reign of 39 years, bequeathed to England this useful lesson, that he who will be secure on land must be supreme at sea."† The decay of the Navy of Offa quickly entailed successive inroads of Danes, by which the country was half ruined, till the fleet, restored and carefully nurtured by Alfred, again gave peace and prosperity to England. Athelstan and Edgar followed worthily in the footsteps of Alfred, and the latter not only established three great squadrons on the East, West, and North coasts, but made annual cruises of inspection. The fleet of Edgar is stated to have numbered at least 3,600 sail,‡ and although the average tonnage must have been trifling, the scale of

* *Lives of the Admirals*.—Campbell, 1779.

† Saxon Chronicles.

‡ "Some fix it at 3,600, others at 4,000; and there wants not authority to carry it as high as 4,800."—Campbell.

naval preparations implied seems remarkable. "By being always ready for war," Edgar "avoided it; so that in his whole reign there happened but one disturbance." * Under Ethelred, the Saxon Navy soon sank into inefficiency, and again the Danes harried the coasts of England, and burned Southampton. Naval defence being replaced by a system of subsidies, the reign of Ethelred proved naturally disastrous, and in 1013, Sweyn, after ravaging the country, proclaimed himself King at Bath.

The brief reign of Edmund was marked by a Danish ascent of the Thames and an attack on London; but with the accession of Canute in 1016, inroads ceased, and in 1027 English forces crossed the North Sea and played an important part in the conquest of Norway. After the restoration of the Saxon dynasty in 1042, intestine troubles paralyzed the naval strength of England, and the coasts of Kent, Suffolk and Norfolk were raided by sea-borne adventurers. Restored by Harold, the fleet won a great victory over the Norwegians; but, for reasons

* Campbell.

which are somewhat obscure, no ships were available to dispute the passage of William of Normandy.

The irruption of the Normans is frequently referred to as if it were the conquest of a united people in a single battle, and has thus served as the text of homilies intended to inculcate the liability of Great Britain to invasion. The political conditions in 1066 are too generally forgotten. Harold had no time to consolidate his power, and his right to the succession was from the first disputed. William was a rival claimant of the throne, and the death of Harold at Senlac left the people of England without a leader, and divided, "One part of the nation adhering to Edgar Atheling, the undoubted heir of the crown, and another inclining to espouse the party of the great Earls Edwin and Morker ; this division disabled both."* It is not even correct to speak of the England of the eleventh century as a nation in the modern sense. Political conditions, rather than the single victory for which William had carefully prepared, brought the Saxon dynasty to an end, and between the circum-

* Campbell.

stances of 1066 and those of to-day there exists no possible parallel. It is remarkable that a great part of the English fleet seems to have adhered to its Saxon allegiance, and under the sons of Harold was able for a time to harass the Normans.*

The consequences of the establishment of the Norman dominion were momentous. England at once became, and long remained, a continental State, and the last foothold on French soil was not relinquished till 1558. The Navy, in Saxon times, as always, the only real safeguard against territorial aggression, thus became further necessary as a link between insular and continental Britain.

The French possessions of the Duke of Normandy proved a *damnosa hereditas*. For nearly 400 years they were the direct cause of a series of wars, and when towards the end of the reign of Henry VI., the continental dominions of England dwindled to Calais, the tradition that the soil of France was the natural battlefield of English armies still lingered. In 1522,

* For want of these ships, William was compelled in 1069 to buy off a Danish invasion. It is curious that the Irish appear to have supported the sons of Harold, as 600 years later they upheld the cause of the Stuarts.

an English force penetrated as far as Amiens ravaging the country.

Sustained communications were not vital to armies then as now. The requirements of troops, comparatively few and simple, could to a great extent be supplied by the country occupied. Moreover, the French territories of England long served as a base, while Frenchmen must have formed a large portion of the armies which won Crecy and Poitiers.

The long maintenance of her continental dominions, and the persistency of her efforts to retain them are, however, convincing proofs that, throughout this period, England on the whole maintained her sea power. The protection of her commerce did not as yet make great demands upon the Navy; but the measure of the security of her coasts depended absolutely upon the fleet.

Towards the end of the reign of William I, the Danes for the last time made great preparations for an invasion, which was not attempted. A portion of the fleet of Henry I. espoused the cause of his elder brother Robert, who was therefore able to land an

army at Portsmouth in 1101. In 1106, Henry succeeded in conquering Normandy, equipping a large number of ships for the purpose. Henry II. maintained a considerable fleet, which aided in the conquest of Ireland, averted a projected invasion in 1174, and furnished assistance to the crusades.

In 1190, Richard I. fitted out a great expedition which he joined at Messina and after capturing Cyprus, took part in the long siege of Acre. This, the first great over-sea venture of England, was undertaken in alliance with France; but King Philip quitted Palestine before the close of the campaign, and in 1194, the two countries were at war. There can be little doubt that the active participation of Richard I. in the third Crusade gave an impetus to the English Navy, and pointed the way to action in distant waters. In days, when our right to maintain a fleet in the Mediterranean is questioned by publicists, it is well to remember that English ships in great force entered the historic inland sea seven hundred years ago.

The French campaigns of John were disastrous;

but the Navy was well maintained throughout his reign, and a projected invasion in 1213, was frustrated by the destruction of the enemy's fleet at Damme in Flanders. This, though like the battle of the Nile, not an action fought in the open sea, seems to be the first considerable achievement of the English Navy. In 1216, the revolted barons offered the Crown to the Dauphin, who, landing at Sandwich, reached London unopposed, thus accomplishing what has been inaccurately accounted a successful invasion. The sailors of the Cinque Ports, however, maintaining their allegiance, appear to have intercepted the supplies of the invaders, and the French cause, which had begun to wane before the death of John, was finally ruined in 1217 by the naval victory won off the North Foreland by Hubert de Burgh. The French force was greatly superior, and the good seamanship of the Cinque Ports squadron seems to have been the principal cause of this important success. Louis, now completely cut off, at once accepted terms, and the command of the Channel thus obtained, appears to have been unchallenged during the rest of the reign.

The campaigns of Henry III. in France were uniformly unfortunate; but there was no attempt to interfere with the frequent passages of English troops.

Edward I. employed a large naval force to aid in the conquest of Wales, and subsequently maintained a strong squadron on the coast of Scotland. The customary French war began in 1293 in a private naval quarrel. After desultory hostilities without any official sanction, the fleet of the Cinque Ports seems to have arranged with its adversaries for a general trial of strength. This probably unique action was fought on the 14th April, 1293, and ended in a great victory for the English sailors. The reign of Edward I. is remarkable for the formal claim advanced to the sovereignty of the seas — a claim which appears to have been admitted by several foreign peoples.

Internal troubles during the reign of Edward II. enfeebled the Navy; but an invasion projected by Charles IV. of France was effectually prevented by the fleet of the Cinque Ports.

The long French wars of Edward III. began in

1338 with numerous raids on the Southern coasts of England. Southampton and Plymouth were burned, several other towns were pillaged or insulted, and two large ships were taken in action with a greatly superior force. An English descent upon Boulogne resulted in the destruction of shipping, stores and docks. On the 24th June, 1340, the King won a great naval victory at Sluys inflicting enormous losses upon the French and their Genoese allies, and subsequently landing troops who invested Tournay without result. In 1346, a great expeditionary force landed at La Hogue to fight at Crecy, and in the following year Calais fell after a long seige and blockade. Depredations by the Spaniards on English commerce in the Channel led to the second great naval victory of Edward III., gained off Winchelsea,* on the 29th August, 1350. Six years later France was again invaded by the Black Prince, and King John, taken prisoner at Poitiers, was hospitably entertained by the Lord Mayor of London. In 1359, an English army appeared before Paris. Other

* This battle is generally known as *L'Espagnol sur mer*.

expeditions followed; but the increasing exhaustion of the nation began to tell heavily upon the Navy, and again French descents upon the South coast occurred.* In 1372 a squadron under the Earl of Pembroke, sent to the relief of Rochelle, was totally defeated by a superior Spanish force. Notwithstanding this disaster, an expeditionary force under the Duke of Lancaster landed at Calais in the following year and marched through France to Bordeaux. During the closing years of the reign of Edward III., the English cause in France rapidly declined.

The decadence of the Navy was strikingly manifested immediately after the accession of Richard II. John de Vienne, the first great Admiral of France, aided by Spanish and Scotch ships, swept the Channel, and systematically ravaged the Southern and Eastern coasts. Plymouth, Portsmouth, Hastings, Gravesend, Yarmouth and Scarborough, were burned, and the Isle of Wight was partly occupied. In 1385, a powerful fleet was assembled at Sluys by Charles VI.

* According to the "Circle of Commerce," printed in 1633, the total exports and imports of England in the year 1355 were about £549,400.—*Entick*.

for the invasion of England; but no attempt was made, and in 1386, 20,000 troops, under the Duke of Lancaster, sailed for the relief of Brest. This accomplished, the force was landed at Corunna, and in alliance with Portugal, enforced terms upon the King of Castile. This, the first Peninsular War, seems to have been bloodless; but it is remarkable that a distant expedition of such magnitude should have been undertaken when danger threatened at home.

During this period of weakness at sea, there were not wanting signs that the spirit of naval enterprise still animated the nation. If there was no great naval victory, minor successes were won in the Channel, and private citizens sought to remedy the shortcomings of their rulers. John Philpot, an Alderman of London, fitted out a squadron, which defeated the forces of Mercer, a Scotch adventurer who had made numerous captures on the East coast. The inhabitants of Portsmouth similarly equipped ships which fought a successful little action on their own account. "So very apparent it is," writes Campbell, "that if our affairs go wrong, this ought to be ascribed to the rulers

and not to the people, who are naturally jealous of our national glory and ready enough to sacrifice, as is indeed their duty, both their persons and properties for its defence."

Desultory warfare in the Channel marked the reign of Henry IV. Descents upon the coast were made on both sides, and a French force was landed at Milford Haven in aid of the Welsh insurrection. On the whole, however, the balance of advantage in these raids seems to have been with the English, who won several small naval successes, and in 1412 carried the war into Normandy, Maine, and the territories of the Duke of Orleans.

Henry V. devoted his whole energy to the conquest of France, and wisely judged that a powerful navy was indispensable to the accomplishment of his ambition. New ships were built and others hired in Holland. The military preparations were deliberate and complete. Sailing from Southampton in 1415 with 1,400 ships and 30,000 troops, the King landed near Harfleur, which was besieged and taken. Agincourt was fought on the 25th October, and the English

force marched to Calais, where Henry re-embarked with his prisoners. The French now made great naval preparations, subsidising the Genoese and obtaining aid from Spain. Harfleur was blockaded, and unsuccessful attempts were made against Southampton and the Isle of Wight. Realising, as some of his predecessors failed to do, that in order to carry on the war effectually, the enemy's fleet must first be dealt with, Henry sent a force of 400 sail under his brother John Duke of Bedford to attack the French. On the 15th August, 1416, a great victory was won off the mouth of the Seine, in which 500 ships are said to have been taken or destroyed, including three Genoese vessels of exceptional tonnage, from which much was vainly expected. After the action, the English fleet lay becalmed and was vigorously attacked by French galleys—the torpedo boats of the day. The siege of Harfleur was raised soon afterwards, and the reinforced garrison took the offensive. On the 25th July, 1417, another great naval victory was won in the Channel by the Earl of Huntingdon, the French Admiral and four large Genoese ships being captured.

The command of the narrow seas had now been definitely obtained, and Henry, with about 25,000 men, embarked on the 28th July, and landing in Normandy on the 1st August, conquered a great part of France. Paris was threatened, and by the Treaty of Troyes in May, 1420, it was agreed that Henry should become Regent of France, with succession to the throne on the death of Charles VI. A final campaign, 1421—2, against the Dauphin was equally successful, and, at the death of Henry, England held sway over most of France north of the Loire. This reign of nine years ranks among the heroic periods of our history; but the exhaustion of the nation was extreme, and the splendid military achievements of Henry V. brought no permanent advantage.

Soon after the accession of Henry VI. in 1422, the English power in France began again to wane, and although the King was crowned in Paris in 1431, the downward progress continued till, in 1453, Calais alone remained. Charles VII. appears to have contemplated an invasion of England, and sought a Danish alliance for the purpose; but beyond a descent upon Sandwich

in 1457 little was effected, and in the following year the Earl of Warwick defeated a Spanish squadron.

The Wars of the Roses necessarily weakened the Navy of England for external action; but historians have failed to trace adequately the influence of sea power upon the great dynastic contest. The commanding position assumed by the Earl of Warwick was mainly due to the fleet, and when, with French assistance, he landed at Dartmouth in 1471, Edward IV. was driven to escape to Holland. As soon as the King was re-established on the throne, the fleet appears to have returned to its allegiance, and in 1475, Edward embarked at Sandwich with 500 sail and landed 20,000 men at Calais to aid the Duke of Burgundy against Louis XI. Peace was, however, concluded at Amiens, and the French King agreed to pay an annual pension, which Edward expended upon his Navy. During the rest of the reign, no French aggression was attempted, and Louis is stated to have subsidised the Privy Council with a view to his own security.

The first attempt of Henry of Richmond was

frustrated by the Navy of Richard III., but the English fleet having been dismantled, Henry sailed from Havre and landed at Milford Haven on the 8th August, 1485, to win the Crown at Bosworth Field on the 22nd.

The Navy was carefully nurtured during the reign of Henry VII., who built the first real English battleship and laid the foundations of a regular naval force permanently held at the disposal of the Crown. Averse to war, the King determined to be strong at sea. Charles VIII. of France and the Duke of Brittany having both appealed for English assistance, large subsidies were obtained from Parliament, and a considerable force was sent to Calais. This demonstration proved successful, and after concluding a treaty, the King returned, "keeping, however, his squadrons at sea; for, though he loved peace, yet it was his fixed maxim, that he might keep it, to be in constant readiness for war; which was the reason that during his reign, the marine was in better condition than under any of his predecessors."*

* Campbell.

No naval successes marked a reign which, nevertheless, constitutes a most important chapter in the maritime history of England. The nation was secure from foreign aggression, and but for prolonged internal troubles, would have prospered exceedingly. Trade received direct encouragement, and treaties of commerce were made with Denmark and Castile. On the 24th June, 1497, John Cabot, under special license from the King, sailed with five ships from Bristol, discovered Labrador and Newfoundland, and afterwards reached the coast of Florida. Four years after Cabot's first voyage, letters-patent for creating settlements in newly-discovered countries were granted by the Crown to two merchants of Bristol. Henry VII. may, perhaps, be regarded as the pioneer of Imperial expansion, while his policy, unlike that of most of his predecessors, seems to have been directed to making England strong, but not aggressive.

The reign of Henry VIII. produced three French wars, and, as usual, the military operations were carried out on French territory. In 1512, Sir Edward Howard, the Lord High Admiral, fought an

indecisive battle, remarkable for the action of the *Regent* and the French *Cordelier*, in which both were destroyed. In the following year he blockaded Brest, where the French fleet lay waiting the arrival of a galley squadron from the Mediterranean, and after ravaging the surrounding country, was killed in a galley action. In 1544, Boulogne was taken by a fleet and land force; but in the following year, when the war with Scotland made great demands upon the naval and military strength of the kingdom, a French descent upon the Isle of Wight was attempted without success, and reprisals in Normandy soon followed. It seems clear, however, that for a time the fleet at Portsmouth was unable to face the French at sea.

Henry VIII. created the Royal Dockyards of Woolwich and Deptford, founded the Corporation of Trinity House, and bestowed care upon the general maritime interests of the kingdom. In 1530, William Hawkyns, father of the great Elizabethan seaman, sailed from Plymouth, and in three voyages to Brazil and the Guinea coast, became the pioncer of a South American trade.

During the brief and troubled reign of Edward VI., the fleet was employed with little success against the Scotch, who were strongly supported by France. A French expedition to Jersey and Guernsey was forced by a squadron under Commodore Winter to re-embark with the loss of several ships; but the guardianship of the Channel appears to have been indifferently maintained, and trade suffered much loss. In 1550, Boulogne was given up to France in return for a money payment.

The Navy which had been on a down grade during the reign of Edward VI., sank lower during that of Mary; but throughout the war of 1557—58, the Spanish fleet aided in neutralising the French power at sea. Calais with a garrison of 500 men surrendered on the 7th January, 1558. On the 3rd July, an action was fought off Gravelines between the French and Spaniards, which, by means of the timely co-operation of an English squadron, ended in a decisive victory for the latter. Raids upon the coast of Brittany followed.

From the days of Offa to those of Elizabeth, a

period of nearly 800 years, the security of England depended absolutely upon the Navy. The vicissitudes were great; periods of naval strength and of naval weakness alternated with much regularity. The one brought prosperity and power; Nemesis swiftly followed the other. As navies slowly grew into organised forces, and as their mobility increased with the progress of the sailing art, the assertion of this law might have been expected. The crude assemblages of ships in Saxon times, however, illustrated the "influence of sea power upon history," as completely as the fleets wielded by Jervis and Nelson. It would be easy to argue at length that an extended coast line could not possibly be defended by such naval means as were at the disposal of the Saxon, Norman and Plantagenet Kings. Evasion, of which we now frequently hear, may seem to have been then a simple and natural proceeding. Yet the immunity of the sea-board during the periods when the naval strength of England was maintained, and the recurrence of devastating raids as soon as weakness at sea was manifested, admit of only one

explanation. It was not by accident that the incursions of Danes and Norsemen ceased during the reigns of Offa, Alfred, Athelstan and Edgar, or that the later years of Edward III. brought national discredit.

Until the irruption of the Normans, the function of the Navy was almost entirely that of coast defence. During the reign of Canute, however, operations across the sea were, for the first time, undertaken. After 1066, the Navy became an essential factor in the long contest for Continental dominion, which involved the nation in at least sixteen French wars. That English armies constantly crossed the Channel, that long campaigns were fought on French soil, and that the French coast line was constantly ravaged, proves conclusively that the control of the narrow sea was, on the whole, maintained. Some great naval victories were won during this period, and the occasional reverses were relatively unimportant, and generally due to marked inferiority of force. It was inevitable that French descents upon the English coast-line should sometimes

occur, and considering the immense moral and material injury inflicted upon France, it is natural that raids and invasions should have been projected by our neighbours. The former were trivial in their results compared to those carried out by England;* the latter can scarcely be said to have been even attempted. This can be attributed only to the sea power of the island Kingdom. Having regard to the many internal convulsions, the comparative poverty and paucity of the population, and the long series of Scotch, Welsh, and Irish wars, the vigorous offensive measures frequently taken, and the immunity of England from effective reprisals, appear alike astonishing. Previous to, as after, the accession of Elizabeth, there were periods of marked naval weakness; but the spirit of a race of seamen was never lost, and as soon as national effort was again brought to bear upon the fleet, natural aptitude for maritime warfare at once re-asserted itself. The early tendency of the French to seek

* The occasional burning of English coast towns is sometimes alleged as a proof of the uncertainties attendant on naval defence; but such exploits did not take place when the strength of the Navy was well maintained, and the achievements upon the French coast-line, which are seldom recalled by modern writers, form an amazing record.

naval allies — Danish, Genoese, and Spanish — in the contest with England, is worthy of note.

The functions and the responsibilities of the Navy thus increased materially after the Conquest. To territorial defence were added the frequent transport and support of armies operating across the sea, the harassing of an enemy's coast-line, and the protection of a growing commerce. The last-named duty was destined to become vitally important.

The maintenance of her sea power was not consistently upheld as the guiding principle of the policy of England. The knowledge was acquired by bitter experience, to be often forgotten and recalled by disaster. There are, however, signs, even in pre-Elizabethan days, that this principle found occasional exponents. The words of the Saxon Chronicles above quoted* are significant, and an elaborate poem entitled "*De politica conservativa Maris*," produced about the year 1460, eloquently tells the secret of the sea. The general introduction of this remarkable work runs as follows:—

* See page 83.

“Here beginneth the prologue of the processe of the libel of English Policie, exhorting all England to keep the Sea, and namely the narrowe Sea: showing what profite cometh thereof, and also what worship and salvation to England and to all Englishmen.”

A gold coin* of Edward III., suggests the following lines to this old writer:—

“For four Things our Noble sheweth unto me,
King, Ship and Sword, and Power of the Sea.”

This really wonderful poem ends with the following stanza, which deserves to be remembered:—

“Keep then the Sea about in special,
Which of England is the Town-wall;
As though England were likened to a city,
And the Wall environ were the Sea.
Keep then the Sea that is the wall of England,
And then is England kept by God's hand,
That for anything that is without,
England were at ease withouten doubt.”

* This coin is represented on the cover and title page of the Armada volumes, published by the Navy Record Society.

In the same strain fifteen hundred years earlier, wrote Thucydides and Herodotus; so, later, were the great seamen of Elizabeth and of George III. to write. Yet, in our day, forty-five years of immunity from naval war sufficed almost to obliterate the teaching of twenty centuries, and the fleet came to be widely regarded as an illusory protection to a maritime Empire.

The reign of Elizabeth, bringing England into conflict with the greatest sea power of the age, threw a halo of glory round the Navy. The fleet had saved the nation and the fact must have been plain to the dullest imagination. Defeat would have entailed the landing of Parma's army, and there were no forces on shore capable of resisting the trained troops of Spain. Never before or afterwards was the national danger so great; but, in 1588, as always, the Navy stood between England and invasion, and the Armada would never have reached the Channel if the sea officers had obtained a free hand.

Naval enterprise in distant seas had, however, anticipated the successive actions in the Channel by

which the Spanish Fleet was half destroyed and wholly cowed. In 1568, Drake and Hawkyns with a little squadron of five vessels were caught at San Juan de Luce by an overwhelming Spanish force and narrowly escaped. In 1572, Drake sailed from Plymouth and returned in the following year laden with Spanish treasure, having captured Nombre de Dios, and sacked Venta Cruz and other towns. In 1577—80, he sailed round the world, taking Spanish ships wherever met, raiding many Spanish settlements, and bringing back booty valued at a million and a half sterling. Again in 1585, the Spanish possessions in the West Indies were effectually raided, and St. Jago, Carthagena, St. Domingo, and St. Augustin were taken. In 1587, when the Spanish preparations were in full progress, Drake with a squadron of twenty-four ships descended upon Cadiz, “sank, burnt, or brought away thirty-seven of the enemy’s vessels,”* offered battle to Santa Cruz at Lisbon, and sailing down to the Azores captured the rich

* Professor Laughton. Introduction to the Armada volumes of the Navy Records Society.

Spanish East Indiaman *San Felipe*. The overthrow of the Spanish navy, following upon exploits such as these, clearly pointed the way to expansion across the seas, and Spanish dominion in the New World, which Elizabeth declined to recognise, was now directly challenged.

Henceforth the wonderful history of the Navy merges in that of the growth of the Empire which has been sketched above.* The scope of action of the fleet and its responsibilities were to be immensely extended. No longer employed only in coast defence, in carrying armies to and from France, and in raiding the French coast line, it could aspire to the "rule of the sea — a mighty dominion,"† in which lay the sure promise of Empire.

Throughout the period of expansion by conquest abroad (1572 — 1814), the Navy has defined the frontier beyond which the Army could act. It has never failed the nation, except when deliberately neglected, as in 1667, or weakened by the concen-

* See Part I. pp. 9-34.

† Thucydides.

tration of effort upon subsidiary objects. It has usually been called upon to oppose combinations of Powers, and in the Wars of American Independence and the French Revolution, it may be said to have withstood the whole naval force of Europe. During this period, its earlier *rôle* of guarding the coast line of England has been necessarily included in the far greater function of obtaining and holding the command of the sea. Hostile descents upon the sea-board of the United Kingdom have, therefore, been few and wholly unimportant. It is a most remarkable fact that when, at the end of the eighteenth century, a French invasion was regarded as imminent, no one knew what military preparations to adopt. "No modern record of the necessary precautions appearing to exist, Mr. Pitt gave an instruction to Mr. Bruce to search all the records of the State Paper Office, and to prepare an account of the measures adopted by Queen Elizabeth on the descent of the Spanish Armada on these shores."* So completely had the idea of protecting England by military force dropped out of remembrance.

* Clode.

In proportion to the expansion of the Empire and the growth of a vast sea-borne commerce,* the primary duty of the Navy became more and more all-embracing, until, as was pointed out in 1888 by three distinguished Admirals,† “it would not require the landing of a single man” upon the shores of England “to bring her to an ignominious capitulation, for by her Navy she must stand or fall.” Unfortunately, all that is implied in these words is not yet fully understood.

In the Seven Years' War, the command of the sea was absolutely asserted by the British Navy. In the War which arose out of the revolt of the North American Colonies, the enormous strain thrown upon the national resources told heavily upon the Navy; but there were no naval disasters, and although the Treaty of Versailles was regarded as humiliating, the growth of the Empire was only checked—not crippled. The fact that thrice during this War the British fleet offered battle to superior French forces deserves to be

* See Part II. p. 50.

† Sir W. Dowell, Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, and Sir F. Richards.

recalled. Hood off Martinique in April, 1781, could oppose only seventeen ships to the twenty-four of De Grasse. Graves off the Chesapeake gave battle with nineteen ships to twenty-four in September. And again, off St. Kitts in January, 1782, Hood, with twenty-two sail, attacked De Grasse with twenty-nine. The numerical odds in these cases were at least as great as those which obtained in the battles of the Revolutionary Wars, and the French navy, untouched by the disturbing political influences which Captain Mahan has described, was then in its zenith.

In the two succeeding Wars, the Navy won and held the "mighty dominion" of the sea. It is just to state that the Navy has never failed in the hour of need, that since it became an organised body, it has never suffered a great reverse, and that the recuperative power instantly evinced, when, after periods of depression, effort was again directed to the sea, is unparalleled. No other fighting body in the history of the world can show a comparable record.

The following Table, indicating the small naval

means with which great wars were begun and the rapid subsequent expansion, is extremely significant:—

TABLE L.

Year	IN COMMISSION.		Total Vessels	Seamen	Marines	Total Personnel
	Line of Battle Ships	Frigates and Sloops				
1755	23	57	90	12,000	—	12,000
1756	88	110	198	40,800	9,133	49,933
1757	115	183	298	51,645	18,355	70,000
1775	31	71	102	13,646	4,354	18,000

GRADUAL INCREASE TO :—

1780	110	254	364	66,221	18,779	85,000
1783	126	314	440	72,851	12,115	84,966
1792	18	102	120	11,576	4,425	16,001
1794	90	224	314	72,851	12,115	84,966
1797	131	469	600	100,000	20,000	120,000

LITTLE CHANGE UNTIL :—

1801	142	554	696	105,000	20,000	125,000
1805	124	574	698	90,000	30,000	120,000
1810	156	682	838	113,600	31,400	145,000

The proportion of frigates and sloops to battleships, which was small during the Seven Years' War, rose

markedly in the War of American Independence, and became about 4 : 1 in the Wars of the French Revolution and Empire.

Since the peace of 1815, the prestige of 900 years has sufficed to guard the onward path of the Empire. Naval strength, actual or potential, has maintained for Great Britain the dignity and the influence of a great Power. As Nelson wrote: "A fleet of British battleships are the best negociators in Europe. They always speak not to be misunderstood, and generally gain their point." The white ensign has effectually secured the growing commerce and prosperity of the Colonies, and has enabled the Army to wage war alike against the great military power of Russia and the feeble revolt of Arabi. Of any decadence of the naval attributes which won the Nile and Trafalgar there is no sign. Whether at Algiers, Navarino, in the Sea of Azof and in the trenches before Sebastopol, on the difficult waters of the Parana and the Zambesi, or in handling squadrons and ships in all the seas of the world, the officers and men of Her Majesty's Navy have shown that they possess in full measure

the qualities by which alone, now as always, naval victories can be won.

In the great wars of the past, superiority of *matériel* has not, as a rule, been on the side of the British Navy. Many of the great naval battles were fought with numerically inferior forces, and in some of the most memorable of the single ship actions, inferiority of size, armament and crew has been a marked feature. Superior discipline, training, resourcefulness, and above all knowledge of the sea, were the determining causes of victory. It is possible that natural aptitude for sea warfare, inherited instincts, and unrivalled traditions of success, may, in some measure, have induced disregard of technical requirements. In early days, before specialised vessels of war had arisen, and when, therefore, the evolution of ship-building was ruled entirely by considerations of fitness for sea-going purposes, it is probable that English craft were superior, in many respects, to their rivals. Thus the promiscuous fleet, which hounded the Armada to destruction, was undoubtedly more mobile, more handy, and more sea-worthy than

its antagonist; while, in the number and weight of their guns,—weapons which the Spaniards despised—“the English had a great comparative advantage.”* When, however, another great nation set to work to systematically build up a navy, technical advantage ceased to be on the side of England. About 1662, Colbert, the great Minister of France, began the reconstruction of a fleet which had practically ceased to exist. Bringing all available science and rare personal knowledge to bear upon his task, Colbert within six years succeeded in putting afloat 199 ships of war, exclusive of galleys.† In 1683, the Marquis de Seignelay, Colbert’s son, “succeeded to the administration of a force which, in respect to equipment and organisation, was far superior to that maintained by any other Power in the world.”‡ The speed of ship construction attained under Colbert’s administration was absolutely unrivalled, and “in July, 1679, a forty-gun frigate was actually built at Toulon in seven hours.§” Technical perfection is,

* *Defeat of the Spanish Armada.*—Professor Laughton.

† *Studies in Naval History.*—Professor Laughton.

‡ Professor Laughton.

§ *Ibid.*

however, only one of the many elements of sea power. The new fleet of France did not show to advantage in the Dutch war, and was shattered by Russell and Rooke at La Hogue in 1692.

Nevertheless, the powerful impetus supplied by Colbert remained. Throughout the Wars of the Revolution and Empire (1793 — 1814) French ships were generally better built, and better equipped than our own; while, in speed of construction, the English yards were unable to compete. The superior sailing qualities of French ships caused the command of prizes to be eagerly sought after by British captains. Captured vessels were copied wholesale, and “as late as 1850, out of 150 ships on the Navy List, upwards of fifty were from foreign models.” *

Until recent years, British naval administration has not developed any marked originality in ship-building, and has occasionally shown a curious reluctance to adopt technical improvements. Alike, in small matters, such as the percussion lock, and in great changes, such as screw propulsion and the employment of

* *The Development of Navies.*—Captain S. Eardley Wilmot, R.N.

armour, Great Britain has been content to follow the lead of other Powers. France, the United States, and Italy have left an impress upon British warships.

Meanwhile there has been no sign of any corresponding reluctance to advance on the part of private ship-builders, and in inventive power Great Britain has never lagged behind her rivals. Iron construction was adopted in the mercantile marine some years before the building of the *Birkenhead* for the Navy in 1845, and this vessel was made into a troop-ship in deference to the prevailing prejudice. Similarly, screw propulsion made rapid progress before it was established in British war vessels. The designs of Captain Cowper Coles were reduced to practical form before those of Ericsson; but it needed the action of the *Monitor* and *Merrimac* and the subsequent arrival of the *Miantonomok* at Portsmouth, to secure the adoption of the turret principle. The genius and enterprise of British builders created and perfected the torpedo boat which may almost be said to have come back to us from abroad.

The supercession of the wooden sailing vessel by the

steel-built, armoured, or protected steamer, has been the most remarkable naval development of Her Majesty's reign. It is sometimes stated that this revolution in ship-building is prejudicial to the maritime interests of the Empire. No possible change could have conferred so great an advantage upon British sea power. The enormous manufacturing resources of the country—special resources which have long been and remain unrivalled in Europe—have become available for the service of the fleet. "The United Kingdom," writes Lord Brassey," is a huge naval workshop." At least ten private yards can turn out a modern battleship. Fully one million tons of steam shipping could be built in a year. The advantage in speed of construction has passed to this side of the Channel, and "in no other country would it be possible to float such a ship as the *Majestic* out of dock eight months after the keel was laid."*

Coal is now the primary requirement of a mobile fleet, and not only does England provide steam coal of the best quality, but spread over the Empire there

* Lord Brassey.

are independent sources of supply. Newfoundland, Vancouver, and Cape Breton, South Africa, Natal, Australia, New Zealand, and Labuan, can all contribute to the essential need of the Navy. In proportion to the increase of the cost of the warship, the wealth of Great Britain tends more and more to her advantage, and, at the same time, British ship-building is more economical than that of any other Power. A German writer, independently corroborating the results arrived at by other calculations, estimates that £32 expended on the British Navy is the equivalent of £39 in Germany, £40 in Italy, £49 in France, £96 in Russia, and £100 in the United States. The building of warships for foreign Powers has naturally, therefore, assumed a considerable position among the national industries. This may have its drawbacks,* but the fact remains that, in steel ship construction, whether of battleships, cruisers, fast mercantile steam vessels or destroyers, the powers of production of the United Kingdom are absolutely unrivalled. A great war in

* On the outbreak of war, however, it would generally be possible to supplement the Navy by vessels building for other Powers.

which the Empire is involved will not be an affair of weeks, and the immense manufacturing and refitting capacities of Great Britain are factors of supreme importance. From every point of view—the free action of the fleet over the seas of the world, the facilities of coal supply, the security by evasion of the mercantile marine, the means of expansion in war—the advantages of steam and steel are on the side of British sea power.

The evolution of the modern Navy, since the completion of the *Warrior* in 1861, is a fascinating study which cannot be here entered upon. The contest between the gun and armour, the assumed capabilities of the ram, the invention of the White-head torpedo, and the introduction of quick-firing medium and small ordnance, have all left their mark on the designs of warships. Varying ideas and fluctuating opinions have combined to produce types which present curious points of difference. Our own fleet alone is a veritable history in iron and steel of changing phases of policy, of much controversy, and of unchecked progress in guns and armour.

For the moment, however, the construction of British warships seems to have fallen into the following types which are fairly defined ;—

(1.) BATTLESHIPS.—The original idea—realised in *La Gloire*, completed in 1859—of a continuously armoured side, protecting all the main deck guns, has long disappeared before the growing power of Ordnance. Armour is now distributed, partly for the protection of the hull and partly for that of the guns' positions. All recent British battleships have a complete armoured deck on which stands an armour belt covering about three-fifths of the length of the side. Beyond the belt at each end the armoured deck is below the water-line and curved in form, dipping down towards the bow and stern. Within the belt, this deck is horizontal and a little above the water-line, but sloping down on either side to join the lower edge of the belt. On the horizontal armoured deck, two pear-shaped armoured redoubts are built up, and the ends of the armour belt are returned to meet the redoubts thus forming splayed armoured bulk-heads. The heavy armament, consisting of four 13½-in., 12-in., or 10-in.

guns, is mounted in pairs upon the redoubts. The secondary armament of 6-in. or 4·7-in. quick-firing guns is disposed on the main or upper deck and is wholly or partly protected by shields or armoured casemates covering individual guns. The minor armament of 12-pr., 6-pr. or 3-pr. quick-firing guns is partly protected by shields to individual guns. In addition, 3-pr. quick-firing guns with light protection are carried in the fighting tops.

Such, in brief, are the characteristics of fifteen battleships,* of which the *Trafalgar*, launched in September, 1887, was the first. In addition twelve such vessels are now building or completing for sea. Of these twenty-seven vessels, the *Majestic* class of nine † have 14,900 tons displacement; the *Royal Sovereign* class of seven, and the *Hood*, have 14,150 tons; and all seventeen have 17·5 knots speed. The *Canopus* class ‡ of five have 12,955 tons; the *Renown* has 12,350

* *Trafalgar*, *Nile*, *Royal Sovereign*, *Empress of India*, *Hood*, *Repulse*, *Ramilies*, *Resolution*, *Revenge*, *Royal Oak*, *Centurion*, *Barfleur*, *Magnificent*, *Majestic*, *Renown*.

† 1. *Magnificent*; 2. *Majestic*. Building or completing: 3. *Illustrious*; 4. *Cæsar*; 5. *Hannibal*; 6. *Mars*; 7. *Jupiter*; 8. *Victorious*; 9. *Prince George*.

‡ Building: 1. *Glory*; 2. *Albion*; 3. *Goliath*; 4. *Ocean*; 5. *Canopus*.

tons and 18 knots; the *Centurion* and *Barfleur* 10,500 tons and 18.5 knots; the *Nile* and *Trafalgar* 11,940 tons and 16.5 knots. The above vessels will form the cream of the battleship fleet, and out of all the navies of the world an equal force could not be made up.

The *Majestic* (Plates I. and I.A) has a 4-2½-in. steel deck, 9-in. partial belt, 14.9-in. bulkhead, 14.6-in. redoubt, 6-in. steel protection for secondary armament, and 2-in. for eight of her 12-pr. The armament is four 12-in. guns, twelve 6-in. Q.F. guns, sixteen 12-pr. Q.F. guns, twelve 3-pr. Q.F. guns, and eight machine guns.

(2.) FIRST-CLASS CRUISERS. — The later first-class cruisers have no side armour; but are provided with a continuous armoured deck 6-in. to 1-in. steel. Individual guns are more or less protected by shields. The armaments consist of 9.2-in., 6-in. Q.F., 12-pr. Q.F., 6-pr. Q.F., and 3-pr. Q.F. guns. The following groups may be distinguished:—*Powerful* and *Terrible*, of 14,200 tons and 22 knots; *Diadem* class* (8), of 11,000 tons and 20.5 knots; *Edgar* class (9), of 7,350 or 7,700 tons, and about 19.5 knots.

* Building.

The *Royal Arthur* (Plate II.) belongs to the *Edgar* class (Plate II.A.); but, with the *Crescent*, is peculiar in having one 9·2-in. gun aft, and two 6-in. Q.F. guns on the forecastle. Her deck varies from 5-in. to 1-in. steel. The armament consists of one 9·2-in., twelve 6-in. Q.F., twelve 6-pr. Q.F., five 3-pr. Q.F., and seven machine guns — of which the 9·2-in. and eight 6-in. have armour protection. The *Diadem* class now building will have sixteen 6-in. Q.F., fourteen 12 pr. Q.F., and twelve 3-pr. guns.

(3). SECOND-CLASS CRUISERS have deck armour 3-in. to 1-in., and individual guns are protected by steel shields. The *Eclipse* class (9) has 5,600 tons displacement and 19·5 knots speed. The armament is five 6-in. Q.F., six 4·7-in. Q.F., nine 12-pr. Q.F., and five 3-pr. Q.F. guns. The *Astræa* class (8) has 4,360 tons displacement, and 19·5 knots speed. The armament consists of two 6-in. Q.F., eight 4·7-in. Q.F., eight 6-pr. Q.F., and one 3-pr. Q.F., and four machine guns. Four vessels of modified *Eclipse* type are building. Their tonnage is 5,830, and the armament consists of five 6-in. Q.F., six 4·7-in. Q.F., eight 12-pr. Q.F., three 3-pr. Q.F., and five

machine guns. The speed will be about 18·5 knots. The above are the latest types of second-class cruisers. The *Charybdis*, of the *Astræa* class, is shown in Plate III. and Plate III.A.

(4.) THIRD-CLASS CRUISERS vary in tonnage from 1,420 (*Rapid*), to 2,950 (*Magicienne*); they have protective decks 2 to 1-in. steel, and their principal armament is shielded. The latest ships built—*Pelorus* and *Proserpine*—have 2,135 tons displacement, and carry eight 4-in. Q.F., eight 3-pr. Q.F., and three machine guns.* Two 4-in. guns are mounted on the forecastle, one on each side of the conning tower, two on the poop, the remainder on the upper deck. The *Pearl* class (8) has 2,575 tons displacement, and carries eight 4·7-in. Q.F. and twelve smaller guns. The *Pallas*, of this class, is shown in Plate IV.

(5.) DESTROYERS vary in displacement from 240 to 350 tons, and in speed from 28 to 30 knots. Of this class 90 are built and building. All carry one 12-pr. Q.F. and three or five light Q.F. guns, together with two torpedo tubes. H.M.S. *Hunter*, of 260 tons, is shown in Plate V.

* Six now building. Three more included in 1897-98 programme.

The above will serve to give an idea of the types into which the ships of the British Navy seem to be settling down at the present time. It will be noticed that in each category except that of third-class cruisers there is still a tendency towards increase of tonnage.

Intermediate between the third-class cruisers and the destroyers, there are a number of unprotected cruisers and torpedo gunboats. Coast defence vessels, armoured cruisers, and torpedo boats are not now being built.

Comparisons of the *matériel* of navies are difficult to frame, and generally unsatisfactory, since they involve many matters of dispute. It may probably be assumed that ships of about the same date and tonnage are approximately of equal fighting power. A comparison based on tonnage is, therefore, somewhat disadvantageous to Great Britain, on account of her relatively large number of recent vessels—due to the exceptional efforts made since 1889.


The table on the following page, based on the Admiralty Returns of August 1896,* will serve to give an

* Some defects in these Returns have been pointed out, but they are substantially accurate.

approximate idea of the navies of the European powers, built and building:—

TABLE M.—SHIPS BUILT AND BUILDING.

CLASS.	France		Russia		France & Russia		Great Britain		Germany		Italy		United States	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Battleships ...	35	325,971	19	179,000	54	504,971	57	634,510	24	158,471	15	154,188	11	89,864
Armoured Cruisers	10	69,712	11	82,273	21	151,985	18	137,250	1	10,482	6	41,117	2	17,471
Coast Defence (Armoured)	14	41,628	16	48,738	30	90,366	15	58,430	11	12,001	nil	nil	19	54,884
Protected Cruisers	37	130,291	5	25,038	42	155,329	116	484,625	13	51,510	16	43,017	13	18,643
Unprotected Cruisers	20	22,749	3	8,400	23	31,149	16	44,290	22	45,592	1	2,279	11	21,237
Torpedo Gun Vessels	16	9,212	17	13,776	33	22,988	35	27,840	5	4,526	18	5,140	2	1,768
Destroyers ...	---	---	5	---	5	---	90	---	---	---	1	---	3	---
Torpedo Boats over 100 feet	191	---	50	---	241	---	81	---	114	---	105	---	18	---




From a Photograph by Symonds & Co, Portsmouth.
Displacement 14,900 tons ; Length 390 ft. ; Beam 75 ft. ; Maximum Draught 27 ft. 6in. ; Speed 17·5 knots.
Armament :—4 12-in. B.L. ; 12 6-in. Q.F. ; 16 12-pr. Q.F. ; and 12 3-pr Q.F. guns.

H.M.S. "MAJESTIC."

PLATE IA.

Midship Section.





From a Photograph by Symonds & Co., Portsmouth.

Displacement 7,700 tons ; Length 360 ft. ; Beam 60 ft. ; Maximum Draught 23 ft. 9 in. ; Speed 19 knots.



Armament :—1 9-2-in. B.L. ; 12 6-in. Q.F. ; and 5 3-pr. Q.F. guns.



H.M.S. "EDGAR."

PLATE IIA.
Midship Section.

1. Edgar.
2. Endymion.
3. Gibraltar.
4. Grafton.
5. Theseus.
6. St. George.
7. Hawke.
8. Royal Arthur.
9. Crescent.






From a Photograph by Symonds & Co., Portsmouth.

Displacement 4,360 tons; Length 320 ft.; Beam 49 ft. 6 in.; Maximum Draught 19 ft.; Speed 19 knots.

Armament:—2 6-in. Q.F.; 8 4·7-in. Q.F.; 8 6-pr. Q.F.; and 1 3-pr. Q.F. guns.



H.M.S. "CHARYBDIS."


PLATE IIIA.



1. Astrea.
2. Charybdis.
3. Bonaventure.
4. Cambrian.
5. Flora.
6. Forte.
7. Fox.
8. Hermione.

Midship Section





Displacement 2,575 tons; Length 265 ft.; Beam 41 ft.; Maximum Draught 15 ft. 6. in.; Speed 19 knots.
Armament:—8 4.7-in. Q.F.; and 8 3-pr. Q.F. guns.



From a Photograph by Symonds & Co., Portsmouth.
Displacement 260 tons; Length 194 ft.; Beam 19 ft. 5 in.; Maximum Draught 8 ft.; Speed 27 knots.
Armament :—1 12-pr. Q.F.; 5 3-pr. Q.F. guns; and 2 torpedo tubes.

Dealing only with the battleship, armoured cruiser, and protected cruiser classes, the comparison between Great Britain and the two naval powers standing next in order of strength, stands as follows:—

TABLE N.—BATTLESHIPS, ARMOURD AND PROTECTED CRUISERS, BUILT AND BUILDING.

CLASS		GREAT BRITAIN	FRANCE	RUSSIA
Battleships ...	No.	44	35	19
	Tons	634,510	325,971	179,000
Armoured Cruisers ...	No.	18	10	11
	Tons	137,250	60,712	82,273
Protected Cruisers ...	No.	116	37	5
	Tons	484,625	130,291	51,510
Totals ...	No.	188	82	35
	Tons	1,256,285	516,974	220,463

In the above categories, which include all effective ships of war capable of being employed in distant waters, British tonnage exceeds that of France, Russia, and Germany by more than 100,000.

In addition to warships, the Admiralty subsidises thirteen steamers, aggregating 105,890 tons, with 16 to 21 knots speed, and sixteen other vessels of 89,353 tons, with 14 to 16½ knots, are held at the disposal of the Navy.*

The *personnel* of the Navy has been steadily increased from 62,400 in 1888-9 to 93,750 in 1896-7; in the same period the Royal Naval Reserve has risen from 19,051 to 24,792.† Including the moderately trained Reserves, therefore, there are now 118,542 men available for the service of the fleet. Mr. Brassey estimates that, by the year 1900, more than 105,000 men will be required.‡ The active strength of the French and Russian navies is about 42,000 and 30,000 men respectively. France has in addition a nominal reserve of about 130,000, provided by the "Inscription Maritime." A commission of the French Chambers which sat in 1892 pointed out that large deductions from this figure must be made, and that only 45,000 men, or 50,000 as a maximum, above the actual requirements (*besoins réels*) of the fleet could be counted upon as available.

* *Naval Annual*, 1896.

† *Ibid.*

‡ In the Estimates for 1897-98, 100,050 men are provided.

Having regard to the necessity—vital to the Empire—of holding the command of the sea, the strength of the Navy can hardly be regarded as excessive. On the other hand, Great Britain now possesses, both in *matériel* and *personnel*, a distinct preponderance over the two greatest navies of Europe; and allied fleets never have wielded, and never will wield, a power equal to that of a corresponding homogeneous force. No probable combination of Powers could cherish any reasonable expectation of asserting at the outset of war a command of the sea hostile to Great Britain. Time would be entirely on the side of the Empire. Sea power, as Captain Mahan has shown, cannot be measured wholly by the strength of a standing navy, and the unrivalled resources of Great Britain in constructive capacity and in sea-faring men would now tell heavily against an enemy. “It would not be extravagant,” states Mr. Brassey,* “to estimate that our shipyards are equal to the construction of twenty-five battleships and seventy-five cruisers, besides smaller craft. . . . A very considerable proportion of the cruisers could be completed in

* *Naval Annual*, 1896.

less than one year; at least half the battleships and the remainder of the cruisers could be completed within two years." Destroyers could be built by dozens in a few months. Herein lie advantages which did not exist in the days of wooden sailing-ships—when, moreover, a rowing-boat filled with armed men could capture a becalmed Indiaman in the Channel. The possession of about 70 per cent. of the steamers of the world* confers a further advantage, alike in offence and defence; while as regards coal supply, the resources of the Empire are incomparably superior to those of all European Powers.

During 1,100 years the Navy has never failed the nation, except when it has been permitted to fall below the necessary strength. Even so it can scarcely be said to have ever suffered a great disaster; and its unique power of immediate recuperation as soon as effort was

* As compared with Germany and France the figures for 1895 are :—

STEAMERS				
		Above 17 knots		Total
Great Britain	90	7,185
Germany	14	912
France	17	555

redirected to the sea, has been invariably manifested. Those who assert that special risks attend naval operations ignore the entire history of the British race from the days of Offa to our own. Time and change have alike enhanced the scope and the potency of the naval weapon, while relatively to those of all European Powers the resources of Great Britain have immensely increased. With a population two-fifths that of France, and with little available aid from Colonial possessions, the naval force of France, Spain, and Holland was broken, and the Northern Alliance checkmated. The home population now exceeds that of France, and the Empire numbers in addition more than ten millions of our race, whose whole manhood would unite in upholding the national cause.

We are frequently told that scientific progress has left us in the dark as to the means by which naval victories can now be won; that we have no experience to serve as a guide; and that we stand face to face with the unknown. This is false. Much doubtless remains to be learned, but the era of armoured steamers and rifled ordnance has seen two great naval actions whose

results have conformed strictly to law. The sum total of fighting experience has been varied and considerable*—certainly sufficient to indicate that the conditions which conferred victory in the past are unchanged, and that moral qualities and sea training, now, as always, are dominant factors. In a sense their value may be said to be enhanced, since the indefinable attributes of command will unquestionably be more than ever important.

Reason enables us to carry prediction a step further. It is certain that a steam mercantile marine is less easily assailable than one dependent for movement on the winds. The courses of steamers can be frequently changed, so that the commerce destroyer will have difficulty in finding them except in waters which can be guarded. A steamer not overhauled by nightfall will usually be safe. The slower craft in convoy can be alike more easily handled and more effectively defended than formerly. Straggling over miles of sea in sailing days, vessels were frequently cut off by an enemy whom their escort could not engage. Now, the commerce destroyer acting against a convoy must count on having

* See *Ironclads in Action*, by H. W. Wilson.

to fight, and unless successful in frequently capturing coal afloat, will be unable to keep the sea for long periods. The extraordinary achievements of the Confederate blockade runners, operating without a shred of naval protection in the teeth of hostile squadrons, throw a strong light upon the relative immunity of steam trade moving in accordance with well-planned arrangements. The success of slow steamers, such as the *Alabama* and her consorts, against sailing commerce have perhaps blinded the imagination to the defensive advantages now enjoyed by a mercantile marine, although Captain Semmes has explained* how easily his depredations might have been checked if the directing head of the United States Navy had possessed any clear ideas of naval strategy.

The duties of the Navy in war may be comprehensively defined as the protection of the maritime communications of the Empire. This involves two practically distinct objects of naval policy—the defeat or the masking of an enemy's fleet in home waters, and the prevention of raids on commerce afloat. The latter may

* *Memoirs of Service Afloat*, 1869.

be effected in three ways, all of which we must be prepared to adopt:—1st. Certain waters upon which commerce necessarily converges must be effectively patrolled. 2nd. Convoys under sufficient escort must be organised. 3rd. Individual commerce destroyers must be ruthlessly hunted down.

It follows that the action of the Navy, defensive in regard to vital Imperial interests, must take the form of a vigorous offensive upon the sea against an enemy's armed vessels. This, the clear lesson of our long history, has now become a condition of national existence.

The responsibilities of the Navy have vastly increased since the days of Elizabeth; but the necessary standard of naval strength is determined absolutely by the power which reasonably probable enemies could exert at sea. The vulnerability of a steam mercantile marine is not, as is sometimes assumed, directly proportionate to its volume, but to the strength of the attack which can be brought to bear against it. To deal with that attack is the function of the Navy. If it is effectively discharged, as in the past, British commerce—steam propelled—will enjoy a measure of immunity not attained between 1805 and 1814.

After pointing to the successive defeats of the navies of Henry IV., Louis XIII., and Louis XIV., Voltaire pertinently asked:—"What can be the reason of this continued superiority? Is it not that the sea, which the French can live well enough without, is essentially necessary to the English, and that nations succeed best in those things for which they have an absolute occasion?" The splendid history of the British Navy is a sufficient answer to those who affect to believe in the special risks and uncertainties of sea operations.

There is no guarantee of safety comparable to that which the Navy has always provided, and will always provide if its strength is sufficiently maintained. That its responsibilities have increased, and that the dependence of the Empire upon naval supremacy has become vital is the greatest advantage which could possibly have accrued to the cause of Imperial Defence.

PART IV.

THE ARMY.

“The Navy,” said Sir Arthur Wellesley in the House of Commons, “is the constitutional force of Britain; but the Army is a new force arising out of the extraordinary exigencies of modern times.”

Centuries of national history are summarized in this remarkable declaration, which could not have been applied to the fighting forces of any other nation. The underlying idea is that a navy is the natural and only effective protection of the territory of an island people: that military force is necessarily open to suspicion, as being capable of employment in repressing the liberties of the civil population; but that the growth of European organisations, intended for purposes of aggression, justified a resort to professional troops on the part of Great Britain. The theory, long cherished—that the maintenance of a standing army was contrary to the principles of a sound constitution, and that citizen forces could be raised to meet emergencies and disbanded as

soon as peace was restored—had completely broken down. Whether this theory would have survived if a Napoleon had not arisen to overthrow the entire system of Europe, and to carry invasion into every Continental State, cannot profitably be discussed. The fact remains that the wars of the French Revolution and Empire supplied a powerful incentive to the creation of great standing armies, and gave to militarism an impetus which still endures.

The new “exigencies” were not only political but military. Improving upon the methods of Frederick the Great, Napoleon demonstrated the decisive advantages attainable by rapidly moving forces—on which the gradual development of means of communication conferred ever-increasing importance. Thus, the triumphs of civilisations—the roads, canals and railways, as well as the increase of population and of the productiveness of the soil—have all tended to enhance the power wielded by highly-organised military forces. Civil progress may be said to have helped to defeat its highest objects.

With the advent of Napoleon the old methods of conducting war became obsolete. Time, formerly of little account, became the principal element in military opera-

tions; and unprofessional armies promiscuously brought together when danger appeared imminent no longer sufficed for the needs of nations. It might safely have been predicted that the people who proved most apt in realising the new conditions, and in applying them to their military system would achieve great results, and this was shown in 1866, and again in 1870-71. The successes of Prussia astonished the world. A general sense of insecurity was created; each Power took in hand the reconstruction of its military system on German models; militarism extended its sway over the peoples of Europe, took deep root in Japan, and found an echo among the Republics of South America. Meanwhile, the German annexation of the Rhine provinces of France disturbed a European equilibrium of over fifty years' standing, left a rich legacy of international animosities, and led to the grouping of the Powers into hostile camps, in which many millions of men, maintained at an exhausting expenditure, watch each other with unceasing vigilance. The material injury thus inflicted upon the prosperity and progress of the populations of Europe defies calculation. The nations dwell under a dark shadow of impending calamity; none

dare to hope for a relief from military burdens, and at periods frequently recurring the sense of tension becomes almost intolerable.

We have, therefore, moved far since the memorable speech of Sir Arthur Wellesley. The idea of the Army as a "new force" arising out of "extraordinary exigencies" has at length passed away. That a standing army, highly trained and fully prepared for war, is essential to the security of the Empire has become an accepted principle; and discussion now ranges only over its strength, composition, and probable duties. Nevertheless, traces of the old jealousy of professional troops are not wholly obliterated. The long struggle between the Crown and Parliament, which occupies so large a space in our political annals, can be everywhere discerned in the history of the military forces, and traditions arising in days when the national conditions differed absolutely from our own, still linger. Such traditions have been transmitted to our Colonies, and have not been entirely destroyed by the influx of many nationalities into the United States. Wherever existing, they constitute a factor of which military reformers should take account.

The Anglo-Saxon people, doubtless from hereditary causes, is specially prone to believe in the efficacy of imperfectly trained men, to be impressed by numbers—apart from efficiency—to trust overmuch to its natural fighting capacity, and to under-rate the vital need of organisation and of careful preparation for war. Circumstances arising out of our insular position and the maritime supremacy asserted in the past, have tended to confirm these illusions; frequent conflicts with semi-civilised races have helped to perpetuate them. The notion that the average Briton is superior, in a military sense, to any representative of another race, may be a salutary assumption; but at least it logically demands parity of knowledge of the use of weapons between the individuals compared. If, however, the comparison is extended further—to battalions, brigades, divisions, and armies—the value of all that is comprised in organisation and training for war increases in a geometric ratio, and the point is soon reached at which the fighting capacity of the individual ceases to be the determining agent of victory. The gallant but hopeless efforts of Gambetta's levies in 1870-71 pain-

fully prove that military instincts of the highest order are powerless when opposed to carefully-trained and organised troops.

The principle of a universal obligation to bear arms for the defence of the national cause forms the basis of the military forces of all States. Most of the European Powers, as well as Japan, apply this principle directly to the maintenance of their standing armies. Switzerland, a poor country with a population of only three millions, thus obtains an extremely efficient militia force, with a war strength exceeding 400,000 men. In Great Britain and in some Colonies, the obligation to bear arms, within certain limits of age, can be enforced by law; but this salutary power, essential to meet a great emergency, remains in abeyance and is half forgotten. The Anglo-Saxon race, however—peculiarly jealous of its freedom, and mindful of past constitutional struggles—has not legalised compulsory service in the standing army. The idea of conscription has never taken root in this country,*

* The conscription of able-bodied paupers was, however, legalised between 1703 and 1712, and impressment for the Navy, though declared illegal by Parliament in 1641, lasted into the present century.

and the Militia force alone can be thus recruited. A dearth of fighting men for service abroad has, therefore, been frequently experienced, and in addition to immense subsidies to European Powers, foreigners, generally of German extraction, have been enrolled to swell the numbers of battalions of the British Army. Towards the end of 1855 a German legion of 10,000 men, and a Turkish legion of 20,000 in British pay formed part of the Army in the Crimea, and Von Moltke, criticising the troops at an Aldershot review in 1856, states, with natural partiality: "By far the best was the German battalion."

Our curiously complex military institutions may perhaps be traced to two causes—the singular tenacity with which the race clings to long-standing traditions, and the fact that no great national disaster has ever occurred. We have known no Austerlitz, Jena, Sadowa or Sedan, and our excessively numerous military reforms have never been organic.

Alfred the Great is credited with the honour of having first established the rudiments of a military organisation by regularising what was vaguely known as the "General

Levy." The establishment of the feudal system after the Norman conquest led to the uprising of a distinct force based upon the conditions under which land was held from the Crown. The feudal chief was required to furnish and equip a certain number of his retainers for the service of the Sovereign, who in addition raised fighting men directly for the General Levy. Both forces shared in the glories of Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt, the one supplying the mounted troops, the other the bulk of the infantry. There are glimpses of a third force, termed "Mercenaries," employed from time to time by the Sovereign, and perhaps constituting the germ of a standing army. Practically, the military forces of England for many hundred years after the reign of Alfred were constituted on a Militia basis. Fortified places, however, needed garrisons; body-guards were maintained by both Henry VII. and Henry VIII., and "though the Commons protested against a guard being raised by Charles I., yet at a later period, when the King had surrendered to them, they declared an infantry force to garrison the fortresses, and a cavalry force of 5,500 men, to be necessary for the security of the kingdom or for

their own protection.”* When, after the Restoration in 1660, Parliament proceeded to disband the army, “guards and garrisons” were excepted, and the Act being loosely drawn, a small standing army was maintained, which in the reigns of Charles II. and James II. was a constant source of dispute. The attempt of James II. to govern by means of the Army was one of the causes of the Revolution. By the Bill of Rights, passed in 1689, the existence of a standing army was at length legalised under significant restrictions. The pay of the regular forces, and the number of men to be maintained, was rendered subject to an annual vote of Parliament.† At the same time the Army was declared to be necessary for the safety of the United Kingdom, the defence of the possessions of the Crown, and the preservation of the balance of power in Europe.‡ The traditional opposition to the idea of a standing army was, however,

* *The Military Forces of the Crown.*—Clode.

† “This condition has not been invariably fulfilled. Until 1855-56 troops of the Ordnance Corps were not included in the annual Act, and in 1860 the estimates provided for 1,907 men in excess of the number voted.”—Clode.

‡ This latter purpose was wisely expunged in 1867.

not laid to rest by the settlement effected in the reign of William III. Until 1792 Parliament refused to sanction the building of barracks, and as late as 1816 the payment of the British Army of occupation in France out of the French subsidy without any parliamentary vote was at once challenged in the House of Commons and abandoned by the Government.

During long years of immunity from great wars, the control of the Army by Parliament has been gradually strengthened, and in 1890 the Royal Commission presided over by Lord Hartington stated that "the complete responsibility to Parliament and the country of the Secretary of State for the discipline as well as for the administration of the Army, must now be accepted as definitely established." Meanwhile the old jealousy of regular troops has practically disappeared, and in 1871 the command of the Militia—the ancient constitutional force of England—was transferred from the lord lieutenants of counties to the Crown.

The Yeomanry force dates from 1761, and was reorganised on a volunteer basis in 1793, on the outbreak of the war of the French Revolution, and established by an

Act of Parliament of 1804. Volunteer forces were raised early in the eighteenth century by individuals or corporations, as aids to the Crown in times of emergency. Originally regarded as temporary bodies, who received arms and equipment for a specific purpose and subsequently returned to a purely civil status, they at length became established forces. The early Volunteer Acts contemplated amalgamation with the Militia organisation;* but this principle was abandoned and the existing system was founded by Acts of 1802 and 1803. A large number of men were enrolled in the latter year, practically under the threat of conscription, from which the volunteer was exempted. A numerous force of moderate efficiency was thus obtained, which disappeared when danger ceased to threaten, to be revived in 1859, when again the fear of invasion was widely felt. The revived force has since been maintained, and materially improved in recent years. Under some conditions volunteers can be rendered efficient; but there are evident sources of inherent weakness in the system, and in the Colonies it has not, as a rule, been successful.

* *The Armed Forces of the Crown.*

The total strength of the armed forces of the Crown, exclusive of those maintained by Colonies, at the beginning of 1897 is given in the following table*:

TABLE O.

Nature of Force.	Establishment.	Strength.
Regular Forces (Regimental Home and Colonial.) }	149,653	143,874
Army Reserve 1st Class ...	80,000	78,060
„ „ 2nd „ ...	80	82
Militia	133,502	115,223
do Channel Islands ...	3,996	3,600
do Malta and Bermuda	2,490	1,261
Yeomanry	11,891	10,184
Volunteers	263,968	236,065
Total Home and Colonial ...	645,580	588,349 †
Regular Forces — Indian Establishment ... }	73,217	76,995
General total	718,797	665,344

* Taken from Army Estimates of 1897-98.

† To this figure must be added 2,309 for “General and Departmental Staff,” and “Miscellaneous Establishments.”

Including the Militia Reserve, and excluding the Second Class Army Reserve, the military forces of Great Britain are thus composed of six classes, whose conditions of service differ. The Army Reserve can be brought back to the colours at any time, and has been so utilised in 1878 and 1882. Volunteers from this Reserve have been called for in small numbers in 1879, 1881, 1884, and 1885. The Militia Reserve, constituted in 1867, and now numbering about 30,000 men, consists of militiamen who, in consideration of a bounty, accept liability for service, when called upon, in any branch of the regular Army. The regular Army and its Reserves are available for service abroad, as is the Militia Reserve also in cases of "imminent national danger and of great emergency." The Militia can be embodied in the same circumstances, and may volunteer for service in the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, Malta, and Gibraltar. It has in the past proved a most valuable feeder to the Army in the field. Militia battalions served in France in 1813-14, and in 1852 Mr. Sidney Herbert stated in the House of Commons that out of 18,000 men of the Line who

fought at Waterloo. the majority were volunteers from the Militia.*

In 1798, a detachment of Irish Militia and Yeomanry repulsed a superior French force under Humbert near Sligo. During the Crimean War, Militia battalions performed garrison duties at Malta and Gibraltar, and the force supplied many men for the siege of Sebastopol. At the present time the Militia provides annually a large number of recruits to the regular Army. The Yeomanry and Volunteers can be called out for home service when invasion is regarded as imminent, and the former may be, and has actually been, employed in aid of the Civil Power.

No military force can boast of such a wonderful record as the British Army. British troops have fought in nearly every country of Europe, in many parts of North America and of Africa, in South America, over the length and breadth of India, in Asia Minor, Persia, Afghanistan, Burmah and China, in New Zealand and in many islands of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The glamour of great battles fought by national armies on the Continent

* *The Army Book for the British Empire.*

of Europe has inevitably tended to overshadow the brilliant deeds of British troops under every condition, geographical and climatic. Great leaders have been relatively few, numerical inferiority almost universal, and occasionally overwhelming. Nevertheless, British troops—under their regimental officers when higher leadership has failed—have exhibited unrivalled fighting capacity. Possibly deficient in some of the qualities which made the French under Napoleon the most formidable military nation in Europe, they have on innumerable occasions exhibited a tenacity which has never been excelled, and a steadfastness under severe punishment which is not a characteristic of the Latin races. There is no modern army which can point to a battle of Inkerman in which the overpowering masses of a brave enemy were repulsed by weak detachments acting on no plan, guileless of tactical purpose in the higher sense, but victorious by reason of sheer fighting power, individual self-reliance, and confidence in the leadership of regimental officers.

The laurels of the British Army, its splendid traditions and its vast war experience, have for more than 800 years, been gathered in fighting the battles of the nation

across the seas. This can be said of no other fighting force in the world.* The first instance of the employment of English troops in over-sea operations appears to have occurred early in the eleventh century, when Canute sought to include the Scandinavian peninsula in his dominions. Forces under Earl Godwin defeated the Swedes, and subsequently aided in the conquest of Norway.

The accession of William I. was the beginning of a long series of wars with France, which were fought out on French soil. Such wars marked the reigns of William I., William II., Richard I., John, Henry III., Edward I., Edward III., Richard II., Henry IV., Henry V., Henry VI., Edward IV., Henry VII., Henry VIII., and Mary. These wars involved long land campaigns, as well as numerous expeditions directed against the French seaboard. The conquest of Wales, frequent hostilities with Scotland and Ireland, and civil wars were interludes in the protracted struggle for the retention of French territory, ending in the loss of Calais in 1558. These, however, do not complete the military records of this period of nearly 500 years. Under Richard I. and Edward I.

* Japan alone shows a historical resemblance.

English troops served in the Crusades, which after many vicissitudes, closed with the capitulation of Acre in 1291. In the reign of Richard II. an expeditionary force of 20,000 men, under the Duke of Lancaster, after destroying two forts built by the French to command the town and harbour of Brest, landed at Coruna, and in alliance with Portugal, dictated terms to the king of Castile. When, therefore, in 1386, Charles VI. of France was believed to be contemplating an invasion of England, almost all the trained forces of the Crown were serving in Spain.

The great naval contest with Spain in the reign of Elizabeth gave a new direction to the national energies; but in 1584 troops were despatched to Holland under the Earl of Leicester in aid of the young Republic. Under James I. English troops were employed on the Continent in aid of the Franco-Dutch alliance, and later in support of Frederic the Elector Palatine, who had been proclaimed king of Bohemia. In 1624, an English force was allowed to be raised for service with the allies against Austria, but little was effected. Charles I. despatched an expeditionary force under the Earl of

Essex to Cadiz, which failed completely. The hostility of Scotland in 1638-39, the Irish Rebellion in 1641, and the Civil War, which began in 1642, engrossed the military activities of the country during the rest of the reign. The reduction of Ireland (1649-51), and of Scotland (1650-51) occupied the Army of the Commonwealth, and Cromwell's Dutch war was carried to complete success by naval operations alone. The expeditions to the West Indies under Penn and Venables secured the important capture of Jamaica in 1655. The two Dutch wars of Charles II. did not involve regular military operations, but the reign was not barren of achievements over-sea, and Goree, New York, with other Dutch settlements fell to the Navy. Under James II., it was the misfortune of the Army to be employed at Sedgemoor against misguided and unorganised peasants; while its defection, with that of the Navy in 1688, accomplished the Revolution. With William III. a new period of military intervention in the affairs of the Continent may be said to have commenced, which lasted with intermissions to the present century. The long contest with France, re-entered upon in 1689 and at first of a

dynastic nature, assumed on the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756 the distinctive character of a struggle for colonial and commercial supremacy, enduring till the settlement of 1815. At the same time and for similar reasons, Spain and Holland again figure as the antagonists of England.

Meanwhile the charter granted to the British East India Company in 1601, and the establishment of its French rival in 1664, led to a mighty contest in the far East, continued till the Peace of Paris in 1763, by which also the ascendancy of the Anglo-Saxon race in North America was definitely determined. The domination of the Hindustan peninsula, with all the results which have accrued therefrom, and that of North America, were alike achieved by the agency of military force and military genius, operating beyond the frontier traced by the British Navy.

From 1689 onwards the history of the Army may be divided into three distinct portions:—

1. Intervention in Europe, which under Marlborough and Wellington attained notable success. Such success, however, neither in Flanders or on the Upper Danube,

and not even in the Peninsula, can be regarded in the light of purely British triumphs.

2. A succession of wars in India, by which Dutch and French rivalry was destroyed, the native fighting races subdued, and the present Eastern empire built up. Throughout these wars, extending down to the recent Chitral expedition, native troops, trained, organised and handled by British officers, have played a most important part; while prior to 1763, policy, by securing native alliances, powerfully contributed to the accomplishment of the objects sought.

3. Over-sea operations of every description—ranging from the conquest of Canada to the recent bloodless march to Kumasi—by which the Colonial Empire has been built up and defended against aggression.

Each of these separate spheres of military action furnishes voluminous records, which in variety, in dramatic incident, and as evidence of fighting capacity are unsurpassed by the history of any other army. All were based upon sea power. The protection at home, provided by the Navy, freed the Army to enter upon the first sphere at periods when European nations were intent upon

defending their land frontiers. The second—Asiatic dominion—was plainly a gift of the sea. The third was ruled by conditions dictated, on its own element, by the Navy, which moreover, in most cases, directly co-operated in delivering the actual stroke.

The consistent records of many hundred years cannot possibly be the result of blind chance. In them we may trace with certitude lessons for the future. An Empire such as our own could not have been built up, and cannot now be rendered secure, except by the employment of military force. But military force—the offensive weapon of the Empire—cannot be brought into play except on conditions determined by the action of the Navy.

PART V.

IMPERIAL ORGANISATION.

Until recent years, the problem of Imperial Defence has received little attention, and no public inquiry has ever been instituted with a view to define its objects and secure their fulfilment. The long period of immunity from great wars which followed upon the European settlement of 1815 induced a comfortable somnolence. During many years in which the Army was neglected, and all questions of defence were regarded with apathy, it was inevitable that the growing needs of the Empire should be entirely disregarded.

“ I am bordering on seventy-seven years passed in

honour," wrote the Duke of Wellington. "I hope the Almighty may protect me from being a witness of the tragedy which I cannot persuade my contemporaries to take steps to avert." "The military condition of Great Britain," stated Sir J. Burgoyne in 1850, "as regards its very existence as a nation, is absolutely awful." Meanwhile, by a long series of wars, British dominion in India was consolidated, and in 1849 the Punjaub was annexed. These wars, with the exception of the Afghan disaster of 1842, were successful; but India was far distant, and communications were slow. The operations were carried out under the directions of the Hon. East India Company, and although a force of British troops was maintained in India, no sense of direct Imperial responsibility was brought home to the nation, and such knowledge of war and of military administration as these many campaigns provided was not turned to full account.

Colonies, some of which were still in their infancy, were not regarded as future sources of military strength. They were possessions of the Crown, which must be protected if the need arose, but the idea of partnership in a scheme of Imperial defence had not as yet dawned.

No Colony received responsible government till 1854, when the Legislative Councils of the two provinces of Canada were first constituted as elective bodies.

During the period of great wars which ended in 1815, Colonies for various reasons did not bring to the national cause such a measure of aid as might have been expected. "America," as Burke stated, "was once, indeed, a great strength to this nation in opportunity of ports, in ships, in provisions, in men." Yet in the Seven Years' War, when the fate of Canada was at stake, the thirteen Colonies of North America cannot be said to have exercised an influence proportionate to their resources and population. "In the New World, 100,000 French colonists confronted fully 2,000,000 of the Anglo-Saxon race; but the latter were split up into separate communities, geographically scattered, and not organised for common action. In Virginia and along the eastern slopes of the Alleghanies, there was a fine fighting element composed of Scotch colonists from Ulster; but Virginia, whose troops had taken part in Braddock's ill-fated expedition, was far from the seat of war in Canada, and was pre-occupied in holding a long line of frontier against Indian aggression. Penn-

sylvania objected on principle to fighting—unless it was carried on by other Colonies in her interests. North and South Carolina, and Georgia especially, were in a backward state of development. Practically it was from the New England group alone that real aid was forthcoming. Republican in sentiment, and occupying a comparatively poor country, these Colonies were intellectually in the van of progress. To them the French in occupation of Canada appeared in the light of a standing menace. As early as 1690 their ships and troops had attacked Quebec, and in 1745, in co-operation with Commodore Warren's squadron, they had captured Louisberg. At the time of Braddock's disaster the New Englanders were prosecuting the war with success in Nova Scotia, and later they took part in the abortive operations of General Abercrombie and Lord Loudon.* In 1762 American troops joined the forces which under Sir George Pocock and Lord Albemarle captured Havana. "When at length Pitt determined to strike a vigorous blow in North America, New England Militia fought under Wolfe in

* Paper read by the writer before the Royal Colonial Institute, 11th February, 1896.

the second siege of Louisberg, and were present under Amherst in the closing scene of the war at Montreal. It is nevertheless just to state that the domination of North America by the Anglo-Saxon race was secured by a great effort, naval and military, on the part of the Mother Country, and that the Colonies did not contribute to this supremely important result in proportion to their capacity."* Then, as now, want of organisation was manifested, and our rivals for Colonial supremacy showed a more just appreciation of the value of local forces. Excellent fighting capacity was, however, displayed, to be turned against the Mother Country in the unfortunate struggle which began in 1775. India, has rendered valuable assistance at various times, supplying troops for Baird's expedition to Egypt in 1801, for the captures of Mauritius in 1810, and that of Java in 1811. During the war of 1812-14, Canadian Militia proved their efficiency.

The insight into future possibilities which the experience of these wars might have supplied does not appear to

* Paper read by the writer before the Royal Colonial Institute, 11th February, 1896.

have been attained, and it is possible that the revolt of the North American Colonies, ushering in a vast contest in which the national resources were severely strained, may have tended to darken counsel. In any case, Imperial defence, in the sense now beginning to be understood, was impracticable under the old Colonial system. Colonies, regarded mainly as sources of profit to the Mother Country, and fettered in their commercial activities by "prohibitions, guards, penalties and forfeitures," could not be expected to cherish a strong Imperial sentiment. The realisation of the principle enunciated by Burke, "that every considerable part of the British dominions should be governed as a free country," was a condition essential to any effective organisation for Imperial defence.

The naval conditions existing during the Crimean War were such that no warning of danger to the Empire, no plea for national organisation, suggested itself. The Colonies scarcely heard the echoes of the great conflict; none was in the slightest degree imperilled, and commerce proceeded without risk or hindrance. The Colonial garrisons provided by the Mother Country were,

however, relatively large at this period, as shown in the following table:—

* TABLE P.

Colonial Garrisons in 1854 (all arms.)

Gibraltar	4,134
Ionian Islands	3,354
Malta	3,893
West Coast of Africa	869
St. Helena	495
Cape of Good Hope	5,765
Mauritius	1,814
Hong Kong	687
Ceylon	3,448
New South Wales, Tasmania, and New Zealand ...	3,381
Canada	3,336
Nova Scotia, and Bermuda	3,240
Jamaica, Bahamas, and Honduras	2,276
Windward and Leeward Islands	3,062
Total in Colonies	39,754
East Indies, exclusive of Company's Troops	29,208
At home or on passage home	71,081
General Total	140,043

The large forces maintained in unhealthy stations appear somewhat surprising, and it has been suggested that this policy was adopted with a view to withdraw the regular Army as much as possible from public observation, in fear of reductions.†

* *The Army Book for the British Empire*

† For a century after the Revolution the small standing Army was distributed in dribbles over the country, as if to conceal its existence.

In 1859, the fortification of the French Channel ports having aroused attention, a Royal Commission was appointed to report upon a great scheme of fortification for the harbours and coasts of Great Britain, which had been prepared at the War Office. The natural rejoinder to expenditure of this nature on the part of a possible enemy was an increase to the Navy; but the experience of a long series of great wars in which the need of coast defences had never arisen was all forgotten. The recent lessons of the Russian war had passed unheeded, and the passive defences of an island State were regarded from a point of view which entirely excluded the principles of naval warfare.

Ignoring the whole history of Great Britain, the Commissioners laid down the amazing proposition that the invasion of an island State, guarded by the most powerful navy in the world, was a specially easy operation!

“Should any such catastrophe (defeat or dispersion by storm of the Navy) occur, or should the fleet from whatever cause be unable to keep the command of the Channel, it appears to your Commissioners that the insular position of the kingdom, so far from being an advantage for defensive purposes, might prove a disadvantage, inasmuch as it would enable any superior Power or Powers to concentrate a larger body on any point of our coasts, and more rapidly and secretly than could be done against

any neighbouring country having only a land frontier; and an army so placed could maintain its base and be reinforced and supplied with more facility than if dependent on land communications."

This tremendous sentence suffices to define the standpoint of the Commissioners, who further stated that "neither our Fleet, our standing Army, nor our Volunteer forces, nor even the three combined, can be relied on as sufficient in themselves for the security of the kingdom against invasion." Salvation could, in fact, be found only in fortifications; and in spite of the adverse opinions of some witnesses of authority, the scheme was practically adopted *en bloc*,* and an era of fort-building supervened, which has lasted to the present day.

The results of the Report of the Commission were disastrous. A standard of coast defences was set up which it now seems impossible to abandon. Public attention was concentrated upon the impossible problem of obtaining security against invasion in the absence of naval protection. The efficacy of the Navy sank in popular estimation; the defence of the Empire as a whole—to

* The total estimate exceeded £13,000,000, but the works were not all carried out, and some of them remained for years unarmed; while the question of organising forces for their defence was not dealt with till recently.

which the fortifications recommended by the Commission contributed absolutely nothing—was effectually obscured.

In 1786, within three years of the conclusion of a great war, which strained the national resources almost to breaking point, another Commission reported upon a proposal to spend £760,000 upon the fortification of Portsmouth and Plymouth. Unanimity was not then attained. A strong minority, including the honoured name of Jervis, dissented on unimpeachable naval grounds, and in spite of the great efforts of Pitt, the vote was lost in the House of Commons. “No contrast,” justly stated Mr. Clode, “can be greater” * than that of the view adopted by a generation which knew naval war and the theories engendered by a long period of peace.

The period 1853-59 constitutes an epoch in our Colonial history. In these years, eight Colonies received free institutions, and there have since been only three additions to the roll of self-governing communities—the Cape in 1872,† Western Australia in 1890, and Natal in 1893. This wise policy,—“a specific alike for the relief of the

* *The Armed Forces of the Crown.*

† The elective principle was, however, established at the Cape in 1853.

Mother Country, the masculine and vigorous well-being of the dependency, and the integrity of the Empire."*— was adopted apparently without full consideration of its bearing upon the question of defence; and the new states entered upon their prosperous careers without an adequate sense of the responsibilities involved. Volunteer organisations of moderate value were established in some cases; but of any recognition of the principles of defence there is no sign.

In 1861, a Select Committee, including Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Stanley, Sir George Grey, Mr. Roebuck, and Mr. Childers, was appointed, at the instance of Mr. Arthur Mills, M.P.,† “to inquire and report whether any and what alterations may be advantageously adopted in regard to the defence of British dependencies; and the proportions of cost of such defences as now defrayed, from Imperial and Colonial funds respectively.” The Committee drew a line between “colonies proper” and stations “maintained chiefly for objects of Imperial policy,” and compiled the following figures:—

* Mr. Gladstone.

† Mr. Mills had carefully studied the question of Colonial Defence as it then existed, and his views were considerably in advance of that day.

TABLE Q.

Colonies Proper.		Total Imperial Troops. *	Total Imperial Expenditure. †	Colonial Contributions in aid. ‡
North America	Canada	2,432	£ 206,264	£ 13,393
	Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick	1,881	149,495	198
	Newfoundland	239	20,807	—
	British Columbia	138	37,000	—
Australasia	New South Wales	645	43,039	33,806
	Victoria	624	36,557	72,110
	South Australia	100	6,836	7,172
	Tasmania	326	35,113	—
	New Zealand ...	1,252	104,852	—
South Africa	Cape of Good Hope	4,866	456,658	56,176
	Natal and British Kaffraria ...			
	Ceylon	2,344	110,268	97,198
	Mauritius	1,630	145,658	25,354
West Indies	Jamaica	1,443	118,285	1,637
	Honduras	355	30,620	—
	Barbados, St. Lucia, Trinidad, & British Guiana ...	2,392	213,793	29,279
	Totals	20,657	£ 1,715,245	£ 336,323

TABLE Q.—Continued.

Colonies Proper.	The Imperial Troops.*	Total Imperial Expenditure.†	Colonial Contributions in aid. ‡
Imperial Stations.			
		£	£
Malta	6,728	483,173	6,200
Gibraltar	5,925	420,695	—
Ionian Islands	4,294	280,061	25,000
Hong Kong	733	57,300	—
St. Helena	497	38,354	482
Bermuda	1,128	87,587	—
Bahamas	398	32,280	—
Falkland Islands	37	2,117	—
Western Australia	174	25,946	—
Labuan	—	7,329	—
Sierra Leone	356	27,302	562
Gambia... ..	334	27,910	423
Gold Coast	306	19,781	234
Totals	20,910	1,509,835	32,901
General Totals	41,567	£3,225,080	£369,224

* From Returns of March 1860.

† Includes Barracks, fortifications, transport and proportion of non-effective services, and of recruiting at home.

‡ Includes all contributions for general military services.

The distribution of troops thus shown appears, like the allocation of charges, to be based on no principle, and to have grown up by chance, modified by temporary exigencies. Mr. Mills's Committee considered that the Colonial contributions should be increased in some cases, and pointed out that—

“The multiplication of fortified places and the erection of fortifications in distant Colonial possessions . . . on a scale requiring for their defence a far greater number of men than could be spared for them in the event of war, involve a useless expenditure and fail to provide an efficient protection for places, the defence of which mainly depends on supremacy at sea.”

This wise and statesmanlike opinion deserves to be recorded as marking a distinct step in advance. Incidentally the Committee mention that “more than 10,000 volunteers have been embodied in British North America; a nearly equal number of volunteers in the Australian Colonies; 1,500 in New Zealand; and 1,200 at the Cape of Good Hope; and that these numbers have probably been since, considerably increased.” Already, therefore, the great Colonies had shown signs of military spirit.

Some of the evidence given before the Committee is worth recalling. Thus Mr. Gladstone stated:—

“As regards the Colonies generally, I agree with the evidence given . . . before this Committee that the whole question is a question of supremacy at sea, and that the maintenance of our supremacy at sea is vital to our existence, I mean to our present place in the world. England would be no longer England the moment she lost it. If she has supremacy at sea, her Colonial Empire is virtually safe.”

As regards the future co-operation of Colonies with the Mother Country, Mr. Gladstone said:—

“I have not the smallest doubt that in the proportion that responsibilities are accepted by communities, they will be disposed to go beyond the bare idea of self-defence and to tender loyal and effective assistance in the struggles of the Empire.”

The practical results of the labours of the Select Committee of 1861 were not marked, and general interest in the subject of Colonial defence again languished. In 1870, the regular garrisons maintained by the Mother Country in the Australian Colonies, in Canada (except Halifax), and in Newfoundland, were withdrawn, the measure being sharply criticised.

Eight years later the Empire was face to face with a war scare. The Eastern question having reached an acute stage, and the integrity of Turkey being, at this period, regarded as a principal object of British policy,

Indian troops were hurriedly brought to Malta; the Reserves were mobilised; * and the historic six millions voted by Parliament were soon dissipated, for the most part on objects of subsidiary value. The results of the scare were, however, of much importance. For the first time, genuine alarm—out of all proportion to the measure of the immediate risks—was felt in the Colonies. For the moment, the nation appeared to realise not only that it was wholly unprepared for war, but that it was without guidance as to the principles of Imperial defence. Since the Crimean days steam had become the prime motive force of navies, and was rapidly replacing sail-power in the mercantile marine.† Coal must evidently play a ruling part in all operations on or across the sea; and all over the world British harbours, with their coal stores, valuable shipping, and commercial wealth, lay open to a destructive raid by any hostile vessel which might for a time escape the observation of Her Majesty's cruisers. Hurried and ineffectual measures were at once taken. Armaments of indifferent

* 13,684 men rejoined the colours.

† The figures for Great Britain in 1879 are :—Sailing ships, 3,918,676 tons; steamers, 2,331,157 tons.

type were despatched to distant ports, to be indifferently mounted after long delay. Several Australasian Colonies, however, earnestly set about the creation of local defences on a large scale, and carried out their projects with characteristic vigour. The principal result of the scare was thus the marked impulse given to coast fortifications. The principles inculcated by the Commission of 1859 were revived, and a natural tendency towards exaggeration was manifested. At times when opinion in regard to Imperial defence is nebulous, and panic prevails, it is usual to resort to fortification. Meanwhile, the year 1878-79 witnessed a decrease of £1,189,102 in ship-building and naval ordnance expenditure, followed by a further fall of £843,934 in 1879-80.

In 1879 an important step was taken by Lord Beaconsfield's Government, in appointing a Royal Commission under the late Earl of Carnarvon "to inquire into the defence of British possessions and commerce abroad." Three admirable reports resulted, the last dated 22nd July, 1882. A mass of valuable information was collated; the condition of the mercantile marine, its needs and its habitual routes were analysed; Colonies were

separately examined ; coaling stations were selected ; and the passive defence of the Imperial ports received exhaustive treatment.

The Commissioners were, however, debarred from discussing the ruling factor, and no data were supplied for their guidance. As a French writer has well stated : “ Si l'on veut déterminer rationnellement quels sont les points de la côte à fortifier, il est nécessaire de tenir compte des effets du concours de la flotte nationale et de l'activité que pourra déployer la flotte ennemie.” This point of view was denied to the Commissioners, who could not take account of the action of the Navy, and had, therefore, no means of adjusting the standard of the defences of the coaling stations, which they selected with great judgment. Nevertheless, they did not fail to call attention to the duties of the Navy, and the paramount necessity for maintaining the command of the sea. The defence of the “ commerce, upon which our populations depend not only for employment but for food,” was stated to be “ essentially a question of naval supremacy. This is also the case to a great extent as regards your Majesty's possessions abroad and their commerce.” And,

in grave words, the Commissioners pointed out the urgent need of immediate measures for strengthening the fleet. "We are deeply impressed by the returns furnished by the Admiralty, and to these, as well as to the other evidence, we invite the particular attention of your Majesty's Government, feeling bound to express our opinion that, looking to the action of other countries, the strength of the Navy should be increased with as little delay as possible."

The full text of these most valuable Reports has never been made public. Action was unaccountably delayed, and Lord Carnarvon justly complained in Parliament and in the *Times* of the long neglect of the coaling stations.

Meanwhile, in 1881-82, the total expenditure on ship-building and naval ordnance fell to £3,425,803, and the expenditure on armoured construction to £949,313, compared with £1,037,752 in France.* In 1882-83 the armoured construction of Great Britain and France cost £940,710 and £1,081,009 respectively. British construction now began to recover, and while for the period of

* Lord Brassey, Address at the Mansion House, 1st. February, 1889.

five years 1878-83 the total expenditure — hulls and machinery only—was:—*

Great Britain £7,184,832

France £7,772,519

in the succeeding six years, 1883-89, the corresponding figures were:—

Great Britain £19,929,797

France £11,801,480

A fresh war scare arose in 1885, out of the Penjdeh incident, and again alarm was widely felt throughout the Empire. Danger to sea-ports rather than maritime risk suggested itself to the imagination, and an impulse was thus supplied to the belated projects of fortification. Reports and memorials from Colonies, couched in urgent terms, at once began to arrive, and there was neither machinery for dealing with the many questions thus arising, nor any clear idea of the principles involved. A "Colonial Defence Committee," composed of representatives of the Admiralty, War Office, and Colonial Office,† was established, which during the period of scare made direct

* Lord Brassey. Address at the Mansion House, 1st February, 1889.

† A representative of the Treasury was afterwards added.

recommendations to the Cabinet. This Committee still remains, and has done much unobtrusive but exceedingly useful work in its twelve years of existence.

After 1885, the defence of the coaling stations selected by Lord Carnarvon's Commission began to make progress, and both at home and abroad much fortification was slowly carried out.

A far more important movement took practical form in 1889. The long-neglected cause of the Navy had for some time been warmly espoused by many writers. The steady growth of the French fleet was pointed out, and the comparisons drawn showed that the maritime supremacy of Great Britain was gravely imperilled. It was forcibly argued that the greatest of all Imperial needs was the protection of commerce afloat; that the movement of commerce during war was essential not only to the food supply of the United Kingdom, but to the purchasing power of the great mass of the population at home and in the Colonies; and that unless this condition could be fulfilled, fortification, however comprehensive and technically satisfactory, was of no account. The wonderful naval history of

England, effectually obscured by the "hypothetical and conditional suggestions"* poured forth in years of peace, was again studied. Chambers of Commerce and the leaders of mercantile activity began to take alarm. And by a happy accident, the publication of Captain A. T. Mahan's first volume occurred at the most opportune moment. The literary charm and the philosophic bent of "The Influence of Sea-power on History" at once secured a hearing for the writer. The fact that his great book came to us from the other side of the Atlantic invested it with special weight. The movement, thus powerfully reinforced, made rapid progress, and the musty volumes of our own forgotten naval historians—volumes instinct with the spirit of sea-power—were ransacked in search of evidence bearing upon the principles enunciated by Thucydides, Herodotus, Drake, Raleigh, Bacon, St. Vincent, Nelson and Dundonald.

The Naval Defence Act of 1889 and the succeeding programmes were the practical results. Not on the initiative of statesmen, not on account of warnings derived

* Sheridan, in the House of Commons 27th February, 1786, when supporting amendment to Pitt's resolution relating to the fortification of Portsmouth and Plymouth.

from disaster, was the rehabilitation of the Navy at length undertaken. Pure reason, brought to bear in time of peace by a group of writers whose numbers rapidly increased, and the strong support of a great part of the Press, accomplished this memorable revival of ancient traditions. There is no instance in our history of such a movement successfully carried out after more than seventy years of immunity from naval war; and in the records of Her Majesty's reign, the restoration of the fleet deserves a place of honour.

Much yet remains to be done, but public opinion has been effectually aroused, and the appeal to the national history has by no means spent its force. At no period has the necessity for maintaining naval supremacy been so universally recognised as now, and this recognition, founded on an intellectual basis, will not be easily obscured. Opinion in the Colonies has to some extent followed that of the Mother Country, and time only is needed to give to the naval movement a broadly national character. When once the Navy is everywhere accepted as the force by which alone the Empire can be held together, and in the sufficiency of which every subject of the

Queen is directly interested, the fulfilment of the first condition of Imperial defence will be assured.

The increase of the Navy was accompanied by a Ministerial declaration of policy. It was announced that "our establishment should be on such a scale that it should be at least equal to the naval strength of any two other countries."* No general scheme of defence can, however, be attained without first defining the part to be undertaken by the Navy, and this definition has recently been formulated by the Duke of Devonshire,† speaking as President of the Committee of the Cabinet specially charged with the direction of naval and military policy, We have now, for the first time, an authoritative statement of the cardinal principles of Imperial Defence, and controversy may surely give place to constructive effort.

The terms of the great problem can be stated in a single sentence. It is required to create an organisation by which the unrivalled resources of the Empire may be rapidly and smoothly brought to bear upon the purposes of war. Nothing which forethought can

* Lord G. Hamilton in the House of Commons, 7th March, 1889.

† At the Guildhall, 3rd December. 1896.

suggest, and no preparation which can be made without prejudice to economical conditions, can be safely neglected.

In the past, the Mother Country undertook—and in the main succeeded in securing—the protection of her over-sea possessions. By great wars, the burden of which the United Kingdom is still bearing, the Colonial Empire was established; under the ægis of the flag, its present prosperity has been attained. The time has come for Imperial co-operation in a general scheme of defence framed in accordance with national requirements. Dis-jointed effort, however well intentioned, must necessarily prove alike wasteful and disappointing.

While several Colonies have shown an earnest desire to defend their integrity, the results obtained by large expenditure have not in all cases been satisfactory for want of guiding principles. Advice sought by Colonies has not, for this reason, been always consistent; and quite naturally, the outward and visible signs of defence have usurped undue importance.

The Mills Committee of 1861 drew a distinction between “Colonies proper” and stations “maintained chiefly for

objects of Imperial policy." As regards the former, the Committee considered that, as a rule, "the responsibilities and cost of the military defence of such dependencies ought mainly to devolve upon themselves." Reduction of regular garrisons were, therefore recommended in several cases, and increased Colonial contributions to Army funds were proposed. At the same time the Committee significantly pointed out that it was "desirable . . . to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of the Empire."

The classification of 1861 was premature. Until after the inquiry of Lord Carnarvon's Commission, entered upon eighteen years later, it was impossible to accurately define stations maintained for Imperial purposes. The general principle—that self-governing colonies were to assume the responsibilities of their local defence—appears, however, to have arisen out of the Report of the Mills Committee, and was embodied in a despatch from Lord Cardwell to the Governor of Canada in February, 1869. This responsibility was accepted by the Australasian Colonies on the withdrawal of the regular

troops in 1870; and Natal, on receiving responsible government in 1893, was informed that a similar withdrawal would take place in five years.

Excluding Egypt, the total number of troops maintained in Colonial garrisons at the cost of the United Kingdom is 33,351, distributed as in the following table* :—

TABLE K.

Colony.	Troops. No.	Contributions. £
1. Bermuda	1,605	Nil.
2. Halifax	1,604	„
3. Jamaica	1,620	„
4. Barbados }	1,459	{ „
5. St. Lucia }		
6. Cape }		
7. Natal }	3,669	{ 4,000
8. St. Helena	226	nil.
9. Mauritius	1,076	20,400
10. Sierra Leone	1,063	667
11. Hong Kong	3,047	42,100
12. Straits	1,520	74,200
13. Ceylon	1,669	87,000
14. Gibraltar	4,924	nil.
15. Malta	9,735	5,000
16. Cyprus	134	nil.
Totals	33,351	£233,367†

* Army Estimates 1896-97.

† To this must be added £1,633 from British Honduras.

The total military expenditure of the Colonies for the year ending 31st March, 1860, is stated by the Select Committee to have been £369,224, and although Natal, Hong Kong, and the Straits have since been added to the contributing Colonies, there has been in other cases a reduction of subsidies. Thus, in 1860, the contribution of Ceylon was £97,198; of Mauritius £25,354; and of Malta £6,200; St. Helena expended £482 on local forces; Jamaica £1,637 on "works, barracks, &c.;" and the "Windward and Leeward Islands. with Guiana" £29,279.* In addition to the contributions stated in Table R, the four Colonies of Mauritius, Hong Kong, the Straits and Ceylon have provided a large capital sum in aid of the fortifications and barracks constructed by the Imperial authorities.

Under existing arrangements, therefore, six Crown Colonies contribute annually to Army funds, and of the eleven self-governing Colonies, Natal alone pays a subsidy which will lapse as soon as the regular

* This, however, includes in the case of British Guiana, "the cost of works described as 'sea defences,'" which were probably of a civil character.

troops are withdrawn. Troops are, however, still maintained at the cost of the Mother Country in Canada (Halifax) and at the Cape, and these Colonies, having each an Imperial naval station, do not, like the Australasian group, provide the whole of their local defence. Further, the Mother Country has supplied armaments for the fortified ports of Cape Town, Esquimalt, King George's Sound, and Thursday Island.

In these somewhat complicated arrangements, it is not easy to trace any governing principle; nor, having regard to the varying conditions, does it appear practicable to draw a hard-and-fast distinction between Imperial and Colonial responsibilities in relation to military requirements.

The aggregate annual military expenditure of all the Colonies now exceeds £1,500,000, and has more than quadrupled in the last thirty years. The total Colonial expenditure upon defence within this period has been large. Precise figures are not available, but some of the statistics laid before the Colonial Conference of 1887 deserve to be recalled:—

TABLE S.

Colony.	Total Expenditure.	Period.
	£	
Canada	4,056,783	1872-86
Cape	488,094	1870-86
New South Wales	1,917,896	1876-87
Victoria	1,903,310	1871-67
Queensland	490,169	1869-86
South Australia	515,694	} Since removal of regular Troops.
Tasmania	93,752	
New Zealand	3,468,125	

The above figures show clearly that although, for various reasons, the measure of expenditure has not been proportional to the population of the Colonies, the total effort has been considerable. The self-governing Colonies as a whole have evinced an earnest desire to assume a share of the Imperial burdens. The highest ratio of annual defence expenditure to population is at present that of New South Wales. Of armed forces, these Colonies now maintain more than 70,000, and Newfoundland alone has no military organisation.

The requirements and the responsibilities of Colonies vary widely—Canada, with its long land frontier, and South Africa, being specially circumstanced. The

Canadian force, which contains excellent fighting material, is being entirely re-armed with modern rifles and field guns. The question of the organisation of the South African forces is now under consideration.

Effort has been by no means confined to self-governing Colonies. Most of the other members of the Empire provide local forces — militia, volunteers, or armed police—and since the concentration of the regular troops in the West Indies, Trinidad and British Guiana, left to their own resources, have shown a praiseworthy desire to protect their sea-ports. Barbados has, so far, neglected to make any military preparations, and the resources of Mauritius remain undeveloped. The total armed forces of the Colonies exceed 90,000,* and in addition there must be considerably more than a quarter of a million of men † in Her Majesty's over-sea possessions who have received some measure of military training.

The Colonial military organisations are various, including permanent forces, militia, partially paid volunteers,

* 91,000 for 1891-92.—*The Army Book*. Some reductions have since taken place in Australia.

† 200,000 in Canada alone.—*Ibid*.

volunteers, and reserves. Militia laws, a legacy from the period of great wars, still exist in several West Indian colonies. Later Colonial Legislation confers large powers of raising men in case of emergency. At the Cape, the Burgher Acts of 1878 and 1884 render all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 50 liable for service. The Canadian Militia Act of 1886 enables the ballot to be applied to men between 18 and 60, if voluntary enlistment fails to furnish the required numbers. The Queensland Defence Forces Act of 1884 imposes military obligations on men between similar age limits, and the Tasmanian Act of 1885 is calculated to provide about 30,000 men in case of necessity.

The available military machinery of Greater Britain is thus extensive in scope, though varied in nature. On account of widely differing conditions, complete uniformity of system, such as that of the present German Empire, is evidently unattainable. It is, however, possible and most desirable to gradually bring about an assimilation of terms of service, and to extend the sphere of action of Colonial forces. The need of a closer connection with the regular Army is apparent, and the outbreak of war

would bring to light many uncertainties and numerous unsettled questions which would gravely impede action.

Organisation for Imperial defence demands that all doubts should be removed, that the functions of Colonial troops should be clearly defined, and that the full measure of their possible activity should be exactly known. Raleigh's words, written to Cecil—"If once we be driven to the defensive, farewell might"—convey a warning far more important now than when they were uttered.

Plans of campaign, as Von Moltke has pointed out, cannot really be framed in times of peace. Of the war of 1870-71 he wrote:—"The advance to the frontier alone was pre-arranged in every detail."* Our preparations can hardly go so far as this; but all that is understood by the term "mobilisation" can at least be fully worked out in advance. Certain contingencies can be provided for, and the means for meeting them may be organised. Finally, each member of the Empire should know what all the others are severally able to undertake, so that an outbreak of war would not be the signal for a flight of telegraphed questions which could not be

* "*The Franco-German War of 1870-71.*"

answered. "On se débrouillera" was the vain hope of the French military authorities in 1870, and we also, at home and in the Colonies, conscious of our national vigour and capacity, are fatally prone to believe that matters will right themselves in some happy fashion when an emergency arises.

Although the measures taken towards the framing of a scheme of Imperial defence have so far been few and ineffectual, the Conference of 1887 marks an important step in advance. For the first time, representatives of most of the Colonies met in Council, and personal discussion replaced official correspondence. The occasion was memorable, and the tone of the debates was eminently worthy of the occasion. Large questions of defence were excluded, but on all sides an earnest desire to uphold the national cause, and to co-operate in national preparations was manifested. The outstanding arrangements for the increase of the Australian squadron, rendered obscure by over-much paper, were quickly brought to a conclusion, and it is significant that the Agreement drafted at the Admiralty was modified on the initiative of the Colonial representatives, so as to comply more

fully with naval requirements.* By this Agreement, the vitally important principle of an obligation on the part of Colonies depending on commerce to contribute to the maintenance of Her Majesty's Navy, obtained, for the first time, practical recognition. The cause of Imperial defence has never received encouragement so direct and so hopeful as that supplied by the patriotic and statesmanlike action of the communities of Australasia. A further important decision was arrived at in regard to the defences of Table Bay, and the fortifications of Thursday Island and King George's Sound were discussed, with the result that the works were, soon afterwards completed.† In a statement which was not submitted for discussion, the President, Sir Henry Holland (now Viscount Knutsford), drew attention to the necessity of assimilating the obligations of the terms of service of

* Article IV. of the draft Agreement restricted the employment of the new squadron to the limits of the Australian station. The saving clause—"or employed beyond these limits only with the consent of the Colonial Governments"—was added.

† This result was attained by a concession made by the Imperial Government to meet the views of the Colonies personally expressed. Without the agency of the Conference, the question might still remain in abeyance.

Colonial forces, and suggested the following conditions:—

1. To serve at all times for the defence of their Colony.
2. With the assent of the Colonial Government, and in the event of that Government providing the means, to aid Her Majesty in any wars in which she may be engaged.
3. When serving within the Colony, to be subject to Colonial law. When serving with Her Majesty's troops beyond the Colony, to be subject to the Army Act and the Queen's Regulations.
4. In such a case the command to be vested in the officer commanding Her Majesty's troops.

While the memorable Conference of 1887 thus led to direct results—to the removal of misunderstandings, and to the establishment of closer relations between the statesmen of Great and Greater Britain—the indirect gain was peculiarly important. It was conclusively proved that Imperial questions could be smoothly and effectively dealt with in Council, and that a method of guiding Imperial affairs to a mutually satisfactory settlement—

a method previously neglected—was at the disposal of H.M. Government.

“The maintenance of sea supremacy,” recently stated the Duke of Devonshire,* “has been assumed as the basis of the system of Imperial defence against attack from over the sea. This is the determining factor in shaping the whole defensive policy of the Empire, and is fully recognised by the Admiralty, who have accepted the responsibility of protecting all British territory abroad against organised invasion from the sea.” This “basis” or “determining factor,” frequently asserted by individual writers, has never before received the authority of the Cabinet. It was, however, clearly laid down in memoranda drawn up by the Colonial Defence Committee in 1890, and forwarded by the Secretary of State to the Australasian and West Indian Colonies respectively. The principle thus publicly applied more than six years ago to the two groups in question has now been authoritatively extended to the Empire as a whole; and it has, therefore, become possible to trace the general outlines of Imperial defence with a measure of certitude

* At the Guildhall, December 3rd, 1896.

which could not be claimed for any statement of private opinion.

Strategically the Navy has been constituted the defensive force of the whole Empire. To the Admiralty is allotted the responsibility for preventing the "organised invasion" by sea-borne expeditions of Her Majesty's wide-spread dominions. This *rôle* the Navy has always played in the past; to this *rôle*, its strength is to be proportioned in the future. Closely allied to this great duty is that of protecting the movement of commerce at sea. If the Navy failed in the discharge of the first, the second would become impossible. On the other hand, as was shown after Trafalgar, territorial security does not necessarily imply that of unarmed merchant vessels; and although a steam mercantile marine is far more easily protected than one moved by the winds, special measures in war, and special preparations in peace are alike required to ensure its safety. To accomplish the first duty is to obtain the command of the sea, which, if rigorously maintained, will tend to the full accomplishment of the second. The command of the sea is then said to be absolute, as was the case during the

Crimean War, and as would soon be the case in a single-handed contest between France and Germany. In order to facilitate or to hasten the assertion of absolute command, offensive military operations, analagous to the attack on Mauritius in 1810, against the over-sea possessions of an enemy, may be necessary. If the Navy is successful in its first *rôle*, such operations will always be possible.

The duties of the Navy in war may, therefore, be comprehensively defined as the guardianship of the sea communications of the Empire. It is for this reason that the Navy is strategically a defensive force. Such defence, however, entails the assumption, as in 1803, of a tactical offensive on the outbreak of war. The Navy must be enabled to be true to its own glorious traditions, to maintain touch with an enemy's squadrons, and to court and force on actions if they quit the shelter of their ports. The responsibility for maintaining the fleet at a standard of strength sufficing for the above purposes rests with H.M. Government, by whom it has been publicly accepted.

Evasions by an enemy may occur now as formerly,

although they are distinctly more difficult than in sailing days; but an escaped squadron, with a British force bent on action following in its tracks, is—except in peace manœuvres—powerless for aggression. The lesson of Lissa will not be easily forgotten.

It follows from the above that the Navy is in the highest sense a national force. Upon its sufficiency and efficiency the territorial security of all such portions of the Empire as are assailable only by a sea-borne enemy ultimately depends. In its guardianship every subject of the Queen whose welfare has a commercial basis is directly interested. By its action alone can the Imperial fabric be held together in war. Should it fail, all other elements of force will be fettered; if it succeeds, immense resources become available for upholding the national cause. That “sea supremacy” should be regarded as the “determining factor” of Imperial policy is therefore, an absolute necessity.

The free action of the Navy in war depends upon coal supply, and what Burke termed “convenience of ports.” Both are available in every part of the world to an unrivalled extent; and can be effectively protected

only by the maintenance of "sea supremacy." The command of the sea, which the Admiralty has now guaranteed, will not, however, avert the possibility of the "predatory raids of hostile cruisers,"* and a defenceless port may not only provide sorely-needed coal for an enemy's vessels, but may witness the destruction of shipping and of resources private and national. Such "raids" are most likely to occur at the outset of war, and to be directed against ports at moderate distances from an enemy's naval bases. "It is in the highest degree improbable that this raiding attack would be made by more than a few ships, nor could it be of any permanent effect unless troops could be landed."†

All ports, such as those defined by Lord Carnarvon's Commission, which are needed for strategic purposes, must, therefore, be provided with defence. Other ports, also, where valuable shipping is likely to accumulate, or where a wealth of private resources may tempt the predatory raider, deserve consideration. In the protection of strategic ports, the entire maritime interests of the

* Speech of the Duke of Devonshire.

† Ibid.

nation are directly concerned; since such ports are needed to supply motive power and means of repair to H. M. ships engaged in guarding the sea communications of the Empire. The defence of other Colonial ports is generally a matter of local rather than public interest, although it is evident that the denial to an enemy's cruisers of any convenient harbour, especially those in which coal is to be found, is an indirect Imperial advantage.

The fortresses, coaling stations, and defended ports of the Empire are shown in Chart I, their classifications being indicated by symbols. Gibraltar, Malta, Bermuda, and Halifax are officially known as fortresses; to the two first named the title is perhaps applicable. Bermuda and Halifax are, however, simply coaling and refitting stations of less importance in the present day than the Cape, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

The protection of a port has two elements—mobile force and fixed defences. The former, which is commonly neglected, is by far the most important. In order to effect material damage, or to obtain coal, it will usually be necessary to land men, who cannot be numerous, and who, as has frequently happened, may be disastrously

defeated by well-handled troops on shore. Fixed defences consist of coast artillery and submarine mines—the latter being generally unsuited to the requirements of a Power which, for very life, must keep its ports open in war. Coast defence guns are provided to keep an enemy's ships at a distance. They need not be either numerous or of great power, but the men who serve them should be well trained and ready in all respects for instant action in the event of war. It is in the early stage of hostilities that "the predatory raids of hostile cruisers" on outlying British ports should be regarded as probable. Fixed defences are, however, distinctly subordinate to field forces; since, as has now been authoritatively stated: "Troops without works may defeat an enemy and frustrate his objects. Works without troops are useless and delusive."

The measure of defence of an Imperial port necessarily depends on its proximity to the bases from which raiding cruisers may operate. Some ports are almost beyond the limits of a reasonably probable raid; others lie at short striking distance from the bases of possible enemies, and if undefended, would be imperilled. Similarly, certain ports

require special measures of protection against torpedo-boat attack, while in others such protection is superfluous. In all cases, however, the standard of the fixed defences and of the sedentary portions of the garrisons may be strictly moderate. To adopt any other view is to ignore the accepted "basis" of Imperial policy. Local organisation, such that all necessary preparations are provided for, and that everyone knows exactly what is required of him on the outbreak of war, is the first essential. Exaggerated defences, undermanned and unready, are a costly incubus in peace and an absolute delusion in war.

The protection of British territory against "organised invasion" by sea-borne forces has now been undertaken by the Navy, which has discharged this function throughout our history. At home, however, as abroad, raids must be taken into consideration; and on account of the proximity of large military resources, and of possible bases of attack, it is clear that such raids may be of a more formidable nature than those which could be directed against distant coaling stations.

In the event of a war with France it is certain that

our neighbours would at once bring immense bodies of troops to the shores of the Channel. "Only think," wrote Keppel to Saumarez at the end of the last century, "what alarms we shall have, and how much our cruising will be interrupted if any more invasions are trumped up, which they will be in the winter, so that their Martinico ships may pass safe." The policy of endeavouring to work upon the fears of the home population in order to hamper our naval action was not markedly successful; but it would unquestionably be repeated, and it is a factor which cannot be left out of account.

The necessary measures of precaution are of two kinds—field troops and sedentary forces at certain fortified ports; the former, which are incomparably the most important, have been too much neglected. The ancient militia force of this country, if properly nurtured, is fully capable of furnishing a large mobile force to supplement the regular Army; as is proved by its own history, as well as by the cheap and excellent system of Switzerland. Volunteers, if embodied and subjected to continuous training, could be in a few months brought up to a reasonable standard of efficiency, and there remains in

addition a large number of men who have borne arms and received some measure of military training.

To provide the necessary field force for home defence is mainly a question of organising the large available material. As has been recently pointed out by a correspondent of the *Times*, such a force should be distributed on the outbreak of war at points conveniently situated from which it can be rapidly brought against any attempted landing. The general object should be that a body of troops complete in all arms should be available at a threatened point within a few hours, to be quickly followed by other forces if required. The immense railway system of this country, well managed and admirably equipped, confers advantages in opposing a landing which were unknown at the beginning of the century. It remains to profit by these advantages.

The subordinate requirement of sedentary garrisons is easily fulfilled. By a process of long accumulation, the number of guns mounted for the defence of some of the home ports is in excess of any possible usefulness. At each port, a few guns only should be permanently manned and ready at all times for instant action.

The rest can be left to local artillery Militia, who can be annually trained and told off individually to their war duties. Militia detachments, aided by a permanent nucleus of the Royal Artillery, can be made to meet all needs; and every man would have knowledge of his gun and its accessories, such as is not always attainable by regular troops constantly moved from one station to another. Local Volunteers can supply the infantry force to be retained at the fortified ports, leaving the whole Militia infantry available for the field army, which is the main element of such defence as is required to meet, or to avert, raids directed against the United Kingdom.

The defence of India is a purely military question; but the solution is possible only on condition of "sea supremacy." The frontier of India is one of the strongest in the world, and the Army—local as well as British—was never so efficient as now. So long as internal tranquility is assured, no real danger threatens from without. The inhospitable regions to the North and North-west will not at present support large armies, and the activities of Russia have abundant scope in other directions. In

the future the conditions may possibly be modified to the disadvantage of British power; but for the moment the strength of our strategic position is enormous.

The most important military requirement of the Empire remains to be noticed. The corollary of naval supremacy is the power to strike. The potentiality of the Navy ends with an enemy's coast line—practically with the three-mile limit, since our admirals will certainly decline to commit British ships to the direct attack of fortified ports. Such attacks were shunned by Nelson. "The general then said," he wrote to Hood,* "why could not ships be laid against the walls?† I took the liberty of observing that the business of laying wood before walls was much altered of late; and that even if they had no hot shot, which I believe they had, that the quantity of powder and shot which would be fired away on such an attack could be much better directed from a battery on shore."

The "business" of direct attacks by ships on coast defences has undergone many further changes since Nelson's day, and the greater part of the warships of

* 20th July, 1794.

† Of the poorly fortified port of Calvi.

the world are now incapable of engaging guns on shore except at grave disadvantage. The experience gained at Alexandria in 1882, if properly understood, teaches a lesson which may not be disregarded. The Chilian Congressionalist navy, in absolute command of the sea, wisely made no attempt upon Valparaiso. As wisely, the Japanese refrained from risking their ships against the guns of Port Arthur and Wei-hai-Wei. In both cases the opinion of Nelson, expressed to General Stuart, was strictly followed with successful results.

Purely naval attacks on fortified ports—excessively rare on the part of our admirals in days when British supremacy at sea was unchallenged—are now most improbable. It is the true function of the Navy to fix the frontier beyond which the Army alone can operate with effect. For this reason the Army always has been and always must be the real offensive force of the Empire, although this cardinal principle has been almost forgotten.

There is, for Great Britain, practically no means of bringing war to an honourable conclusion, or of obtaining solid guarantees of future security, except by the employment of military forces for offensive purposes. And

further, there comes a point at which it is always more economical and more effective to capture than to blockade or observe an enemy's fortified harbour by a squadron. The home ports of all great Powers are now securely guarded against such a contingency, not by their fortifications, but by the large field forces immediately available. This is not, and cannot be, the case with isolated ports over-sea. Here, as frequently in the past, it may be necessary to strike, and the blow can be delivered only by military forces. These important considerations were clearly stated by the Colonial Defence Committee, in a memorandum,* in which the following passage occurs:—

The Colonial Defence Committee desire to point out that the *rôle* which the Australian Colonies will probably play in the event of war, is not likely to be limited to the passive defence of ports little liable to attack. These Colonies will doubtless desire that solid guarantees for future security should be taken, and it is evidently essential to success in this sense that their land forces should be organised on a common basis, so as to be capable of being brought together for concerted action. The possibility of being able to take a vigorous offensive at the outset of war against points which might subsequently prove menacing would be a strategic advantage of the first importance.

* 19th May, 1890.

Addressed only to the Australian Colonies, these words apply to the whole Empire. At no period of our history have fortifications and passive defence been great national requirements; at many periods, field forces have been sorely needed. It is now more than ever essential that we should possess ample striking power. To be ready to strike is the first condition with which the regular Army, as well as Colonial troops, should prepare to comply, and if this condition is fulfilled, the rest follows.

Measures of passive defence may almost be left to take care of themselves.

Besides the long land frontier of India, that of Canada falls within the scope of Imperial defence. This frontier is secure against violation by all European powers, and is shared by a people bound to us by ties of kinship, of mutual regard, and of commercial interdependence such as exist between no other nations. If the Treaty recently signed had become an accomplished fact, it would have brought the Anglo-Saxon peoples into new and special relations. We might then have fairly hoped that the time would come when each could forego all considerations of defence against the other. To both security of maritime

transit is the greatest of interests. United, the Anglo-Saxon race could decree peace on the seas. In any case, however, the protection of the long Canadian frontier is a question of mobile forces, and will be provided for if the main military requirement of the Empire is fulfilled.

The essence of Imperial defence is, therefore, military force set free to operate by a navy securely holding its sea communications. Utilising the unrivalled powers of ocean transport at our disposal, we must prepare to strike as soon as the Navy has asserted its traditional supremacy.

While, therefore, military effort may be decentralised, and expeditionary forces may, as in past wars, be organised out of diverse components, and despatched from distant Imperial ports, the homogeneity of the Navy must be absolute, and its general direction must be centred in the Board of Admiralty. This point has been well stated by the *Cape Times* in the following words:—

“ We want to strengthen the fleet, not to split it up and distract its forces. The ideal of the immediate future is not a network of petty Colonial fleets, which might be chaffering about differences of opinion in the face of the Mede, like the auxiliary ships of Athens before Salamis. The ideal is that while the central power keeps, as keep it must for many a long day, the

responsibility for the defence of the Empire, and wields as with one brain and one arm the great weapon which secures this, the scattered parts that depend on this protection should care also to help with the cost."

A Navy able to hold the sea communications, prohibit the transport of organised invading forces, and protect adequately the commercial marine; field troops to strike an enemy's over-sea possessions, to reinforce the Army of India, and locally to oppose small forces landed from predatory cruisers; moderate fixed defences to keep hostile raiding ships at a distance, and to deny to them the use of convenient ports—such, in order of importance, are the requirements of Imperial defence. If these requirements are met, there will be ample provision for the small wars which unfortunately appear to be necessary at brief intervals.

The "basis"—"sea-supremacy"—has already been authoritatively laid down. Further definition is, however, urgently needed, in order that national effort may be consistently directed to specific objects.

If, therefore, the principles above enunciated are questioned, let others, which will receive general acceptance, be formulated. Agreement is an essential condition of united action, whether in measures of preparation or

under the strain of war. Such agreement has been attained by all great Powers, and forms the foundation of their policy. With the members of the British Empire scattered over the world, unanimity of opinion is peculiarly important. We cannot discuss first principles when war has broken out; we have no right, in peace time, to squander our resources and enfeeble our strength for want of clearly-defined lines of action.

In attempting to trace the outlines of a system of Imperial defence, it is necessary to assume certain principles, failing which a blurred and unintelligible picture must result. The following pages are, therefore, based upon what has preceded, and carry only the weight of an individual opinion, arrived at after much thought and study.

The Navy is the one force in which every member of the Imperial family is directly and immediately interested. By its agency all the members are linked together; to all alike it is the primary guarantee of territorial security, of peace and of prosperity. Thus, pre-eminently and in the broadest sense, the Navy is the one distinctly national force in the maintenance of which every Colony

should participate. An example has been already set by the Australasian Colonies, who contribute directly to naval funds on conditions laid down at the Conference of 1887. No step could have been wiser, and an expenditure fourfold the amount of the present subsidy spent locally could not have provided equal protection to Australasian interests. It is, however, on the action of the Navy as a whole that the protection of commerce depends, and a local squadron can at best secure the arrival and departure of shipping which must in a few days pass outside its *rayon*. Similarly, the territorial safety of Australasia rests mainly upon other squadrons maintained by the Mother Country in far distant waters. The renewal of the naval agreement, which will lapse this year, is therefore of far more than local importance. It lies with the Australasian colonies to lead the way in establishing the Navy on a national basis, and thus fulfilling the first condition of Imperial defence. There is little doubt that, if tactfully approached, these great communities will rise to the opportunity offered.

Comparisons of the defence expenditure per head of

the Colonies and the Mother Country are misleading where economic conditions widely differ. Contributions to the national Navy might, however, be based upon population, revenue, or, more logically, upon a quinquennial average of sea-borne imports and exports. The actual amount in the first instance is of far less importance than the establishment of the principle of partnership in upholding the national force. The military contributions of all Crown Colonies would cease with evident advantage. They cannot be equitably determined, and they involve undesirable disputes.

Fortified ports in self-governing colonies should be maintained and garrisoned at Colonial expense. Where, however, such a port is maintained for general Imperial purposes, assistance should be granted until the resources of the Colony permit its withdrawal. Thus at Halifax the infantry garrison might before long be provided by the Dominion, the United Kingdom continuing to supply the artillery till a later period. This artillery force, which consists of about 360 men, might probably be recruited in the Dominion with great advantage. It is commonly forgotten that in 1858, when the population of Canada

was relatively small, 1,200 men were recruited in four months to form a British regiment.

Already the Australasian Colonies maintain and garrison all their defended ports, armaments for Thursday Island and King George's Sound only having been provided by the home Government. Natal also has fortified the port of Durban, and maintains a force of nearly 800 men. Where, as at the Cape, a naval port (Simons Bay) and a fortified commercial harbour (Table Bay) are both provided, the former should be maintained by the Mother Country and the latter by the Colony. At present the Colonial Government has only provided the cost of the defences of Table Bay; the entire armament has been a charge upon the Mother Country, which also supplies the artillery garrison. With the development of the Colony, this arrangement should be modified. Regular troops maintained in the Cape Peninsula for purposes of Imperial defence should, as now, be supplied from and paid for by the United Kingdom. If, in time, the conditions of the Colony permit any part of this force to be locally recruited, the advantage would be considerable.

Coaling stations in Crown Colonies should be maintained entirely by the Mother Country, the money contribution of such colonies being appropriated solely to the purposes of the Navy. In Ceylon, both Trincomalee and Colombo are defended, the first being regarded specially in the light of a naval station. If, however, Colombo is necessary for Imperial purposes in war, no distinction should be drawn.

There remain other ports where protection is desirable, either as security to Colonial and private property against a raid, or in order to deny convenient places of shelter to an enemy's cruisers. Such cases should always be dealt with by Colonial means; but, in Crown Colonies, aid in arms should be freely given where the revenue is small, on condition that an effective local force is maintained. The extremely moderate defence required "need entail no heavy burden upon a Colony, and where any fighting spirit exists, it should be encouraged by every possible means. A Colony without organisation for defence is liable to insult and material loss in the event of war at the hands of even a boat's crew of armed and organised men. If mode-

rate and inexpensive measures be taken, if a complete local organisation exists, and if the manhood of the Colony be actuated by a determined spirit of self-defence, insult and loss will be effectually prevented."*

The above definitions of Colonial and Imperial responsibilities in regard to fortified ports have been in part adopted, although not authoritatively formulated as general principles of Imperial defence; nor is their full application at present possible. We cannot at once expect all self-governing Colonies to assume entire charge of their local measures of protection, as is practically the case throughout Australasia, and the ideal of a national Navy remains to be realised. Much, however, has been accomplished, and there are grounds for hope that, as a wider understanding of Imperial requirements is attained, so will a desirable decentralisation of responsibility be accomplished.

The greatest military need of the Empire in war will be forces available for field service. It is only in peace time that measures of passive defence usurp undue importance. Even in making provision for the local pro-

* Memorandum by Colonial Defence Committee, dated 14th July, 1890.

tection of coaling stations and commercial harbours, mobile troops are the principal element. The supply and maintenance of regular troops from Great Britain for garrison purposes abroad is not only very costly, but from the Imperial point of view presents drawbacks. The constant drain upon the battalions at home renders them unfit for immediate use in the field. On all grounds, the development and the increase of efficiency of local forces is to be desired. The difficulty and complication of the supply of troops for India and the Colonies have naturally induced a marked concentration of thought upon the regular Army. Thus the ancient constitutional force of Militia, which before 1689 mainly fought the battles of England, which in later wars supplied invaluable aid, and which now furnishes a large annual contingent to the ranks, has been too much neglected. Even more naturally Colonial forces have grown up all over the world with scant recognition and little direct encouragement till recent years. To bring these forces into touch with the Army, and to assign their place in Imperial defence, would be a national gain. Diversity of conditions of service, unequal efficiency, and a nar-

rowly restricted military horizon, combine to reduce the value for purposes of war of Colonial forces. Their primary duty may be the defence of their soil, but "organised invasion" can be effectively prevented only by the Navy, to whom this responsibility is now formally allotted. The "predatory raids of hostile cruisers" have in some cases to be guarded against, but in other cases they are improbable; and as the power of the Navy is gradually asserted, they will tend to become impracticable. The protection of an individual port is not, however, the only function which Colonial troops can discharge, nor is it thus alone that the requirements of the Empire can be fulfilled; Imperial defence cannot be conducted in piecemeal fashion. It is not an aggregate of scattered States which has to be protected, but a united people linked together by a powerful Navy. Every Colony has a peculiarly direct interest in preventing an enemy from establishing himself in adjacent waters, and in war the need of capturing or neutralising a hostile base would quickly be brought home to every individual dependent on commerce. It will undoubtedly happen that the most important Colonial requirements can best

be fulfilled by military effort outside of home territory. In other words, Imperial defence requires a larger unit than that of the Colony.

No better unit can be suggested than that of the present naval commands, into which all the seas and coast lines of the world are divided. (See Chart I.) Each possesses a complete squadron, ready for instant action, and in each the members of the Empire have special mutual interests. In each also the naval situation must dictate the military measures which may be necessary or practicable. The Naval Commander-in-Chief alone can judge the possibilities of the moment. To support and further his operations will necessarily be the first object.

It follows that all the military forces in each naval command should be available for employment in war within the limits of that command, and this should be regarded as an essential part of their conditions of service. Further, the sphere of preparation and forethought should be extended from the individual Colony to the group into which it would thus fall. The result would be the first commencement of a federation of the Empire

by groups for purposes of defence, and this principle, once established, could be gradually extended.

The elements of Imperial defence would thus comprise :—

1. A national Navy, homogeneous in all respects, and charged with the duty of guarding the sea communications of the Empire.

2. An Army maintained by the Mother Country, and available, as now, for employment in any part of the world.

3. Auxiliary forces, consisting of (*a*) Militia, supplying the bulk of the artillery garrisons of the home ports of the field Army maintained to prevent raids upon our shores; but available to free regular troops in any part of the world, or at need to take part in expeditions abroad. (*b*) Volunteers, supplying the sedentary garrisons of the home ports, and, with the Yeomanry, supplementing the Army; but also available for service, if required, in garrisons abroad.

4. Colonial forces, supplying the garrisons of some ports; but organised for action in any portion of the geographical division formed by the several naval commands.

5. Measures of preparation for meeting all probable

contingencies—such measures being considered in London as regards the Empire as a whole, and locally as regards the geographical limit.

While, therefore, the general administration of the Navy and the Army would necessarily remain centred in the Mother Country, there would in other respects be decentralisation. The group would not, during a temporary interruption of communication, be paralysed for want of knowledge, and uncertain how to act. At the same time, the central authority, having full information of all the pre-arranged measures of group preparation, would not be wholly in the dark as to probable proceedings.

Colonial infantry forces might be numbered throughout the group, placing the territorial title first, as: "5th Victorian Regiment, Australasian Force;" or "10th Trinidad Regiment, North American Force." The precedence would be regulars, militia, and volunteers, as in Great Britain, each ranking next after the corresponding force of the Mother Country.

It would be a great advantage if territorial regiments of the regular Army could be raised in Colonies, and a most gratifying step in this direction has been taken by

the people of Canada. The 100th Prince of Wales' Royal Canadian Regiment was raised in 1858 in the Dominion, and the first public act* of the Prince of Wales was to present colours to this fine battalion, which his Royal Highness stated was "the spontaneous offering of the loyal and spirited Canadian people." The "Royal Canadians" have lost their old territorial connection, and have been linked to an Irish battalion, forming the Leinster Regiment. A movement for the repatriation of the Royal Canadians, started in recent years,† has met with a response throughout the length and breadth of the Dominion. Petitions have been everywhere signed, and the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief have signified their readiness "to give favourable consideration to any proposals which may tend to foster the connection between the regular Army and the military forces of Canada, and to further cement the strong feeling already existing between the Mother Country and the Dominion." There are no insuperable

* At Shorncliffe on the 10th January, 1859.

† Largely due to the energy of Captain Brown Wallis, a retired officer of the Royal Canadians.

difficulties in carrying out this measure, beneficial alike to the Army and to the Canadian forces, and constituting an important departure in Imperial defence. If this first step were taken, further results in other great Colonies would in time follow. Already Canada has supplied valuable officers to the Army, and Australasia, when it possesses a military training college, will add to the direct Colonial supply. Meanwhile, the door to recruiting in Colonies should be held wide open, and eligible men from local forces should be accepted in the ranks of regular battalions, or of garrison companies of Royal Artillery serving abroad.

A further important means of raising the efficiency of Colonial troops should be adopted. All the forces in each Imperial group should be annually inspected by an officer of proved capacity. Such inspections have hitherto been irregular, and frequently initiated and paid for by Colonies. The system should be extended and regularised. At Halifax and at the Cape there are Lieut.-Generals with small commands, who could not in peace time render more valuable service than that of inspecting annually the forces of the North American and Cape groups. A

carefully-selected General officer could be annually sent to Australasia, until by means of federation the forces of these seven Colonies are placed under a single head. Defects would thus be pointed out, progress recorded, needs ascertained, information as to the efficiency of local troops rendered available; while, to every member of a Colonial force, the idea of connection with the armed strength of the Empire would be brought home.

The adoption of the naval commands as the geographical units of Imperial defence would lead to a much needed decentralisation of the resources of the Navy. Each unit should be rendered capable of fully supplying its squadron in war. The great resources of the Colonies in excellent material for the creation of naval reserves remain unutilised. The population of Canada alone includes 70,719 seamen and fishermen, of whom 12,650 live on the western coast line,* and both at the Cape and in Australasia it would be possible to organise and train local reserves which would in war be a valuable addition to the *personnel* of the respective squadrons. No other Power possesses this great advantage in equal measure.

* Hon. T. A. Brassey in *the Nineteenth Century*.

Some form of machinery is required to establish and maintain any system of Imperial defence. In most Colonies small committees already exist, and have done useful work in studying local questions and collecting information bearing upon local resources. It is necessary to take a further step in this direction, and to focus the defensive preparations of each Imperial unit. For this purpose a group centre conveniently situated in regard to communications should be selected. Singapore, Sydney, Cape Town, and Halifax suggest themselves; the West Indies might possibly form a separate group, with a centre at Kingston or Port Castries. At these centres, representatives from all Colonies possessing means of defence would meet annually. Here all questions of preparation affecting the unit could be discussed. The time of meetings could be so arranged that the naval Commander-in-Chief, or a representative delegated by him, could be present. A permanent secretary and well-kept records are essential. The group committee would watch over the defence measures of all affiliated Colonies, taking note of change, improvement, and backsliding. It would

consider the means of meeting such contingencies as appear probable. It would seek to promote progress on definite principles throughout the unit, pointing out instances of aberration, and endeavouring to secure harmonious effort. The question of maintaining communication throughout the group will be of extreme importance in war. The committee would study the probable points of vulnerability of telegraph cables, and concert means for their restoration if cut, or for providing temporary steam communication to bridge a gap. (See Chart II.) Cables can be grappled and cut at depths up to at least 2,700 fathoms; but, except in fairly shoal waters, specially fitted vessels are required for the purpose, and the operation of finding a cable may entail much time. A general protection of cables following trade routes which will be used in war would, therefore, be provided by the Navy. On the other hand, cables can be easily found near their landing-places; or telegraph offices, if unguarded, might be destroyed by sending a few men on shore. In this case, however, restoration, if the means are available, should be a simple matter. All these questions should be considered by the

group committee, and such preparations as are possible to prevent sustained interruption should be decided upon. It is dangerous to leave such questions to be dealt with when the emergency arises; and it is most unwise to assume that all individuals are alike capable of solving difficulties, and of taking the responsibilities of a bold initiative on the spur of the moment. Finally, the unit centre would be a permanent repository of intelligence in peace and in war. Intelligence departments in London, however perfectly equipped, cannot on the outbreak of war disseminate needed information throughout the Empire. In each geographical unit, all such information as will probably be of value should be ready stored. All local committees should be in full touch through the Colonial Office with the Colonial Defence Committee in London, of which every Agent-General should be an *ex officio* member. The machinery of Imperial defence would be completed by conferences held in London every five years, to which each colony might send a representative.

Nearly ten years have passed since the first and most successful Conference was held. No period could be more auspicious for again taking the Colonies into council

than this sixtieth year of the beneficent reign of the Queen. Throughout the Empire, there is a desire for closer union and for the strength which national organisation can alone confer. The unique opportunity offered by the approaching visit of the Colonial Premiers can be turned to account for the accomplishment of a real Imperial advance. Many outstanding questions may thus be settled, but more is needed. Can the Navy be now nationalised? What permanent machinery can be devised for bringing the national preparations into full harmony, and for enabling the immense resources of the Empire to be smoothly and swiftly applied to meet the needs of war? These are the great issues which might be discussed this year, and although a complete solution may not at once be attained, it is at least possible to lay securely the foundations of Imperial defence. "We are all sensible," said Lord Salisbury at the Conference of 1887, "that this meeting is the beginning of a state of things which is to have great results in the future." This forecast may easily be realised, but the initiative must come from the Mother Country.

The scheme above presented in outline lies open to

the criticism that executive power is wanting to the group committees. The first necessary steps are, however, the diffusion of information and the local study of local needs. To decide what ought to be done under given circumstances and with given resources, would be a substantial advantage. To ensure that, within the geographical unit, each Colony was aware what pre-arranged measures were being taken by all the others would create a sense of mutual reliance. The assimilation of military ordinances and conditions of service would be a distinct gain. Motive power would be supplied by the quinquennial Conferences, by which all great questions requiring action on the part of Colonial Governments would be brought to a settlement. Finally, in this scheme lie the germs of a real federation for purposes of defence, and of an closer political union in the future.

Already in Australia the federal idea seems to be within reach. Canada supplies an instance of a federation which has unquestionably added to her prosperity. In the West Indies, it has been proposed that the armed police should be organised on a uniform basis and ren-

dered interchangeable between the islands. If, in South Africa, the prospects of federal union appear less hopeful than elsewhere, it is to be remembered that events move rapidly in this important part of the Empire, and that community of interests is a powerful agent in reconciling differences, however arising.

The drawing together of the members of the Empire for purposes of defence would lead to far-reaching results. Commercial union, even some measure of political union, would thus be brought within a measurable distance. A great stimulus would be given to sentiment—now more than ever the most potent factor in determining the destinies of nations. At the same time, the consciousness of strength, visible and acknowledged, would prevent the recurrence of the symptoms of panic which have at some periods brought national discredit, and which, if prolonged, must entail commercial disaster.

The greatest interest of the Empire is peace, "so far as it may be had with conscience and honour."* Despite our history, we are now of all peoples the least likely to provoke a quarrel, and our influence will always

* Cromwell,

be exerted on behalf of the accord of nations. Individual Colonial writers have alluded to the risks which they assume to be involved in the Imperial connection, strangely forgetting the vastly greater risks which would confront weak isolated communities at a time when expansion appears to be an ardent object of desire to at least two great Powers. The conquest of Madagascar is a difficult operation compared with that of most British Colonies if left alone face to face with the armed forces of a Continental state. Such writers also dwell upon the liability of Colonies to become involved in wars waged for objects with which they have no concern, and arising from causes over which they have no control. It is true that no one has yet devised a practicable scheme of Colonial representation in the management of Imperial affairs. Nor could such a scheme be adopted until the burden of defensive measures is borne by every member of the Empire in approximate proportion to its resources. Many years must elapse before this condition can be fulfilled, since young communities, actively engaged in developing great territories cannot possibly be expected to devote to naval and military purposes so large a

proportion of their revenues as the Mother Country thus expends. All that we can at present hope for is the practical recognition of the Navy as the distinctively national weapon of defence, and the progressive improvement of Colonial forces under a comprehensive scheme of national organisation.

The philosophic historian of the latter half of this century will, however, discern the growing influence of Colonies upon the Mother Country. If not directly represented in her Councils, the great offshoots nevertheless powerfully react upon her whole policy. Weighted with new responsibilities, she will never repeat the high-handed proceedings which characterised some periods of her history. The wars of England up to 1756 may be said to have arisen out of island policy—or impolicy. From 1756 to 1815 the contest was for Colonial dominion, and the future Empire hung upon the issue. Now, it is as an Imperial Power that Great Britain arouses the jealousy and incurs the dislike of other nations. The clashing of international interests and ambition, which is generally the direct cause of war, is now more likely to arise out of some Colonial question than any other.

While the home Government is and must long remain the custodian of the national honour, it is certain that strong Colonial sentiment will never be disregarded. If we are compelled to take up arms, the cause will be one which commands the sympathy of our brothers across the sea. We shall never impose sacrifices upon them for objects that are either trivial or unworthy, and when the time of trial comes, we count upon their full support. There has of late been no difficulty, no menace, which has not called forth spontaneous offers of aid from all parts of the Empire, and at no period has the loyalty of Colonies been so marked and so outspoken as in recent years.

In proportion to the national strength are the hopes of peace. There are no signs of failing vigour; in population and in resources, the Empire is still rapidly growing; organisation alone lags behind Imperial requirements. The task is not easy, but the way is plain, and the principles of Imperial defence are indelibly stamped upon the pages of our long history. Naval supremacy—the first condition of national security—is now better understood than at any period during the reign of Her Majesty, and there

has been a happy revival of old traditions half forgotten by generations which have not known naval war.

Much still remains to be accomplished, and no nobler task awaits the touch of a great statesman's hand than that of drawing close the many ties which bind, but do not fetter the members of the Empire. United and prepared at all points for the needs of war, we can face the unknown future with equanimity. It is the object of Imperial defence to insure that we may be able to hand down to our successors, untarnished in honour and intact in territory, the splendid inheritance that we have received from our fathers.

ERRATA.

Page 57, line 6 from top—for “five months’ consumption” read “four months’ consumption.”

Page 159, line 7 from top—for “the Army was neglected” read “the Army and Navy were neglected.”

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